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4ABSTRACT
An initial attempt is made to draw connections between politics
and education. A paradox exists in finding education ultimately
dependent upon social and political values. The paradox i. that
as a result of a drastic revision of the concept of liberal
èemocracy much more can be said about education than was previously
possible in its treatment as a self—contained concept. Liberal
democracy is essentially a hybrid of two rival value constellations,
market and moral democracy.
In the second chapter different varieties of market democracy
are considered as diverse as elitism and economic democracy.
No variant of market democracy entails the intention to educate
critical citizens, merely an acquiescence in socialization and
training.
The third chapter expounds the moral conception of democracy.
Thinkers from the Levellere to Green are exiiined in the cause of
elucidating this concept. The latter entails the educational aim
of a critical citizen.
The educational implications of market democracy are developed
in chapter four. For the majority of the population material for
reflecting upon the values and institutions of society, and diverse
forms of life, will be absent from the formal curriculum, either
because such material is the province of an elite, or because
short—run individual utility i. considered the only u.erthvhile goal.
In chapter five a connection is established between moral
democracy and the disciplines traditionally thought to be
'intrinsically' worthwhile, on the basis of the opportunities
and encouragement the latter provide for reflection upon different
forms of life and the critical assessment of institutions and
values in society. Adlitionally the drastic curriculum changes
5which foll.ir frog
 a participatory democracy are also era.ined,
Finally the fundamental Importance .f the moral conception of
democracy for the justification and continuation of liberal
democracy is noted. This suggests the moral aim must have priority
in relation to educational aims and curricula content in a liberal
democracy.
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7haj,ter I - Introduction
i. Education, politics, and democracy
The traditional divide between liberal and totalitarian
democracy has resulted largely in a state of acquiescence in the
philosophy of education, in a paradigm of liberal democracy now
dangerously redundant. Just as totalitarianism outdates Aristotelian
classification of government, so it is also true that the notion of
liberal democracy is itself outdated. This is not to say that a
contrast still cannot be drawn between liberal democracy and
totalitarianism. It is rather that developnents within liberal
democracy, occurring to some extent as a result of alarm at the
phenomenon of totalitarianism, have produced divisions so great as
to amount to rival conceptions of democracy. If, however,
philosophers writing about education continue to defer only to the
traditional liberal democratic paradigm then the implications of
these rival conceptions of democracy for education are entirely
missed.
As long as liberal democracy is expounded in the light of a
contrast with totalitarianism, it appears a coherent whole, and of
considerable significance. In such a frame of reference the existence
of multi—party systems, secret ballots, independent judiciaries, and
quinquennial parliaments appears to be quintessential of liberal
democracy. If however one abandons this polarisation of liberal
democracy and instead focuses attention upon constellations of values
within liberal democracy, a marked rivalry between these sets becomes
apparent. The most concrete manifestation of these competing models
of democracy is to be found in the preoccupation with controlling
the political activity and behavioi r of the vast majority of the
population. These rival constellations have been endemic in
8political philosophy and ethics for a long period of time, (1)
but have developed both momentum and sOphi8ticatiOn in recent years.
I shall seek to argue in particular for two conceptions of democracy,
which I label moral and market theories of democracy. The
distinction is novel insofar as it has not been acknowledged
previously by philosophers of education, (2) To the extent that
the concept of democracy has figured at all in education, and
arguably it has not figured very much, the discussion proceeds for
the most part as if democracy was an unproblematic concept. (3)
Now if one does concentrate on the institutions and procedural
principles of liberal denocracy and compares them with totalitarianism,
then indeed liberal democracy appears unproblematic. For the rival
schemes of democracy I shall identify would all want to endorse
regular and supervised elections, independent judiciaries, and an
uncensored press. Yet only in the case of what I term moral
democracy, do the values actually provide a firm measure of support
to such institutions. If these rival conceptions of democracy exist,
as I contend they do, then liberal democracy is essentially a hybrid,
tenable as long as it is contrasted with totalitariansim, and because
of the underpinning provided by the moral conception of democracy.
I shall discuss the different strands within the market and
moral conceptions of democracy and their implications for education.
It will be argued that moral democracy is a preferable conception
to market democracy, and its implications for education will be
established.
My preliminary considerations in this introductory chapter
relate to problems in defining democracy, and also to making general
points about the link between democracy and education. This enables
my positive thesis to be developed in subsequent chapters.
9Any attempt at an analysis of the concept of democracy faces
formidable problems, particularly if it is conducted with an eye to
its relationship to education. That there are empirical connections
between democracy and education is true, but for philosophy
unremarkable. In particular, such connections are found, on
examination, to be in the nature of a functional relationship, such
that the higher the general level of education within a society, the
greater the probability that it will be a democratic society. ('i)
The social scientific problems immanent in such an analysis, such
as the matter of the direction of causality, are not my immediate
concern. 1hat I do wish to point out is that however strong the
probability of the above hypothesis, its primary interest is in the
conditions for the existence and. continuance of democracy, and not
in the meaning of democracy.
I regard it as the business of philosophers in this sphere to
be essentially concerned in elucidating conceptual connections,
leaving empirical issues to sociologists and psychologists; that
for example empirical issues are not as value free as the latter
claim. This activity is of good philosophical vintage.
Nonetheless in elucidating the concepts of democracy and
education, philosophers are bound to pay some attention to
institutional and empirical features. Some statements may arise
which though normative, are also sensitive to empirical considerations.
For example political equality might be deemed a necessary condition
of democracy. Beyond political equality as a value there is the
further consideration of what institutional arrangements are
empirically necessary and what arrangements might be merely contingent
in realizing that value. (5) An empirically necessary arrangement
for realizing that value might be universal adult suffrage. Now
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the statement about political equality is sensitive to empirical
considerations to this extent, that if it were the case that a
legislative change occurred whereby only some adults were able to
vote instead of all adults, the latter would, ceterus parabus,
tell against the value, political equality, and indicate that
the term 'democracy' was being incorrectly applied in this case.
Iuiother celebrated example of this problem is that of the
rational, informed citizen, operating through a sovereign legislature,
and postulated to a varied extent in Locke, Rousseau, J.S. Mill, and
Green. Research by political sociologists, together with advances
in psychology, has made the concept of the rational chooser, the
democratic man, and the sovereign legislature, highly disputable
concepts. This of course does not lead an exponent of this view
with no reply, but it does make it incumbent on him to reply. (6)
The above points are related to the tension between the
conceptual and empirical, which also exists in the enterprise of
education. Here the notion of what it is to be educated, and the
values and prescriptions encapsulated by the concept of education,
may be so incommensurate with the end products of that activity,
that there may be pressure for the concept to be revised, or the
suggestion made that the techniques employed in the activity are
gravely at fault. (7) The latter is important. Of course a
determined autocracy can maintain a notion of what it is to be
educated that is applicable only to the members of a stultifying
bureaucracy, but I am concerned here with the relationship between
democracy and education, and in particular with that between
particular conceptions of democracy and education. Ultimately the
view' that one takes off the constraints which democracy imposes on
the notion of what it is to be educated, depends crucially upon
'what sort of democrat one is. This may be tautological, but it
11
is hardly trivial. It may well have appeared trivial when philosophers
of education 'were confident of an agreed democratic paradigm. In general
the latter appears to amount to a belief in the participation by all in
the direction and policies of an institution. Thus liirst* in the Logic
of Education finds it necessary to argue against the "democratization" of
educational institutions on the grounds that the inmates of such
institutions are of too inuature years to qualify as citizens.
Richard Peters ** also considers the contribution which the schools
might make to democracy in terms of learning and practisiug taking part
in democratic discussion. This presupposes that participation has a role
to play in a democracy.
However uncontroversial such points might have appeared, it is part
of the objective of the øecond and third chapters of this thesis to
demonstrate that logically there are in fact great differences between
professing democratic theorists differences not merely of degree but of
values and purposes. The fourth and fifth chapters show that these
differences have important implications for education. It is easy to see
that a democratic elitist (8) could propose a "practical" prograine
consisting of a recondite schooling for a few and a utilitarian workshop
tra1ning for the majority. Such a progranue would be incompatible with
the values of an adherent of the moral conception of democracy, and. also
repugnant.
Of course there are limits beyond which the elitist has to say of a
particular educational ideal, that it is not democratic. One candidate
for this would be the philosophei'-king ideal of Plato. It is not so
much that few could ever attain it as a cognitive achievement, but rather
that it was indissolubly connected with virtue, and thus, correspondingly
fey
 could ever have any authoritative say on the direction in 'which
society should move. The latter is a moral function, and an
educational aim appropriate to the moral conception of democracy,
is one which actively promotes such a function to the vast
majority of the school population.	 A democratic
**	
See Footnotes
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elitist could endorse this position only nominally. The difference
between the platonic philosopher—king and the democratic elitist
is that the latter is supposed to endorse regular electoral choice
between competing elites. (9) I shall argue subsequently that on
this view it is the groups, largely, that make judgements about where
society ought to be going and the electorate which endorses one
path rather than another. If the elitist favours democracy at all,
it is unclear how his restriction on the electorate here can be other
than arbitrary. (10)
Clearly in the most general sense all educational theories may
be construed as political theories. (ii) This is not merely because
the organization of the educational system will be a relevant factor
in the consideration of any ruling elite hypothesis, but also because
the educational system can transmit norms of citizenship, directly
or indirectly, through influencing political attitudes. The merits
of free enterprise and the sanctity of monarchy can be innocuously
conveyed, without any structured approach in the form of the subject
"civics". It may be highly pertinent to a consideration about how
far a particular society is a democratic society, to be aware that
senior civil servants and the cabinet members of the governing party,
though ostensibly performing different tasks in government, went to
the same band of selective schools and share the same attitudes and
beliefs. Such persons, who have attained the pinnacle of the
educational system, may themselves be directly involved in preparing
and influencing policy measures, or framing a criticism of such
measures. In addition, the educational system will form a ladder
of occupational selection and mobility. This may mean, for example,
that high status occupations are open, in the vast majority of cases,
only to those with a private schooling. This leads to issues of
13
how far the society in question is an open society, and also about
how far some occupations are 'political', such as the law, in the
sense of reflecting a particular spectrum of values.
The above points are primarily sociological in so far as they
exhibit links between different sub—systems of society, such as work
and education. However the issues may be of interest to philosophers,
though they may ask different questions. More dramatically, and
of more interest to philosophers, education has figured centrally
in prograimnes to reform and regenerate society. For Rousseau, (12)
education was the means of both regenerating and reproofing man
against the corruption of societal institutions. For Plato,
education was the vehicle for perpetuating the status quo, via
selection and stratification. In totalitarian societies, education
has been the means for the infusion of loyalty to the norms of the
party, and in capitalist democracies, the indirect means for sustaining
civic attitudes and loyalties, and economic and political viewpoints.
1hilst these points indicate in a very general way that the
educational system can fulfil certain functions within society, such
as providing a means for social mobility, I am concerned with the
nature of the connection, if any, between the political system and
the educational system, primarily from the point of view of
philosophical entailment. That given a particular conception of
democracy certain implications necessarily follow for education. (13)
It seems necessary before making some observations about
conceptual features of democracy to pay some attention to changes
in modes of doing philosophy. Political philosophy has seen a
considerable undulation in its fortunes since Plato. For my purposes
note ought to be taken of the affinity between "grand design" political
philosophy of Plato and Rousseau, and the rebirth of political
1philosophy under Nozick and Bawls. Prior to logical positivism,
the notion of philosophers Baying something, not merely about what
it was to know something, or what was entailed in saying that something
was good or right, but also about the implications of the latter
considerations for how societies ought to be governed and organized,
was acceptable. The merit of this grand design philosophy for my
present purposes, is that it made overt certain connections between
politics and education; in particular it made explicit the moral and
epistemological presuppositions in the former.
Grand design philosophy recognized a corpus of questions which
provided a conceptual link between the enterprises of politics and
education. lQhat things can be known? Idiat things are worth
knowing? Can all men know these things? Is knowledge of how men
ought to live different from or a compound of other sorts of knowledge?
Is it available to all? Supposing that with Plato we answer the
question, what things can be known, in terms of a distinction between
general terms and particulars, such that knowledge comprises
acquaintance with the "essence" of general terms, and opinion
encompasses only acquaintance with the referents of particulars.
The consequent superiority of knowledge to belief will demand not
merely a superior intellect, but will also licence an hierarchical
morality in which, for the ordinary man, virue will be found in
acceptance of the edicts of those who possess the knowledge of how
one ought to live. There is no notion here of knowledge being
provisional and truth being an aegis under which debate and discussion
might produce further advance. The very perfection of the Pl&tojc
Forms logically entailed their inertia, and in turn ossified the
social structure. With such preconditions the function of the
educational system was essentially conservative, subservient to a
15
static societal model. Again, with Rousseau, there was the same
dependence of his philosophy of education, on the theoretical scheme
of his "grand design". ifis subordinate placing of reason via a via
the passions permits him to insist on the importance of equality in
the face of different degrees of reasoning power, and his empiricism
removes any epistemological warrant for a privileged access to ethical
truths, though it does not discount reference to experience in the
running of political institutions. The aim of education here was
the regeneration of society and the establishment of a virtuous
citizenry. (Vt)
Grand design philosophy highlights two features: a key to
perfectibility, and a lack of autonomy for education. The latter
point calls for immediate comment. I want to propose two senses in
which it might be used:-
1. That what counts as the achievement of being educated in a
particular society is always a reflection of institutionalised
norms and values.
2. That teachers and pupils are inhibited from questioning current
norms and mores.
The first sense in which this is used is logically true, the
second is a contingent factor depending on the particular society in
question: it is not true, for example, in relation to 'the moral
conception of democracy.
Societies cherish aims which themselves fashion what it is necessary
or desirable to know in succeeding generations. These aims, though
there may be some dispute as to how far they are political in character,
cannot ultimately take effect without the attention of the political
structure, even if it be only an acquiescence in the wholesale conduct
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of schooling in the private sector. The link between the political
structure and educational aims is at its acme in Plato. Here there
is genuinely no difference between educational and political criteria
in deciding what should be taught, though questions about when and how
they should be taught remain. The point about the Platonic political
system is that it leads to a lack of autonomy in sense (2). This, as
I have suggested is not a necessary feature which must always occur in
the relationship between education and politics. It is possible to
envisage a situation, where for example, the pupil studying history
was taught about widely different political regimes from his own simply
because it was considered desirable by tho* prescribing history
syllabuses. Clearly pupils may in this situation evolve views critical
of their own political regime, a fact not pleasing to some politins
or possibly to the general public. (15) Here education enjoys a
measure of autonomy in sense (2).
It happens of course in the Platonic system that there is a
condition (rule by philosophers), the realization of which will transform
the existing imperfections into an ideal state of affairs. Since
knowledge of this ideal is the preserve of the few initiating the
change, it follows that steps merely to implement the condition, and no
more than the implementation, no criticism or further examination, are
either appropriate or necessary. Moreover, the means of implementation
vii]. themselves be prescribed insofar as they are a function of and
subject to the presuppositions surrounding the panacea in question.
Qbat we are offered in education is thus a programme from the existing
state of affairs to the 'new' state of affairs, such that we can always
ask and answer why such an item is prohibited, why another is included,
why one is stressed and so on. In Platonic Grand Design, the product
of the educational system is not therefore the critic of the idea
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principle, but its disciple. Education here, is not therefore an
open—ended activity, but an endorsement of what is held to be both
possible and valuable.
Supposing, however, that a philosophical system vas to embody the
notion of the critical citizen, as in participatory democratic theory,
then the notion above, would itself be open for assessment. Here again
it appears that education would not be autonomous in sense (i), in that
it would be expressing a particular ideal. Bat we need to qualify
this point. One of the characteristics of the Platonic model is the
unity of purpose it exhibits. This is a contingent feature. A society
may be pluralistic in that it embodies several competing ideals: it
will be no less a society for that. The paradox of the critical citizen
idea is that it thrives on the presentation of alternative social goals,
ideals, and life styles. Thus though education is Dot autonomous in
sense (1) it is expressing an ideal that is open—ended. Sense (1) is
logically true, as I have suggested, in that I cannot envisage a society
in which it was possible to have completely autonomous education.
That is, the provision of education will always reflect a particular
value(s) on the part of the society in question, even if it was merely
of individual utility. If we ask the question in a given society,
concerning what is taught and receive the reply that teachers teach
what they like, this still represents a value position.
On the matter of democracy, I take it that if a particular
conception of democracy had the idea of improvement of its citizens
implicit, it would seem that it would have to acknowledge the necessity
for the provision of education. I do not refer here to just any sort
of improvement, such as the finer acquisition of vocational skills.
Rather I am concerned with the acquisition of those modes of thought
which enable a citizen to evaluate different courses of action Within
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society. It may be that the latter will require the acquisition of
some skills, such as financial decision-making (16), but what is
essential is equipping the individual to be a moral agent. The
latter requires the capability for choice, whether in relation to
nationa] politics, work, or domestic life. It seems that within
what I term "moral" democratic theory, it would be contradictory to
declare of any person both that I intend to educate him, and that I
intend him to sustain no improvement of a cognitive kind. Eramples
of such improvements might include the sampling and developnent of
tastes in literature, the mastering of quantitative techniques, and
the elaboration of conceptual schemes in generaJ..(17) Of course this
does not obviate the need to consider whether such an individual can
in fact be produced by that particular society. According to one
(18)
influential "market" theorist such an issue was not squarely faced by
older theorists. It is at all events an issue on which some comment
will have to be made here.
ii. On defining democracy
It is now fashionable within political philosophy to start
from an'origina]!' position, stipulating various conditions, and arguing
from there for various entailments of a procedural and. substantive
kind. (19) Because this is so recent, it has not contributed much
to any understanding of democracy. (20) Prior to this there seems
to have been considerable malaise over the "meaning" of democracy,
and difficulty in defining democracy. (21) At an elementary level
this may seem to arise from the diverse uses to which the word has
been employed. Bewilderment arises at the seemingly contradictory
referents, such as American capitalism and Russian communism, plus
a desire to discover which system is in fact a democracy. The latter
implies that there must be some litmus test for this purpose. At
19
an esoteric level the assumption is made that, since "A is a democracy"
is in the grammatical form of a statement, this is a sufficient
condition for insisting that it is capable of being true or false.
I shall later claim that the latter leads to insuperable difficulties
in any- analysis of democracy. It has been suggested that the concept
of democracy is meaningless (22); others have proceeded by identifying
democracy wholly with their current political system (23), and it has
also been claimed that democracy is a concept quite properly- to be
disputed over, without any hope of a final conclusion. (21&)
It will, I think, be granted that we can engage in everyday
discourse without scholastic precision in the meaning and use of terms,
and without troubling too much about technical distinctions between
connotation and denotation, and the importance of speech acts.
There is of course no necessary connection between controversy over
a policy, practice, or institution, and controversy over its meaning
and use. Thus, for example, the issue of Nationalisation has been
a controversial policy item in post war British politics, yet there
seems little difficulty in settling the meaning of the term
Nationalisation, namely by referring to those instances where the
government of the day passes a bill into law authorizing the payment
of the industries shareholders, and the establishment of a Public Board
to run the industry. Yet though there has been agreement on what
counts as Nationalisation, there has been a very different attitude
towards it from different groups.
On the other hand, we may say of the concept democracy, that
there is little difficulty in assessing the attitude towards it, namely
that it is in general, favourable. Its connotation, in other words,
is favourable. Yet in the central sense of meaning the for ger will
not help very much, in that we cannot say that the meaning of a term
is its connotation.	 For grant that there is a favourable attitude
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to democracy, suppose also that there is some paradigmatic sense of
democracy to be found analagous to the way in which the word apple
names and corresponds to the fruit apple. In what possible way then
could we make anything of the fact that diverse political systems claim
to be democracies, and. also that democracy is approved. For we would
be prevented from identifying the one to one correspondence in which
our theory of meaning prescribed.
There is a more subtle difficulty with the paradigm search in the
theory of democracy, but I would like first to mention one possible and
influential alternative which has been employed by some writers on
democracy. Recognisiug the descrepancies and diversities of belief
about democracy, they have circumvented the difficulty by claiming
that a particular political system is "real" or "true" democracy. (25)
Now there is a logical fallacy in this moves which is I think quite
fatal to any such enterprise. What in effect has happened is that
such persons are guilty of assuming what they have set out to prove.
Thus, supposing I want to show that a political system, P, is a
democracy, and that I proceed to do this by claiming that it is a
democracy by virtue of containing features S, T and J, this manoeuvre
would be evidently circular. I would first have to establish that
features S, P and J, were necessary and/or sufficient conditions for
democracy, and only then could I conclude that system P was a democracy.
A rather different ploy would be to suggest that any analysis of
the concept of democracy would be vitiated by the fact that it is an
emotive word. (26) By this I take it that what is meant is that the
word excites approval. We may agree that typically the word excites
approval, but beyond this I am not sure what we are supposed to
conclude • Though the fact that the word democracy excites approval
when it is used may tell us something, it cannot, I suggest, tell us
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what democracy means. We can, I think, adduce ready explanations
of why people approve of democracy and do not therefore need to fall
into the trap of insisting that the term democracy has some special
emotive meaning.
I have mentioned the emotive theory of meaning here simply
because it has had a powerful effect in discussions centering on
democratic theory. In the hands of W.B. Gallie (27) ii leads to a result
where one definition of democracy is equally valid with another. My
view is that Gallie's particular treatment of democracy rests on a
mistake brought about by a confusion between liberalism and democracy.
My aim is to overcome this confusion by maintaining a hi8torical
perspective on the developnent of the concept of democracy. Gallie's
analysis is an example of the partial nature of emotive meaning, no
matter how powerful it has appeared to him and to philosophers in
the past. (28)
The importance of maintaining some degree of historical
perspective is further reinforced when a direct application of
analytical philosophy is attempted, leading to disappointing results.
&ipposing that two different political systems, A and B, both claim
to be a democracy, X. In what way should we react to this situation.
Insofar as there is a dilenina here, it arises because of a conviction
that it is somehow right, or proper, that we should be able to choose
between A and B. This does not mean, of course, that they are either
of them necessarily democracies, but what it does imply, in principle,
is that there must be some way of choosing between them. Now, if we
are to make a choice, in the face of both A claiming to be X and B
claiming to be I, with both A and B being constitutively different,
then that choice can only be made in the light of their approximating
to some paradigm of X, called Y. Such a procedure cannot however
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be helpful, at least ultimately. Suppose that we proceed to
adjudicate between A and B with reference to the paradigm Y. We might
conceivably be able to settle on Y as a paradigm, at the cost of
extreme generality, but the institutional practices would have to be
settled, and it is on these points that A and B would be at odds.
For the resolution of the dispute both parties, A and B, would have to
agree about the acceptability of the details in the paradigm instance
of democracy, Y. Bat it is precisely the essential or institutional
properties of democracy that are at issue. Thus either the paradigm
secures agreement at a level of generality too far removed to entail
specific institutional details, or, at a more concrete level, it simply
duplicates the disputes.
Both of the foregoing possible assults on the meaning of
democracy have been applied with reference to competing systems of
democracy, namely liberal and totalitarian democracy. In this respect
they reflect the approach to an understanding of liberal democracy
discussed in the first section of this chapter. Since I want to
abandon that particular approach for the meaning of liberal democracy
I shall turn to examining the developnent of liberal democracy without
reference to totalitarianism.
iii. Liberalism and Democracy
I have suggested that it will ultimately be more rewarding to
take a different approach when considering the meaning of democracy
from that followed by analytical philosophy and eniotiv-ism. I believe
that it is possible to get behind the relativist position which would
leave us with the banality of saying that each has his own view of
democracy, and that is all there is to be said. Though there may
be some merit in the claim that democracy is a contested concept,
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this does not amount to the admission that it is exclusively so.
The latter appears to have some credence only when one adopts an
entirely ahistorical approach to the analysis of a concept, thus
neglecting crucial shifts which have arisen over the course of time.
I am not here suggesting or defending an approach which simply
amounts to an historical study under the guise of conceptual analysis.
I am saying that some concepts have a historical perspective rather
analagously to the way in which a cube has a volume property as well
as an area dimension. We are not getting the measure of some concepts
if we arbitrarily divorce them from a rich and varied past. My view
is that such an approach is crucial to the concept of democracy for
several reasons. The latter I want to mention briefly at this point,
and then proceed to develop them. It is of course partly a matter
of history that democracy has its origins and original applications
in Athenian civilization. It is further a matter of history- that it
did not reappear in civilization until very much later, and then in
Western European thought. It is a matter of analysis, however, as
to how far the reappearance of the concept in Western European thought,
was an identical or different concept. It is further very much a
matter of analysis as to how far democracy became fused with liberalism
in political thought and how far liberal societies are also democratic
societies. It is also a matter of analysis as to how far there are
any empirically necessary features in democracy. The historian can
say that the institutions of so called democracies have changed through
time, he cannot properly debate the former issue. I want to resist
then, as vigorously as I can, any charge that I am simply doing
history. My approach is different from that of Gallie, described
previously, but I think, ultimately more fruitful.
21i
The historical approach in analysis seems to be fruitful
wherever different systems of social and political thought are bound
together at various points by one particular tradition of interpretation
from a common conceptual root. My view is that such a conjoint
relationship exists between liberalism and democracy in the
individualist interpretation given by thinkers from Locke to H yek.
It ebould be noted, however, that I am only concerned 'with liberalism
to the extent necessary to disentangle the concept of democracy.
It is the latter and its relationship with education that is my main
concern. One further brief illustration of this point of common
conceptual roots and conjoint relationships with other strands of
social and political thought would be the phenomenon of totalitarian
democracy. An understanding of the differences between totalitarian
and liberal democracy does require an appreciation both of the
coimnon, i.e. democratic root of these two traditions, as well as other
facets of social and political thought, such as Marxist utopianism,
or laissez—faire liberalism, Within which the two traditions have
functioned.
I do not want to elaborate on the distinction between liberal
and totalitarian democracy, but I do want to extend my present line
of analysis to argue that one particular tradition of democratic
theory, liberal democracy, can without fundamental objection, be held
to contain several subsets of concepts which may not be acknowledged
with equal force within liberal democratic policies. That such a
situation is feasible follows from my earlier argument about the
importance of conjoint relationships and common conceptual roots.
I am suggesting that it may be possible to argue within the confines
of one particular tradition of social and political thought, that a
given topic such as liberal democracy logically owes a measure of
coherence to some aspect of its corpus of beliefs, which it prefers
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or tends to neglect. I am convinced that this much may be said
of liberal democracy in that it prefers or lends to neglect aspects
of "moral" democratic theory which are conceptually related to it,
and necessary for its justification. I further maintain that this
factor is of the first importance in assessing the relationship
between liberal democracy and education.
I suggest that such a method of analysis, if successful, will
prove more illuminating than the mechanistic approach of adumbrating
a different interpretation of democracy and proceeding to evaluate
the systems of government so described. I grant that the latter
has some importance for we may certainly wish to reject a view of
democracy because we find it results repugnant. Both approaches
will feature here, indeed there is no necessary incompatibility
between them. It is arguable too that conceptual shifts do not
divide into discrete sections which are qualitatively different.
There is, rather, frequently a connecting thread to an earlier strand
of the concept, 'which may, sometimes on almost nostalgic grounds, seek
to stress one aspect which appears patently lacking in the present context.
In the light of the development of democracy reference is first
made to Athenian thought. J.S. Mills attempted correlation between
a form of government and the character of its citizens is thoroughly
Greek in its orientation. It was a relationship acceded to by
democracy's opponents as well as its supporters. Sinclair states that:
"Changes in a constitution were therefore regarded with suspicion;
if they went far, they would change the whole character of the city,
and of the citizens too. Plato uses demokratikos - to sum up the
character of a changeable and pleasure-seeking kind of man - I Socrates
never tires of calling the constitution the very mind of a city;
Aristotle speaks of it as the life of the state; Demosthenes says
that a city's laws are its character." (29)
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Similarly, Rousseau's contentious on the voluntary character
of political obligation consequent upon participation in law making
was matched in the Athenian polis.
- any binding public decision of the Athenian state, the
making of an alliance, the declaration of war, the passing of any
law, was enacted by the popular assembly of the Athenian citizen—body
as a whole, meeting regularly." (30)
The right to be heard on these issues, in the Assembly, gave
to the citizen: " - at least the claim on the part of the community
at large to a corresponding equality of obligation." (31)
The organic dimension in Rousseau and later Green, is also
thoroughly matched: "The ancients had seen their community as a focus
of value, an entity, the significance of which dwarfed their own
lives." (32)
Clearly though the latter points to a conceptual divide from
the later notions of pluralism, checks on power, and limited
governmental spheres. The absence of a perceived division between
public and private life and extra—state political activities represents
a much greater gulf between Athenian democracy and pluralism, than
between the former and democratic elitism. The latter can already
be found in the tracts of the critics of democracy and argued over
by its supporters. However, despite the fears of elitists, it
appears that: "widespread public participation in the affairs of
the state including the personal failures, socially isolated,
economically insecure, uneducated, did not lead to extremist
movements." (33)
Aristotle pondered the issue of whether some citizens should
be excluded from the governmental process and pointed out: " - that
there is a serious risk in not letting them have some share in the
enjoyment of power; for a state with a body of disenfranchised citizens
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who are numerous and poor must be a state which is full of enemies." (34)
Equality, itself suggestive of a latent optimism in human character
seems to have been a further basic ingredient in Greek democracy. It
appeared to encompass both equality before the law and fair play for all.
The latter should be seen in contrast to arbitrary power, a theme
prevalent in the earliest debate on the best constitution. (35)
Again there is continuity of theme from Athens to the later
revival of democratic ideas in that the attack on arbitrary power was
repeated by he Levellers, at a moment so close to locke, yet containing
none of the latter's individualistic overtones. Its ideals are, if
anything, more transparent in the Funeral Oration attributed to Lysias
than they are in Pericles: "Our ancestors - were the first and only
men of that time who cast out arbitrary power and established
democracy, holding that the freedom of all was the greatest concord -
and the part of men to define justice by law, and to persuade by reason,
and serve both by action, having law as their king and reason as their
teacher." (36)
Turning to the distinction between public and private life,
however, it is clear that this is essentially a modern introduction
into democratic beliefs, and one attributable to liberalism. It is
an illustration of the extent to which liberal individualism has
entwined with democratic ideas. In the Athens of Pericles, there is
already identity between public and private life. "An Athenian citizen
does not neglect the state because he takes care of his own household;
and even those of us who are engaged in business have a very fair
idea of politics. We alone regard a man who takes no interest in
public affairs, not as a harmless, but as a useless character; and if
few of us are originators, we are all sound judges of policy. (37)
My argument would be that the location of participation in Greek
democracy is partially contingent in the sense that as a happy
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coincidence the Assembly was also the locus of potential and possible
power relations affecting the citizen. Work had not assumed the
dominancy or the essentially hierarchical character it was to achieve
under industrial capitalism. What was necessary was that participation
and equality should function in just that situation where the
individual was affected by power relations, viz, in relation to
political commitments. It would, however, have been unthinkable to
suggest that a 'full' life was possible merely through 'private'
satisfactions. This was not merely a consequence of the lack of
other associations beside the state, it was rather consequential upon
a view of public life as the ground of an individual's being. In this
respect the Athenians went essentially further than Mill for 'whom public
life was merely an instrument to produce a civilized populace.
A similar point introduced by liberal individualism is the denial
of the Athenian link between democracy and character. Whilst J.S. Mill
wrote eloquently on the latter, individualists from Locke to Hayek
have raged against any hint of a "collectivist character". With the
absence of any division between public and private life, as discussed
above, the link between democracy and character has had a powerful
effect. Field argues that: " - the ultimate justification for
democracy is a means to,produce certain states or attitudes of mind
in the citizen, independence of mind, respect and tolerance for others,
interest in public affairs, a willingness to think about them and
discuss them, and a sense of responsibility for the whole conummity."(38)
The explanation for this must depend tn part not merely on the
individual actors within a participatory democracy, but also on the
perceived norms and values immanent in the practices of that society.
It is only within the latter context that Protagoras's claim is
understandable, that: " - every man has a share of justice and general
citizen skill - ". (39) It may be that proximity is both a
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psychological necessity as veil as a value in relation to institutions,
in order to realize this. As Ikinn argues: "the ancients had seen
their community as a focus of value, an entity, the significance of
which dwarfed that of their own lives as individuals. - if the
democratic regime in Athens was narrow by modern standards in its
citizen body, it was democratic in its political institutions to a
degree that is hard for the citizen of a modern state to comprehend."(liO)
The above points suggest that the decisive shifts affecting the
concept of democracy themselves relate to the notion of human agency
and character that is built into it, and not in the main to its
procedures. ( h i) Of course the latter, as I have suggested, are as
much a matter of value as the former, but there are largely historical
reasons why procedures produce little controversy until the twentieth
century. Bearing in mind the cluster of points made so far concerning
the influence of liberalism on democracy, it may be possible to enlarge
on this issue by paying some attention to etymological considerations.
The evidence is that the word "democracy" remains in limbo until the
eighteenth century, when it reappears in restricted, scholastic
language and is used in political antipathy to the word "aristocrat". (h2)
It appears that political thinkers who did employ the term used it in
connection with the old Aristotelian classification, combined with
monarchy and aristocracy. Certainly it did not enjoy any sort of
favourable connotation. Of more significance is the position with
the noun "democrat". Palmer finds that: "The two nouns "democrat"
and "aristocrat" did not exist until the very last years of the
Old Regime. No "democrats" fought in the Ainerican Revolution; and
the Age of Aristocracy, as long as it was unchallenged, heard nothing
of "aristocrats." (h3)
Ikinn notes that "The late 18th century assault on the closed
privilege caste order of the post—feudal Ancien Regime, in Europe as
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a whole and of course above all in France, was responsible for the
resurrection of the term 'democrat' as a term of political self-
identification." (41i)
A century later, Tocquevi.11e: " - saw the political meaning of
democracy as essentially the repudiation of the feudal past, the
triumph of the non-privileged over the aristocrats, the victory of
the Third Estate." (45)
In some senses this is not dissimilar to the position in Athens
prior to the institution of democracy, but the situation is inevitably
much more complex because of both the existence of different strands
of individualism, already established in ]igland, and because of the
existence of embryo political institutions (116) which could themselves
constitute vehicles of democratic political practice. Moreover,
some of the demands for the instigation of democratic machinery came
from men 'who were not themselves avowed individualists at all. The
latter were quite distinct from those who demanded freedom of conunerce.
The Levellers, and the less influential but more radical Diggers,
were primarily concerned with the control and removal of arbitrary civic
power, not with the freedom to establish market relations.
In addition, not every strand of individualism was democratic in
the sense of being unambiguously in favour of popular control of
government. Conservatism in Fäigland partly drew its strength from
the contention that government was an esoteric art which thrived on
a repository of wisdom, vitalized by tradition, and was not amenable
to the demands of the uninitiated. (47) Confusion may also arise
because a strain of individualism which was seemingly 'moral' in its
stress on the sanctity of the individual, as in Puritanism, and
democratic in its own internal organization, could also be associated
with a doctrine of material wealth and prosperity as the outcome of
individual resourcefulness and blessedness.
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There is a final point relating to liberal individualism and
democracy which must be made. It happens to be the case that the
mainstream of individualism has itself been conceptualised in the
doctrine of liberalism. ( Li8) it is moreover, just that part of
individualism which does not see ruling as an esoteric or problem
undertaking. The grounds for an insidious conceptual confusion here
between democracy and liberalism are overwhelming in that liberalism
itself has come to be associated both with the highly naturalistic
strain of thought commencing from Hobbes, which discarded traditional
concepts of society, justice, and natural law, and deduced political
rights and obligation from the interest and will of dissociated
individuals, and with the 'moral' strain of individual worth
emanating from the Puritans. It has also been held to cover the
work of the British Idealists who emphasised the possibility of state
action to further the conditions for individual moral developnent.
Yet the demands of both wings of liberalism in their attacks on
autocracy were demands for democratic controls in that they favoured
a sovereign legislature and the application of the rule of law and
separation of powers. It is important to remember, however, that
men like Benthant and the Mills were liberals first and democrats
second, in that at least with Benthain and James Mill, democracy was
merely the most effective instrument by which rulers could be
controlled. (1i9) Thus democratic procedures such as elections, did.
not reflect anything other than expeñiency, and certainly did not
instantiate values of a lofty moral nature. The same is not true
of John Stuart Mill, for whom democratic procedures were a part and
indeed the principal part of the amelioration of the common people.
iat a wholesale and uncritical acceptance of liberalism as
a unity leads to, is the view of Fhglish democratic theory from
Locke onwards, as merely the superimposing of representative
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procedures on an increasingly divided society-, with the latter as
entirely secure from any fundamental change. (50) Liberalism is
not primarily a doctrine about political organization and being a
liberal " - is often a matter of broad cultural allegiance and not
of politics at all". (51) Liberalism however has political
implications insofar as some conditions in society are more
conducive to the enjoyment of liberalism than others. In particular
liberalism in its political implications has been equated with a
condition of minimum government. "A liberal society is a pluralistic
society precisely because the concept of countervailance is essential
to its understanding of liberty - ". (52) In this respect the
tern 'liberal' has afforded a most convenient prefix to those who
wish to distinguish those nations professing democracy with capitalist
or mixed economies, from those nations professing democracy and
following command economies. The latter have been labelled
titotalitarian democracies". (53)
In the main, this develojxnent is decidedly unfortunate for
any analysis of the concept of democracy. The tern "liberal", as I
have suggested, is an unhelpful one, masking as it does two
traditions of individualism, whose divisions increase in strength
in the twentieth century. The very distinction between totalitarian
and liberal democracies indirectly suggests the latter as a unity,
which it manifestly is not. Whilst I think the tern liberal
democracy an unfortunate ones I shall continue to use it in some
places, mainly where I wish to subject to criticism writers or
schools of thought which tend to propagate it. What I very much
prefer is the distinction already mentioned between the market and
moral conceptions of democracy. (5'i) This distinction cuts right
across liberalism. I regard T.H. Green, for example, as a 'moral
democrat', but he is also hailed as a liberal. On the other hand.
I regard Rousseau as a moral democrat and he is certainly not
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classified as a liberal.
I do not pretend that this is an easy distinction to maintain.
Some theorists such as Lode and John Stuart Mill are exceedingly
difficult to classify since they appear to show a concern for the
moral worth of individuals, yet also envisaged man as merely a
bundle of utility preferences. For all its difficulties, however,
the distinction seems long overdue. Modern divisions within
liberal democracy are now so very different in their implications
for society and in the values they champion that it has become
impossible to assess their implications for education, by simply
parroting liberal democratic cliches and tacking on a few valedictory
comments about education. The divisions within liberal democracy
are sometimes referred to as elitism, pluralism, and participatory
forms of democracy. (55) I regard both elitists and pluralists as
essentially market democrats. In addition I include within market
democrats, theorists whom I term economic democrats and whom (56)
I regard as being on the extreme liberal wing of the market concept.
Economic democrats are characterized by their predilection for
individual utility as the guiding principle for social action and
their extreme distaste for any form of governmental role, exceeding
that of a Lockean night—watchman. Elitists distrust the masses
political behaviour as much as pluralists and economic democrats
distrust the government's political behaviour. Thit the latter also
are unhappy with some facets of individual political behaviour.
Dahl's (57) desire to see groups interposed between government and
the individual is as much due to a fear of "mass" political behaviour
as it is to control central power, and Down's and Biker's (58)
determination to excorcise moral ideals and aims from individual
political perceptions is largely due to the same cause. All market
theorists can be distinguished by their attempts to devalue majority
3political behaviour from the level of a prime moral engagement.
Participatory democrats are moral democrats, but the class of moral
democrats is larger than the class of participatory democrats and
includes theorists such as Kant and Green (59) who did not envisage
the extention of individual control over institutions beyond that
of the political macrocosm, unlike Cole (60) who did advocate the
latter especially in relation to work. What unites moral democrats
is a belief in the moral potential of the individual in relation to
political affairs, a conviction that individuals ought to make
decisions which influence public policy (61) and a belief that the
state has some role to play, partly through education, in helping
the individual to realize his moral potential especially in relation
to the wider considerations of the political macrocosm. The
foregoing is necessarily a generalization, but will I hope serve to
distinguish moral from market theorists.
In maintaining the distinction between moral and market
democrats, I shall also be criticising and assessing the implications
of these two positions. Clearly I think there can be several
stances from which a comparison can be made between the two rival
systems. There are purely formal requirements such as consistency,
which would constitute grounds for preferring one characterization
rather than another. Then there is the issue of how far one scheme
solves the philosophical problems found endemic in another. Thus
for example, both elitism and pluralism claim to solve some of the
problems endemic in classical democratic theory. (62) Finally,
there is the sense in which one characterization is ethically
preferable to another. In some cases the latter could be classified
under a formal requirement. Thus classical utilitarianism treats
statements about values in the same logical mmner as statements
about facts. Now, if it is held that statements about values are
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indeed logically separate from statements about facts, then the
ethical theory involved will have been shown to be defective.
Further, one ethical theory may be preferable to another in terms
of the ideals immanent in it. The notions cf moral autonomy and
integrity might be found more defensible than the Hobbesian rational
man.
Part of the difficulty in assessing different conceptions of
democracy is that one is concerned with operational conditions and
values. In their characterization of democracy pluralists have
confined themselves almost exclusively to the matter of operational
conditions such that democracy becomes synonymous with certain
empirical features such as freedom of association (except for
coimmmistsl). Indeed all market theorists freely and lavishly
commit the naturalistic fallacy: elitists as well as economic
democrats. The purported 'value—free' position of market theorists
is examined later at various points, but for the present I want
aimity to argue that operational conditions are merely empirical
features which, accurately it is hoped, translate values which are
considered appropriate to their particular conception of democracy.
It is important to appreciate, however, that the relationship between
values and empirical features is asymmetrical. For empirical
features may relate to 'n' different value systems, and thus it is
not possible to claim of a particular piece of political machinery
that it is a sufficient reason for concluding that the society in
question has such and such a political regime.
However, there is a case on what amounts to inductive grounds
for suggesting that the existence of 'n' different empirical
features, especially for some features more than others, point
towards one set of values rather than another. Th is argument is
developed shortly but it is necessary first to say one more thing
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about values. There seem to be strong grounds for saying that
values, including declarations and choices of values cannot, unlike
empirical political features be true or false. This is not to
say that values are things we cannot usefully argue about nor is
it to say that one set of values cannot be preferable to another.
what it does say is that declarations of values are of a different
logical type from other statements, even though they have the same
graimnati cal fo iui.
One important effect of declarations of value is to create
expectations about empirical political features. It is this area
of functional dependency (61k) which has been of decided importance
in relation to shifts in conceptions of democracy, and which
indicates that the relationship between values and empirical features
varies within certain finite limits. The elitist formulation of
the concept of democracy arose directly out of a perceived
incongruence between the value precepts of early democratic theory,
such as the rational voter, and the considered results of empirical
research into attitudes and voting behaviour. The conception of
democracy subsequently proposed by both elitists and pluralists,
was superimposed on what was considered to be the empirical realities
of the time. In this whole operation, value premises were entirely
subsumed under empirical auspices.
It is perhaps part of the reason for the lack of attention
to these developnents by philosophers of education, that both the
elitist and pluralist models did not, either in their value positions,
which were implicit, or in their empirical recommendations,
stray outside the accepted norms of liberal democratic societies.
Indeed it is arguable that their positions were more apposite to
industrial capitalism than the position they intended to revise.
In this respect, the developnent of both these conceptions merely
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reinforces the traditional divide between liberal and totalitarian
democracies. The latter is not, however, my concern in this thesis.
I am dealing with the implications for education of rival
conceptions of democracy 'which happen to come within the ambit of
liberal democracy, though moral democracy in its participatory
form undoubtedly creates acme tensions with capitalist economic
organization.
iv. Boundaries, institutions, and values
The exclusion of totalitarian democracy from consideration
returns to the theme of the meAning of democracy and the question
of boundaries in relation to the meaning of democracy. I hay-a
already mentioned the functional relationship between values and
empirical political institutions. I have suggested that this
relationship can and does vary. Thus for example, the elitist
model of Schumpeter attempts to reduce the value fraction to zero,
unsuccessfully I believe. I have also suggested that values cannot
be true or false, but that they can and do dIffer. what I am
concerned with now is whether there are limits to the operation of
the whole expression, i.e. the combined fraction of values and
empirical political features. There are undoubtedly differences
between elitists, pluralists and moral democrats both about values
and political institutions, Elitists want minimum participation in
politics by the electorate, confining it to a choic. between competing
parties at election time. To them democracy is merely a political
method by 'which government is periodically subject to renewal
or change. Pluralists are concerned with countervailing centres
of powers, to match the state, rather than simply periodic elections,
which they regard as an insufficient check to government.
The meaning of democracy here is a society 'with a multiplicity of
autonomous groups, in which the state is only one association.
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Moral democrats hold that democracy fundamentally presupposes
individual autonomy,a necessary condition of which would be the
opportunity for participation in social and political institutions,
and the provision of an adequate moral and political education.
blhat remains evident as common is the possibility of changing
the government of society. At a minimum, in the elitists model,
this involves elections at which rival parties stand for office.
There may be other means of changing governments than elections,
but I find them difficult to conceive of if ii be allowed that the
choice to be made by the society is between rival parties. Without
the possibility of a change to a rival government, there seems to
be no democracy. Elections would then be an empirically necessary
condition of a democracy and a finn indication that if this
institution were missing the political system concerned would not
be a democracy.
Since, however, I have suggested that institutions differ to
the extent that they are empirically necessary to democracy, or
merely contingent, it follows that there are several possible
marginal cases affecting the boundaries of democracy. Suppose,
for example, that we were able to ascertain something of the
political methods of a certain country. We discover that country A
has enfranchised its adult citizens, excluding only lunatics and
vagrants. We further discover that voting is conducted by means
of verbal utterances at polling stations. Clearly A has elections
and universal suffrage yet it cannot be presumed that such elections
are effective in duplicating national opinion between the two rival
parties, because of the possibility of intimidation, that is to
say then that guarantees ensuring a choice without intimidation
(nonnally the Secret Ballot) are more than contingent features of
democracy. Again, it may be that A subsequently introduces a
Secret Ballot, but it is also now apparent that the media in A
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are controlled by the governing party and that no opposition policy
statement is ever available for perusal by the electorate. In
another respect then, the choice between the rival parties is
nullified by the absence of sufficient grounds on which to make a
choice.
Other combinations of different empirical properties may be
adopted. Assume that an official opposition is tolerated and
that governments are voted into office for a ten year maximum session,
through a representative simple majority system. Policies are
debated in the run up to the election, but the government, during
its ten year tern of office, has to take many decisions which were
not debated in the pre—election period, and some of which are highly
unpopular with the electorate. For moral democrats changes might
well seem desirable here to allow for greater participatory
opportunities. Elitists however may well approve of the sovereignty
of politicians here. The point is I think, that both market and
moral democrats would be prepared to allow that this particular
political system was democratic.
There is, I think, no need to prolong the8e examples to draw
out the points that a mere list of empirical features will not do
when discussing the meaning of democracy since it is crucial to
settle on the distinction between necessary and contingent features.
In a sense the distinction is even more complicated than that.
Interest groups are a familiar feature in Western societies.
Pluralists, however, make the existence of interest groups virtually
an axiom of democracy since they stipulate autonomous groups as
part of the meaning of democracy. Yet to an elitist, what matters
within the operation of democracy is regular elections which feature
competing parties. The existence of groups is contingent within
the elitist model of democracy. Pluralists, however, accept
elections as a necessary feature of a democratic political
structure, but not a sufficient one.
flnpirical features then are not sufficient for concluding
that a particular society is a democratic society, though they
'will clearly count towards such a verdict, but in varying degrees
according to whether they are necessary or contingent features.
A further problem with any assessment based on empirical features
is that the relationship between these features and the fonn of
government is asymmetrical. That is, we cannot take any one
institutional feature, for example an elected parliament, and
argue from that feature that the country in question is clearly
a democracy. I am not suggesting that such a feature would be
without significance in deciding whether a particular society is
a democracy, but my view is that the empirical approach remains
unsatisfactory. We have to be clear about values, if we are ever
to resolve differences over empirically necessary arrangements.
An attempt upon values would however meet an immediate
riposte from elitist democratic theorists. Schumpeter, for
example, claims that democracy is merely a political method.
That claim 'will be examined but it should be noted that a caricature
of democracy as a bundle of procedural principles plays straight
into the hands of the elitist insofar as it says nothing about the
extent to which individual autonomy should have a bearing on public
policy. Pluralists are primarily concerned with the maximization
of group and individual utility. Moral democrats are concerned
with the furtherance, not merely of individual utility, but of the
moral develoilnent of individuals as well. Thus though the moral
democrat may be happy to envisage state action to secure improved
circumstances for the growth he favours, he does not thereby commit
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himself to a sanguine acceptance of values which emanate other than
from the controversies of individuals. In particular he is not
necessarily bound to any collectivist doctrine. Indeed, it might
be suggested that the whole apparatus of elections, the rule of law,
and the separation of powers, is a reflection of a non-holistic
value structure, in that it presumes that truth is a matter of
debate. This would apply to all values, even that of moral
autonomy.
i. Towards a new analysis of democracy and education
The present chapter has argued for the hybrid nature of
liberal democracy and made the plea that more fruitful work will
come from analysing the different value constellations within
liberal democracy. At present such a move has not been made
within philosophy of education, and it seems long overdue. An
examination of the different conceptions of democracy, market and
moral, will be carried out in the following two chapters, and it
will be seen that the divisions between them are broad. This
detailed examination will permit me to show the incoherence of
market democracy and the weakness of its values as a foundation
for democracy. The moral conception will be shown to provide a
finn foundation for a democratic polity. Hopefully this will
substantiate the claim that it is the moral conception that lends
plausibility and support to liberal democracy. The latter has
persisted as a model because of the attention paid to empirical
features such as elections and because of the attribution of several
values which arise from the moral conception of democracy.
To attempt to dissect liberal democracy at this time is not
merely apposite in terms of the very general injunction that
philosophy should amount to some kind of search for truth.
There is also the matter of an urgent need for clarification in
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relation to the aims of education and the composition of the
curriculum. In the present chapter I have discussed in general
terms the relationship between politics and education in autocracy
and democracy. Following the elucidation of the two conceptions
of democracy, the thesis goes on to consider in much greater
detail the relationship between the two conceptions and education.
Again it must be emphasised that this work is not simply
a matter of stipulating several initial conditions and then
extrapolating various political and educational implications. It
is a question of looking at liberal democracy and its properties
as it stands now, and the inconsistencies and ambiguities within
it, I shall also attempt to show that these are apparent within
its educational aims and curriculum. If my analysis is correct
then a good deal of philosophy in education has been written around
a model which is no longer tenable, and based upon a false consensus.
r it is not merely that there are two conceptions of democracy,
but that within the market conception there are rival strands of
thought 'which are diverse and contradictory. Again, if it is the
moral conception of democracy which actually provides the semblance
of unity and sanctity to liberal democracy, then it is past time
for that construction to be made explicit in educational aims and
curricula, ('ice the fundamental weakness of the market conception
is perceived, namely that its values cannot provide enduring support
for the institutions and practices designed to give a moral polity,
the importance of the moral conception of democracy in providing
liberal democracy 'with an appearance of unity becomes apparent.
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APTER II
Values, The New Democracy, and Education
i. Introduction
I mentioned in the last chapter the profound difference in
democratic theory between market and moral democrats. (1) Part of
the claim of market democrats to pre-eminence stems from their boast
that their approach to democracy is 'value-free', and hence in marked
contrast to the moral conception of democracy.
The pirpose of this chapter is to consider the thesis of the new
democrats in some detail, arguing that their claim to be 'value-free',
even assuming that to be either possible, or desirable, is confounded
by a barely disguised preference for the values of stability and utility
maximization. In addi'tion, it is suggested that such a value position
necessitates the reduction of 	 education to the twin pillars of
socialization and training. The implications of the market conception
of democracy for education are further developed in Chapter IV.
Some general points of an introductory nature are made first, before
considering representative offerings of the new democrats in detail.
On the matter of the choice of which theorists to consider, the
position can be readily defended. Schumpeter wrote a brilliant
attack (2) on 'moral' democracy, but only the least satisfactory
aspect (3) of that polemic has attracted attention. Of much greater
philosophical interest is his most original attempt to claim that
democracy is merely a political method and not amenable to question
of value. In this respect Schumpeter may be considered as the
father of the revisionist movement, though as I shall try to show,
as far as the role of politicians, and the importance of elections
are concerned, there are significant differences between Schumpeter
50
and other theorists. Schumpeter is less successful in the points
he makes against the moral conception of democracy but this aspect
of his i.rk is also significant in that it provides a possible realm
of meaning for the much vaunted value—free claim. The latter
becomes intelligible only and insofar as it represents a reaction
to the very obvious moral preoccupations of some early democratic
theorists, their presupposition of epistemic ('&) rationality to
individuals at large, and their belief in the efficacy of governmental
institutions and practices to achieve their moral ends.
lobert DaM is also an extremely important figure in modern
democratic theory. Dahl is essentially a pluralist (5): he differs
from Schumpeter most obviously in that he accords rather less
importance to elections, less freedom to politicians, and. much greater
reliance on social constraints, principally groups, on ulers rather
than mere institutional constraints. Dahl regards democracy as an
ideal, and in discussing democracy he substitutes his extremely
influential "polyarchy" (6), which he holds to be an approximation
to democracy-. Dahi interest is primarily in conditions necessary
for the maintenance of democracy, or polyarchy, an end for which he
is prepared to espouse rigorous social indoctrination.
Anthony Downs uses the tools of economic analysis, especially
utility theory, to build an explanatory model of political behaviour
in a pluralist society. I shall try to show that Down's model,
despite its sophistications and rigour, is self—defeating.
Mathematical analysis appears in the work of Buchanan, Tullock, Biker,
and Ordeshook, in their attempt to explain political behaviour on
the basis of rational self—interested agents. These theorists also
endorse inconsistencies ultimately fatal to the model
A measure of the above theorists work is similar to the
utilitarians (7), and has important implications for education.
It should be noted that really very little work has been done on the
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relationship between democracy and education, apart from
sociological observations (8). Barrow's (9) work, with which I am
in disagreement, is the most important at the present time. There
are however signs that this conflict will have important implications
in schools in the near future (10).
Au allied controversy which has attracted much more attention
in recent works is the status of the 'value-free' claim made by
revisionists. To some extent this dispute was part of a general
dilemma about the status of political philosophy as a whole. It is
fair to say that in the light of very recent develo1inents, political
philosophy is certainly not dead, in the sense that writers in this
field now bring an unabashed treatment of values to the fore of their
works. (ii)
ha. Schuinpeter and Value-free Democracy
Commensurate with his view that classical theorists built far
too much into democracy, Schumpeter sought to demythologize democracy
to the extent that it became a political method only. His criticisms
of the classical theorists I turn to later, my immediate concern being
his reduction of democracy to a political method, entirely neutral
with respect to whatever results may accrcte from its implementation.
Schuinpeter attempts no less than the splitting of values and empirical
procedures in the following passage:
"Let us transport ourselves into a hypothetical country
that, in a democratic way, practices the persecution of
Christians, the burning of witches, and the slaughtering
of Jews. We should certainly not approve of these
practices on the ground that they have been decided on
according to the rules of democratic procedure. 	 it the
question is would we approve of the democratic
constitution itself that produced such results In
preference to a non-democratic one that would avoid them?" (12)
Schumpeter believes that it would be most reasonable for a democrat
to answer the question in the negative, and that this should not come
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as a shock since: " - there are ultimate ideals and interests which
the most ardent democrat will put above democracy." (13)
The position which Schumpeter assumes here is entirely question
begging. The way in which we respond to this position depends
entirely on what values we build into democracy yet this is precisely
what Schumpeter intends to isolate. It is not clear what it means
to say: " - that in a democratic way practices the persecution of -".
(i) Presumably Schumpeter means that such clandestine practices
in this instance were approved of by the majority. There is however
no logical relationship between majoritarian support for a measure
and a democratic regime. The most scurrilous dictator may choose
for reasons of expediency, to obtain majority approval for a particular
measure or measures. Neither is there any necessary connection
between majoritarian or unanimous support for an administration, and
the same measure of support for an individual measure of that regime.
In essence what Schumpeter wants to say here is that a democratic
regime is a regime in which measures are approved of by most of the
population and further that there is no logical or empirical restriction
on the measures which may be approved of. That is, Schumpeter
proposes the majoritarian or unanimity rule as a sufficient condition
for democracy. Yet this cannot be a sufficient condition for we do
talk of the importance of toleration in the context of democratic
regimes. This is not to elevate toleration to the status of a
sufficient condition since it is possible to envisage an autocratic
regime which tolerated various kinds of opinions without persecution
and yet did not permit the vast number of persons within its boundaries
to have any control over the measures which it enacted.
There is thus nothing illogical about withholding the title
'democracy' from a regime, which with majority support conducts such
clandestine practices. It is in any case to construct a false
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dichotomy to claim that there are ideals and principles which a democrat
will pat above democracy. For it is part of the very concept of
ideals and principles that indeed they are imperfectly realized:
equality, toleration, respect for persons. Schuinpeter wants to say
that if a democratic system goes seriously enough off course, then
on the basis of these ideals we will condemn it. It is clear however
that we uld no longer be talking about a democracy. This is not
to deny that there are degrees of toleration, that there are degrees
of representation, and that hence some systems are more democratic
than others. 1it what Schumpeter presents as democracy is a system
which practices the systematic suppression of minority groups, hence
with the total abrogation of toleration.
Following his comment that there are values which will sometimes
be put above democracy, Schumpeter proceeds to advocate the value—
neutrality status of a method, and of democracy in particular.
Schuinpeter declares that democracy is merely a political method and,
"hence incapable of being an end in itself." (15) Quite what
Schumpeter means at this point is difficult to arrive at. If he
means that as a matter of logic, anything that we classify as a method
is non—normative he is surely wrong. For we do talk of one method
being better than another, of a method being unacceptable, or poor.
If be means that a person cannot delight in a method for its own sake
then he is arbitrarily legislating against a whole field of human
action. For in the latter what logically counts as a method to one
person does not proscribe the same activity from being an end to
another person. Painting a canvas is a method of preserving a scene
or capturing a pose and it is quite conceptually coherent to regard
it merely as one method of preserving and recording. Yet for some
it also counts as anend. in itself, as an activity which affords
vast opportunities for expression, endeavour, amelioration. To
treat it merely as a method is to inflate the causal properties of
painting to the exclusion of all other properties. Yet this is what
Schumpeter wants to do for democracy. If we inflate the causal
properties of political activity sufficiently it can then be argued
that it is merely a means to forming a government. Thit to do so is
arbitrarily to proscribe a whole area of human action and condemn
it to a regulative activity. This arbitrary causal reduction would
of course apply equally to activities like education where it could
be construed as merely a means to producing a skilled work—force.
In fact this "means—end" construction emerges again in the revisionist
thesis, presented with increasing force and sophistication, until it
reaches its zenith in Riker and Orde shook's claim that private
satisfaction in political activity is irrational and publicly
inefficacious.
I want to suggest that further difficulties follow for
Schiunpeter's thesis from the very restricted interpretation he has
placed on a method. In order to do this, slightly more needs to
be said about a method. Let us suppose that 'x' is a method leading
to achievement 'y'. If we say that 'y' is an end in itself this
is tantamount to saying that 'y' requires no further justification.
If something is incapable of being an end in itself then presumably
it must be justified by a reference to something which is an end in
itself. This I take to be what Schumpefer is implying; that a method
can logically only be justified by the result towhich its
implementation leads. 	 it because a series of operations 'x' is
empirically conducive to a particular achievement 'y' this does not
mean that 'x' must always be constued as a contribution to 'y'.
In particular, because	 is causally necessary to 'y', this does
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not amount to logical necessity. Thus sowing seed is a method
causally necessary to growing vegetables, but there is no logical
reason why sowing seed should not be regarded as an end in itself.
This has important implications about the scope for action in various
fields. Sowing seed has a utility value in terms of the food or
flowers produced. It is possible to hold, however, that one gets
equal or more satisfaction out of sowing seed, that the satisfaction
derived from sowing seed well is not derived from the higher yields
but from the exercise of skill, judgement, and. finesse in sowing the
seed. That further, sowing seed can be refined, improved, and
excelled at. In addition, I may see 'x' as causally necessary to
'y', yet also as an end it itself. Doubtless we might want to hold
that outside a given range of intentions the engagement in any causal
process becomes rather absurd, and in some cases Logically impossible.
For example, it would be a trifle absurd if the individual who saw
inumerable challenges to his abilities in sowing seed, did not intend
to grow some produce, since the latter is at the end of the causal
chain from seed sowing. The point is that the causal chain itself
does not oblige him in any way to limit what he regards as the intrinsic
interest in sowing seed. In the case of a formally structured game,
of course, like chess, it is logically impossible for me to claim
both that I intend to play chess and that I intend to disregard every
rule of chess. Moving pieces in a certain way is not merely causally
necessary to playing chess, it is also logically necessary since the
game of chess takes its identity from the rules and conventions
ordering the way in which pieces may be moved. ]it in the case of
this highly structured activity the notion of a method, in the narrow
sense of a means to the achievement of a given end, becomes logically
redundant. Moving pieces in a certain pattern on a chequered board,
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is not a method of playing chess, it is playing chessi In this
narrow sense there is only one method of playing chess and the logic
of method simply collapses here into the concept of chess,
1it chess as I have suggested, is a highly structured activity.
To meet Schumpeter on his own ground one may take the appointment of
a govemment as an end. Fit note that this says nothing about the
extent to 'which governing might to be or will be a function of public
pressure or participation. When he declares that democracy is a
political method Schwnpeter has a very definite view of public
participation in the process of governing, namely that it shall be
at a minimum. As far as individual voters are concerned:
... they must understand that once they have elected an individual,
political action is his business and not theirs" (16). Re declares
that " ... democracy is the rule of the politician" (17). In his
reformulation of democracy the passive role of the citizen is again
apparent: "the democratic method is that institutional arrangement
for arriving at political decisions by means of a competitive struggle
for the people's votes". (18)
What is now clear is that Schumpeter's concept of democratic
govenmient involves a highly structured and narrowly defined end,
that of popular endorsement of the policies of a political party,
from time to time. In giving citizens the very minimum role to play,
and confining that role to confirming a party in power Schumpeter is
then able to plausibly cast democracy in the role of a political
method. Though it is still logically possible for an individual
to maintain in the face of this system that they find politics
intrinsically interesting, challenging, enriching, stimulating, it
is nonetheless empirically extremely doubtful. For on Schumpeter's
own admission political action is not the business of the ordinary
57
voter, politicians must be left to get on with the job. We may
therefore take it not merely that there would be a very limited supply
of political resources in the form of speakers, information, debates,
consultative documents, but further that such spontaneous political
activity as did occur would have little or no effect on politicians.
Moreover it seems doubtful that such a system would continue in that
form. With voters occupying such a passive role two obvious dangers
loom. Voters would have a limited and immature perspective on
politics by their very lack of political activity and political
argument. Hence the continuance of the democratic method would rest
heavily on the parties and would make the most onerous demands on
their integrity. If parties compete for votes by means of rational
debate the process is expensive in terms of the cost of information
provided, the risk of losing office, the budgeting of an election
fund. These costs could be avoided either by presenting a previously
agreed campaign to the voters with the aim of sharing the spoils of
office, or by one of the parties conducting an insidious campaign
designed to inflame prejudice, exploit irrationalities and gain power
with little opposition. The logic of Schumpeter's position is to
make parties and not voters the custodians of democracy. It is to
require that politicians be convinced democrats and to leave voters
politically immature. In time the system would appear to be justified,
for as voters had less opportunities for political activity, so they
would appear more politically inept. Ultimately, the spectre of a
popular persecution of minority groups with which Schwnpeter attempts
to confront the classical democrat, appears an empirical possibility
under his revisionist system.
The dangers imminent in "oarty sovereignty" seem to go unnoticed
by Schumpeter, though not by Downs who ventures that the conduct of
parties must in some way be constrained by law. Yet on this model
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how shall parties be persuaded to constrain their activities other
than as the result of an extraordinary phase of altruism? If
democracy is merely a political method there is a puzzle as to 'why
parties must always endorse laudable values in their conduct for votes?
Schumpeter claims as an advantage for his model that it is realistic
in the sense that unlike the classical theory (19) it fits conditions
in the real world. Part of his thesis is that in general people have
rudimentary, irrational notions about politics. His solution to this
problem is the essential status quo procedure of advocating a strong
executive government with the most limited participation by the
electorate. In this respect he differs markedly from other revisionists
who in general favour construing individuals as centres of preferences
aiming at a maximum utility income, served by weak governments whose
utility is to be found in holding office and who therefore strive to
please their electorate. This of course is much more like the
classical utilitarian treatment of democracy and will emerge in more
detail when considering the values of Downs, Biker and 2ullock. Iit
if realism is Schumpeter's value and his goal he must at least explain
away both the ready and prolonged engagement in politics which
individuals make, and the predilection for tyranny which strong
executives show. Above all he says nothing about the criterion by
which he thinks voters ought to choose between one prty programme
and another. In the absence of such a criterion we are Qbliged
to look to his notion of a "manufactured will" (20) by which the
parties themselves act to produce the political thought of the voters.
In this way the last vestiges of voter action are withdrawn.
Any attempt to provide a caricature of democracy which fits the
real world faces enormous social—scientific difficulties about which
a considerable amount has been written. (21) In general this material
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has more force against Dalil than against Schumpeter. Clearly it is
true that Schumpeter either does not see or chooses to ignore the
value judgement inunanent in selectfLng what in fact is to count as
a real world democracy. Thit this is a point of only the mildest
sophistication. We get nearer to the deserved criticism of
Schunipeter by noting the logical point that having selected the
paradigm of democracy certain crucial variables are thereby endowed
with a particular status and then lead to the value judgement that
one state of affairs is better for democracy than another. For
example, following Schuinpeter it appears that competition between
elites is a crucial variable, as is very restricted citizen participation.
If then I point to a society in which there is a limited measure of
competition between elites, but a high level of citizen participation
in the political system, Schwnpeter must, to be consistent, say that
the first state of affairs is better than the second. This leads
I think to the values of Schumpeters democracy: a conservative
preoccupation with stability based on a pessimism about the outcome
of human action in democratic politics. Schumpeter isprepared to
sacrifice the principle of political equality in favour of stability.
It is better that the majority of men should react to the options
presented by the few, rather than act to produce and pressure options
on the few. He is prepared, too, to sacrifice whatever benefits
classical democrats thought to accrue from participation in politics
in the name of stability. This species of naturalism has the mark
of a self—fulfilling prophedy; men are politically inept therefore
they ought to be kept out of politics, heiice of course men thereby
lose the opportunity of being anything but inept. Above all what
strikes one about this revision of classical democratic theory is the
way in which the possibility of virtue, the potential of rationality
in the individual, has shifted to the virtue and promise of a stable
society. Moreover, the former was not founded on a contingent
empirical property, but itself occupied the status of a value,
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central to the concept of democracy.
We have then the view that minimum citizen participation in
the political system Is not merely necessary for democracy, it is
also desirable. That it Is desirable is due to the fact: " - that
the electoral mass is incapable of action other than a stampede -". (22)
The latter are to remain in ignorance whilst the name of democracy
is upheld by parties, who on Schumpeter's own startling admission
are not " - a group of men who intend to promote public welfare - ".
(23) Of the empirical likelihood of parties continuing to champion
democracy I have already commented adversely but what concerns me now
is the position of education within such a political system. If
Schumpeter is right about the immaturity and irrationality of men in
relation to politics, then the maintenance of his model of democracy
serves not merely to preserve this state of mass ignorance but also
to commend it. On this view, any change in the level of
participation in politics is undesirable since it threatens the
stability of the political system. For Schumpeter does not merely
consider participation in politics is undesirable because of the
quality of the participants, he also considers the isolation of the
politician desirable, per se. On both counts then, participation
is undesirable since either it threatens the stability of the system
because of its inherently irrational demands, or because of the
intolerable administrative burden it places on the politician.
So that even granted a man might be a rational chooser, as opposed
to a member of Schuinpeter's irrational stampede, he would still be
a menace to the system.
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11(b) Education, training, and socialisation
It has already been suggested that the concept and aims of
education reflect the values and norms of society. (21i) In particular
the extent and variety of ways in which autonomy is exhibited In
education in respect of different social and political systems has
been mentioned, and it was noted that education enjoys the greatest
measure of autonomy in relation to the moral conception of democracy,
with its ideal of the critical citizen. I now want to consider the
position of education in relation to Schumpeterian democracy, discussed
above, and to make some comments on the concepts of training and
socialisation.
I take it firstly that education is an intentional enterprise.
This is not simply because of the empirical point that in societies
where education is compulsory for a given age range provision has to
be made to provide for syllabuses, inspections, assessment, partly
because public money is involved. It is rather due to the conceptual
point that education as an enterprise involves the prescribing of a
programme of learning with the intention that certain aims and
objectives ought thereby to be achieved. What one wants to do at
the level of the social and political macrocosm is to enquire what
sorts of learning it would be coherent and consistent for that
particular society, given its values, to propagate. We can take the
values of a particular society and enquire what sorts of achievements
that learning may terminate in, which may be considered worthwhile.
For Schwipeterian democracy a number of observations and inferences
may be made. If it is better that participation in politics be kept
to a minimum, then men's expectations about the manipulation,
assessment, and understanding of their environment must also be kept
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to a minimum. The ramifications of a determination to keep the
masses out of politics are enormous for the teaching of various subject
disciplines. The advent of modem science, for example, contributed
to the ebullience of empiricism, with its anti—dogmatic stance: the
pens of 7ola and Hugo recorded the deceit and grandiosity of the
French Second Hnpire. The teaching of economics would also be a
candidate for exclusion, since questions of Inflation, wages, profit,
rent, interest, and public finance logically entail judgements about
the role of government in influencing the distribution of wealth in
the community, about the assumptions of benefits and burdens by the
masses. History too might fare badly, for might not discussion of
the French Revolution, the Chartist Movement, the General Strike,
cultivate a desire for participation in politics? In particular,
it seems empirically possible that, taught by- an enthusiastic teacher,
some at least of these issues will defy the norms of apathy and
status quo, which are necessary to this variant of democracy.
L have already argued that for a moral conception of democracy
an appropriate educational ideal is one which promotes rational
judgements for the individual in relation to the political and social
macrocosm. (25) This would have to obtain for the vast majority of
the school population, whatever other vocational skills were thought
appropriate in relation to the curriculum at various ages. (26)
Its hallmarb would be the debate of social and political values,
policies and institutions. what I think is apparent in Schunipeterian
democracy is that education, in the open—ended moral sense I have
just given it, could not obtain. Fbr it is clear both that education
in the foregoing will entail chsmge, in a logical sense, and in
particular open—ended change. Of course related concepts such as
socialization and training are also committed to change in some way.
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To socialize someone is to introduce them to a particular way of
life, to train an individual is to introduce them to the skills and
accomplishments of a particular role. Though the difference between
these latter two concepts, and the concept of education might be
marked out in various ways, it is clear in the case of the moral
democrat that the difference will be marked out in terms of an open
concept and two closed ones. On this view Schuinpeterian democracy
cannot, logically, be educating pupils, merely socializing and training
them.
The argument is as follows. We socialize into, we train for,
in the sense that we are aiming the individual at some pre-determined
end.	 2iange is clearly entailed here, but with no apparent restriction
on how the change might occur, and no facility for evaluating the
predetermined end. Indeed, the predetermined end is analytic to
propositions of the sort 'x' is training for 'y-'; 'p' is being
socialized into 'a'. To be well trained for something is to be
proficient in a role, to be socialized into a community is to occupy
acceptable roles within that coiwuuidty. Reason of course has a role
to play in training; clearly if one were expected to perform several
actions in sequence: n, ni, n2 - np; it would be compatible with
being a good trainee to enquire; why do ni before np-i? The answer
may be that ni is a safety precaution necessary to check a known
hazard at action np-i. But what would not be compatible with being
a good trainee is to ask for reasons for being in such an occupation
at all? One is never trained to be critical of an occupation; one
is simply trained for the occupation. There are, it is true,
legitimate objections which might be made concerning the extent to
which the training for a particular work role encourages some reflection
upon that role instead of the achievement of mere behavioural skills.
Thus an objector might argue that teacher training includes Within
its leai,iing programmes the opportunity to reflect on the role and
purpose of a teacher.	 it then we do in fact sometimes talk of
teacher—education as well as teacher training; we do not talk of
educating to be a plumber, but training to be a plumber. That we
can talk of teacher—education and not plumber education is due to
the fact that we require trainee teachers to possess a variety of
socio.-.cnitural concepts both before and during their training and
it is the latter which facilitate any reflection which they can
engage in. Such concepts are not necessary in training plumbers,
plasterers, or bricklayers.
Again, to socialize is logically to take certain norms as given,
as acceptable for a subject. The demand for reasons is compatible
with socialization in so far as It is reasoning about proedures:
when is it best to do 'x': how should one do 'y': is it better to
do 'x' than 'y'? Training and socialization are essentially
instrumental concepts, means—end in their orientation. These points
cannot be dismissed as a mere semantic quibble, for the notion of
socialization is analytic to society, and training is an empirical
necessity to an advanced industrial society. Both activities
therefore have a ready justification. But there is the matter of
the propriety of questions which we found incompatible under these
two concepts. In the case of socialization a sufficient condition
for asking the rationale for certain moves is that one is already
socialized. To start formulating critical assessments of social
moyes is to move beyond the field of action prescribed by the concept
of socialization. Similarly with training, questions arose about
values presupposed in the enterprise of training. To question why
one ought to be trained for a given end, is to seek for a justification
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outside the enterprise of training. Both socialization and training
are interested in the attainment of a given end state. 	 hy such
questions are approtriate in the education of a moral democratic
citizen has to do not merely with the fact that the demand for reasons
is an inmortant facet of any cognitive process, for we saw that in
a restricted perspective that demand was also approprIate in training
and socialization. Rather it has to do with the ethical basis of
education in such a society, and especially with respect for persons,
treating people as ends, seeking truth, being impartial. Education
in the moral democratic society, is an open-ended concept in the sense
that all postulated ends are moral ends, in that they are themselves
capable of debate and vulnerable to demands for justification.
This point requires stressing in the face of injunctions that
education should serve the needs of industry or the whims of political
parties.
The concept and aims of education commensurate with the moral
conception of democracy is incompatible with the norms of Schumpeterian
democracy. The ideal of the critical citizen is antipathetic to
the norms of apathy and ignorance which is the logical prescription
for the bulk of Schumpeterian democracy. The moral democratic educator
is committed to a degree of optimism in the face of a status quo
insistence that men cannot be changed, or are happier or better as
they are. The principle of respect for persons implies an opposition
to the exclusion of any area of knowledge from his students, in the
absence of good grounds being produced to the contrary. To refuse
the opportunity to another of acquaintance with a given area of
knowledge is not only to flout the concept of respect for persons,
it is also to prohibit a condition which Schumpeter might well
endorse as being necessary to the concept of an educated man, namely
breadth of understanding.
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Schumpeter claimed democracy to be merely a political method,
but I argued that certain values were implicit in his presentation
of democracy. The cursory endorsement permitted to voters of the
presentations of political parties is hardly compatible with the
notion of respect for persons. In particular the elevation of
government to a lofty impregnable station between elections, the
predilection for a 'manufactured' political will, represents the
indictment of the electorate as moral children and governments as
moral adults. This rests on an arbitrary nxtion of the intuitive
inability of the electorate to make acceptable judgements about
societal ends, and not upon any rationally defensible value position.
It contains not merely the empirical position that most individuals
are moral children, but the prescription that they ought so to remain.
Schuinpeter's contrivance may lead ultimately to a conforming
and sterile society with men unable to see themselves as actors or
originators on the socio—political scene at all. For since according
to Schumpeter men are so immature, then presumably government will
have to exercise considerable supervision over the community. Bat
those whom such controls affect will not be permitted to make
representations or proposals about them. In his concern to preserve
the stability of the community Schumpeter in yet another arbitrary
sweep, has excluded a further facet of the democratic legacy, namely
the representation of interests. This presents a further, contingent
incom atibility between Schumpeter's values and whatever protestations
he might make to the effect that he would offer the majority a
curriculum broader than a mere vocational training programme or a
conformist prescription. The objection arises simply because in the
process of the developnent of mind, students may acquire several
values and propensities; values of truth, tolerance, justice, and
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sympathy, 'which cause the level of participation to rise, thus
invalidating the premise on which the theory is based. Insofar as
I am concerned with truth or justice, I may contingently be obliged
to probe for information into those spheres of activity labelled
'the political'. Further, on some occasions my zeal for such values
may lead me to co—operate with like—minded persons to influence the
modification of existing legislation or press for new legislation.
In other words, to participate in the political.
By claiming that "democracy means only that the people have
the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are to rule
them;" (27) on the premise of voter irrationality, Schumpeter justifies
a system as elitist as the Republic. Knowledge of how one ought to
live is reserved to the few, the many being pawns in a manufactured
will. If men are so irrational in politics, then it is not clear
why they are deemed capable of endorsing or refusing the policies
presented by competing elites. Equally, if they are so capable,
then it is not clear why political participation should stop here.
Where individuals are deemed worthy of respect an inference can be
drawn to the effect that their ignorance is not a matter of indifference.
In Schumpeter, it would appear that democracy- is only possible because
of men's ignorance.
iii. Dahi and Polyarchy
Dahl ha both less trust of politicns than Schumpeter and. less
trust in simply leaving the majority out of politics. Insofar as
be is critical of early democratic theory hi quarrel is limited to
the inability of the institutional checks of I.ockean and especially
}fadisonian democracy, to guarantee the preservation of a pluralist
society. (28) Dahb's single most important contribution to revisionist
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theory is his insistence on the primacy of social constraints on
government to secure the maintenance of democracy and to that end he
advocates wholesale indoctrination in the values of polyarchy.
Whilst the responsibility for the maintenance of democracy was placed
on parties by Schwupeter, in Dahi that role is taken by autonomous
groups and fostered by a favourable civic culture. For Dahl,
education is a means for the maintenance of polyarchy and not a
right which accrues to the individual by virtue of values inherent
in the concept of polyarchy. In Dahi the elite is made up of
autonomous groups • In Dáhl bargaining between groups and the
government is important, but even more important is the fact that
this takes place within certain limits of acceptable action, and
according to certain agreed rules.
In common with other revisionists Dahi makes the claim that he
is simply describing "the actual facts of political life", a gambit
encountered in discussing Schuinpeter and. open to the reply discussed
there. It is in any case quite apparent that Dahi advances in places
to an overt valuative position. In his Preface to Democratic Theory,
Dahi declares: "But at a minimum, it seems to me, democratic theory
is concerned with the processes by which ordinary citizens exert a
relatively high degree of control over leaders -. (29) In Modern
Political Analysis be writes; "A democracy is a political system in
which the oiportunity to participate in decisions is widely shared
among all adult citizens". (30) In considering the conditions which
must obtain in order for democracy to exist Dahi rejects at some
length the Madisonian argument for the efficiency of external checks
because, " - it underestimates the importance of the inherent social
checks and balances existing in every pluralistic society. Without
these social checks and. balances, it is doubtful that the intra
governmental checks on officials would in fact operate to prevent
tyranny -." (31)
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Dahi proceeds to establish his own theory- of democracy, known
as polyarchy. "What do we mean by democracy? Do we mean a perfect
or nearly perfect equality of power? - a perfectly equal distribution
of power seems to be unattainable, certainly it is in a large industrial
society. We shall consider as democracies political systems in which
power over (32) state officials is widely, though by no means equally
shared." "Polyarchy re nires social indoctrination and. habituation
in the process of polyarchy -". (33)
The construction of political equality as equality of power
leads Dahl to attack traditional democratic theory; " - we must
conclude that the classic assumptions about the need for citizen
participation in democracy were, at the very least, inadectuate.
If one regards political equality in the making of decisions as a
kind of limit to be achieved, then it is axiomatic that this limit
could only be arrived at with the conrnlete participation of every
adult citizen. Nevertheless, what we call democracy - that is, a
system of decision in which leaders are more or less responsite to
the preferences of non—leaders - does seem to operate with a
relatively low level of citizen participation." (31k)
Bit Dahl has almost certainly got his analysis wrong here.
The nature and extent of desired participation varies crucially from
I.ocke to Mill. To Locke, Bentham, and James Mill, participation was
a necessary condition for ensuring that rulers provided what men
wanted and was not a panacea for their amelioration. It was in fact
decidedly similar in its orientation to the social constaints of
Downs, Tullock, lUker and to a lesser extent Dahi. For Tullock as
for Mill and Bentham " - goveroinents exist for our satisfaction not
to promote our moral consciousness or to encourage us in any way to
honour or lead us to recognise our obligations". (35) For Locke
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- it being only with an intention in every-one the better to preserve
himself, his liberty- and Property - - the power of the Society, or
Legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend
farther than the conunon good - -." (36) Bentham's verdict on
government was that a measure of it "- may be said to be conformable
to or dictated by the principle of utility, when in like manner the
tendency which it has to aunent the happiness of the coziuuwiity is
greater than any which it has to diminish it." (37) Since
participation was primarily an instrument of control on government
and not a value pre-requisite of a democratic society it was in the
main a matter of indifference to Locke, Mill and Bentham who
represented, providing only that governments were faced with a
sufficient cohesion of interest to remain only protective agencies.
Locke, though he credited every man with the executive of the law
of nature, never acknowledged any moral problem in settling for the
procedural device of majority rule. The latter emerged, simply as
a device for securing the unity of society and not as a response to
a moral imperative which is what Dahi is implying. For Bentham and
James Mill representation is essentially the presentation of intersts,
necessary to ensure that they will not be coerced and hence put
happiness at risk. Indeed Dahl is pleading for the same instrumental
view of participation when he advocates democracy- as a system in
which leaders are responsive to the preferences of non-leaders•
Though it is true that Rousseau envisaged political equality
probably as equality of power, Dáhl fails to acknowledge the very
considerable empirical arrangements which Rousseau provided for this
end. It is clear too that J.S. Mill who was certainly an advocate
of participatory democracy was seekin g
 an informed discretion in a
democratic populace "A democracy has enough to do in providing itself
with an amount of mental corn etency sufficient for its own proper
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work, that of superintendence and check." (38) Dalil claims the
advantage of a model of democracy which operates with a low degree
of citizen participation yet it is bought at the cost of a definition
so loose as to be commensurate with any political regime, To say
of a political system that it is one in which the leaders are more
or less responsive to the preferences of non—leaders is to provide
a charter to which any dictator could happily assent.
Dáhl's theory of polyarchy differs little from the work of
Bentham and James Mill. Though the latter do not specifically refer
to group interests it seems that in their adherence to the
representation of interests they could well have accommodated the
existence of groups and certainly accepted private interests as
constraints on government. Dahi declares that " - for most people
much of the good life is found in small groups." (39) Hence it
follows that "The predominance of small groups is essential in order
to limit the degree of control of leaders over non—leaders". (io)
"The nation—state can only provide the frame'wot'k within which
"the good life" is possible; it cannot fulfill the functions of the
small groups that make up the immediate environment of good living". ('&i)
Government is thus primarily a "black box" into which various
preferences are channelled. No criteria4t-laid down for the
resolution of conflicting preferences, yet it is axiomatic that such
preferences will conflict. 1Where resources are used to satisfy the
preferences of one group they cannot also be used to satisfy the
demands of a rival group. In one sense the resolution of such a
conflict will lie in the strength of the group demand, the latter
deriving from access to infonnation, financial resources, and the
number of votes commanded. Dahi, it appears, expects such conflicting
demands to be resolved in a way analagous to the market economy.
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What is logically required in any system in 'which preferences are
resolved, is some consciousness of "the rules of the game". If
voluntary associations are to predominate in a market democracy then
something more than a mechanism for the resolution of preferences is
re uired. There must be agreement that such associations ought to
exist. For on the basis of the maximizing of preferences alone it
may be in the interests of one group not merely to lobby the
government as keeper of the nation's resources, but to secure its
position b-v direct action against its rivals, or the government, or
by uniting with other groups.
This leads to a most important conclusion against the revisionist
thesis in general. Individuals and groups in market democracy
participate primarily for the satisfaction of preferences. If
however parties participate on this premise how shall we guarantee
that a fabric of peaceful, open competition between individuals and
groups shall be maintained? To be sure Dalil anticipates the problem
when he declares "lblyarchy also requires agreement on those basic
issues and those methods that facilitate peaceful competition and
the opportunity for non—leaders to switch their support to rival
leaders". (t2) It seems reasonable, however, to ask how such an
agreement might be guaranteed or perhaps more important, to ask how
it could be rational to follow such an agreement. Dahi declares
that "Iui action is rational to the extent that it is correctly
designed to maximize goal achievement, given the goal in question
and the real world as it exists('i3) ithout institutional checks,
'which Dahl ex'olicitly rejects, and with a system of ethics which
equates obligation with desire, peaceful competition seems
problematic. Various solutions are offered by revisionists:
Schunpeter reserves political activity to an elite, Downs relies
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on a "super-preference" of social responsibility, Tullock on private
firrational* satief actions, Dahl places the problem of ensuring
"correct" social behaviour partly with gront)s and partly with
schooling.
Dahl correctly anticipates a mere reliance on the market
economy of preferences will not sustain the social system,
	 or
those groups who profit by the status quo the system is rational
enough, but not for the losers. For the losers government action
is not a possibility since they cannot win on an aggregate of
preferences. For an overriding preference for the "rules of the
game" to work all groups must obtain greater satisfaction from abidino
by the rules of peaceful competition, than they lose by an inability
to realize their policy goals. In the case of groups persistently
failing to obtain policy goals a continued adherence to the norms
of peaceful conmetition would appear to be irrational, This is
irrational even though group members may have some private admiration
for peaceful competition. ror on the one hand they may calculate
that by steprdng outside the norms of peaceful competition the system
will only be marginally diminished in its orientation, and secondly
in the face of a continued failure to achieve policy goals there will
arise an inevitable dissonance between admiration for the system and
disaipoinnent at the failure to achieve satisfaction through the
system.
Dahl attempts to preserve rolyarchy in a way far more drastic
than thorough-going market revisionists like Downs, Tullock and
Riker could possibly contemplate owing to their marked emphasis on
the individual rather than the group preference, In doing so Dahi
ridicules attempts to foster individual autonomy, to preserve an
element of choice, and to treat people as ends, He argues that
the wholesale social engineering he attempts is no more drastic
7
than anything liberals have ever done." Whatever might be made of
his charge against liberals, there is no doubt that Dahi is
inconsistent in his advocacy of social engineering. Polyarchy is
to be preserved by norms instituted by "successful indoctrination".
(l&li). To maintain polyarchy " - the norms and habits must be built
into the very depths of the unconscious". ('i5) He remarks "that
polyarchy - or indeed any stable structure of control must rest
uüon successful indoctrination is now hardly contested". ('i6)
Yet he also takes up a view on social engineering reminiscent of
Burke rather than lousseau. He advocates a piecemeal approach to
social change, cautious, and suspicious of the potential of reason
to produce a desirable remodelling of society. "Incrementalisin
is a method of social action that takes existing reality as one
alternative and compares with probable gains and losses of closely
related alternatives by making relatively small adjustments in existing
reality, or making larger adjustments about whose consequences
approximately as much is known as about the consequences o existing
reality, or both". (Li7)
"Patching up an old system is the most rational way to change
it, for the patch constitutes about as big a change as one can
comprehend at a time". ('&8)
One wonders therefore how Dahl can reconcile his position as
an avid supporter of indoctrination and yet also as an increinentalist.
For if the essence of increnientalisin is rofotmd caution in the
management of social change in the structure of society, the
characteristic of oolyarchy is the inculcation of unshakeable
beliefs about the social and political order. So that on the one
hand we have an awe of change, and on the other wholesale intervention
in society to secure adherence to polyarchy. Thus it is hard to
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resist the conclusion that for Dahl wholesale intervention is
pennissible only to secure the maintenance of polyarchy, otherwise
it is susect. Indeed Dahl mak a the latter emDirically valid
by- contriving a very limited role for the state in polyarchy and
a wide role for sectional interest groups. We can hardly agree,
I think, that Dahi 'a pronosals for the maintenance of polyarchy
merely amount to the patching up of an old system.
Incrementalism is not merely a proposal about what can or cannot
be done in the way of social chanoe, it is also about what ought
and ought not to be done. It is an added bulwark to polyarchy,
an attempt to present a value judgement in the guise of an empirical
generalization.
Dahi defends his group politics and especially the inculcation
of unshakeable beliefs in polyarchy by claiming that liberals in
fact do much the same. This is an extraordinary and important
argument. In essence Dahl claims that no society, no matter how
liberal or democratic it might appear to be, can avoid either the
psychological or the moral problem that social processes, the total
environment, helps to mould the individual. 1ypically he thinks
that liberals try- to avoid the problem by- an absence of direct
interference with the person, but this absence of interference is
a mere illusion.
"By- concerning themselves with the general framework of society
rather than direct control over personalities, liberals solved a
psychological problem and anpeared to believe they were solvin
a moral one. - it might be said that the moral problem was solved
by avoiding direct action in shaping htunan personalities, in order
to follow the categorical imperative of Kant according to which
men are to be treated as ends and not means. Yet this is to avoid
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the problem rather than solve it. - whether men take social
actions consciously and purposefully or not, their social processes
do in fact help to mould personalities. Second, the moral
distinction between controlling the broad framework and direct
control is very shaky. One treats man as a means in
	 sense
only if he is looked upon exclusively as an instrument to one's own
goals." ('9)
"Finally, to the extent that one believes that some norms,
attitudes and. social processes foster widespread opportunities for
freedom and others do not, one is logically coimiitted to favouring
the kinds of personalities predisposed to the norms, attitudes, and.
social processes that one desires. No more than totalitarians
can democrats shrink from the prospect of social action directly
to foster desired personality types in their society." (50)
Dalil is of course correct in his contention that the social
milieu of a person's youth have some influence on his personality,
He is further correct in implying that there is a moral problem
inherent in the social process namely that the decision to abstain
from programming a person's environment with a view- to fostering a
particular type of personality, itself Is a value judgement. It
is in that respect only that the moral distinction between controlling
the broad framework and direct control is very shaky. Of greater
significance is whether the personality will be permanently
inhibited from ever depending on its own judgement, making its own
choices, possessing any integrity. It seems in the case of Dahl's
polyarchy that the failure to realize the latter is a distinct
possibility. In his advocacy of indoctrination DaIil assumes that
means are instrumental and ends final and thus he wants to claim
77
that such processes are justified by the 'freedom' which they
eventually produce. In his desire to institute an unshakeable
belief in polyarchy, Dahl confounds the very value of freedom which
he champions. Dalil claims that one treats man as a 'means' in
Kant's sense only if he is looked upon exclusively as an instrument
to one's own goals yet this is precisely 'what Dahi advocates in
producing polyarchical man. He argues that a belief in norms such
as freedom logically entails favouring certain personality types.
1it again he assumes a 8imple means—end relationship. For one
thing there is clearly a difference between Dahl's notion of a
democratic personality and the rational chooser of early democratic
theory. Evidence in favourtof the latter suggests that there are
certain invariant stages through which the rational chooser
progresses before reaching autonomy. These stages are incommen-
surate with a programme of indoctrination promulgated by Dahl.
Again, the values of a democrat may not merely logically predispose
him towards a certain personality type but also act as constraints
on the process of education of the individual. To this extent
means will be expressive and ends will be immanent.
It is also true that Dáhl's prescription for the preservation
of polyarchy is inherently fragile. Polyarchy is to be favoured
because it permits the satisfaction of preferences on the part of
the ruled. If such a system is self—evidently good it is difficult
to see why Dahi has to introduce indoctrination to support it.
Of course, we could say of most political systems that they do this
but presumably that is why Dahi is prepared to involve indoctrination
for polyarchy. It is unstable in that presented with rational
argument a product of polyarchy is thrown back on a coris of
convictions which he cannot justify.
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bove all in h advocacy of polyarchy ahi neglects the
essential point that the small groups which he c ampions, the good
life which he alleges is to be found in such gron s, was as a matter
of history made possible not by the chain ioning of anpetitive
ureferences but by the value bequest of early democratic theory.
Dahi's solution to the inefficacy of external checks in a democracy
was to suffocate moral imperatives altogether. In so doing he
divorced the existence of his reputedly autonomous grouns from the
very ideological roots which ustified them. The pluralism which
Dahi favours so much is the effect of a particul r consciousness
of the dignity and rationality of man. It was this philosophy
which provided the justification to achieve the limited government
Dahi so ardently supports and not the claim that men should be able
to indulge in appettive preferences per se. lie states " - in all
countries where popular governments have thrived, a great variety of
associations have enoyed considerable autonomy - political parties,
Trade Unions, Churches, lobbies, pressure groups, and the like." (51)
Thit such associations were historically antecedent to popular
government, and were by no means able to enjoy autonomy at large
prior to nopular government. Their importance was that in their
procedures they exemplified and practised autonomy.
Moreover it is not the case that they believed in pluralism
per se, rather that pluralism was a consequence of the realization
of their demands. The latter were moral claims not appetitive
preferences. In his Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke made the
moral claim that "the busin 88 of laws is not to rovide for the
truth of opinions, but for the safety and security of the
Commonwealth - ". (52) The strungle for religious toleration
in fligland gave moral force to political democracy. It was true
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of dssident groups that "In their constant struggle to maintain
their own independence th y laced a perpetual check upon the
absolutism of the civil authority, and they develo ed a theory of
resistance that lead ultimately to democracy and freedom." (53)
The moral imperative also ensured a highly democratic procedure.
"The foundations of modern de ocracy are to be found in the Church
meetings of the Independents and Baptists, and the Class Meetings
of the Methodists. The form of ecclesiastical government was a
christocracy run by democrats." (54) "Reason cannot be kept down
for ever, and Protestant regard for the individual soul could and
did enlarge into respect for the individual judgement." (55)
Unions also were the progenitors of popular government, not its
result. The Chartist Movement demonstrates the presence of the
pressure of democratic demands from unionists. Their aims were
T)olitical and not economic universal adult manhood suffrage, annual
parliaments, equal electoral districts, abolition of pro',erty
qualification, and payment for Members of Parliament.
My point is th-it the nature and beliefs of the associations
'which Dahi finds so characteristic of polyarchy, is anti athetic to
an indoctrination in the norms of polyarchy and the wholesale
pursuit of aiirnetitive preferences. Further the emancipation which
such grous have achieved is grounded in moral argument, something
'which a product of ahi's polyarchy would seem to be incapable of.
These groups with their preoccu'ration with the dignity of the
indiv-idual, with moral conviction, are the antipathy of government
by preference. The logic of an advocacy of government by preference
is the presum tion that the functions of government are so minimal
or insignificant as not to jus ify the use of reason. This cannot
be the case in Dahl's poly rchy for there government has at least
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the important function of ensuring that the "rules .f the game"
are followed. Dahi finds institotional checks and balances
inefficacious for this Jrpo.e, and instead relies on indoctrination.
Yet the norms of the voluntary groups he wishes to rely upon are
themselves antipathetic towards indoctrination, favouring as they
do an emphasis on individual reason and autonomy. These values
logically coomit such groups to educating individuals rather than
acquiescing in a state where men were in blind obedience to polyarchy.
In his advocacy of revisionist democracy Dahi misconstrues the fact
of pluralism. Though he might care to construe the demands of
groups as preferences it is not possible for the latter to provide
a justification for this activity.
In his advocacy and determination to sustain polyarchy by means
of an unshakeable coitment to its practices, Dalil robs it of
rational sanction. He removes f rem the area of debate the value of
goals, and focuses attention on the means to attaining those goals,
"There are two basic prerequisites to rational social action by an
individual or group. The actor most make rational calculations
about the ways in which the attAin.ent of his goals can be
maximized in the real world. And the actor must be able to control
others whose responses are needed to bring about the desired state
of affairs." (56) A political tra n4ng for polyarchy is a training
in bargatnfng and lobbying. &tccesa for the individual in polyarchy
is to be judged not on how worthy his cause is but how many
politicians he controls and how far he can effect a given change.
In his construction of polyarchy Dahl thus provides a system
antipathetic to any moral democrat. His advocacy of an unshakeable
belief in polyarchy is the result of a prior judgement that rational
consensus about polyarchy is not possible. In so doing Dahl
violates the very genesis of polyarchy which is the values and
norms of autonomous groups.
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iv. Downs and Fconoinic Democracy
There are both similarities and differences between Downs and
his supporters and Schuinpeter and Dahl. In brief, groups matter
far less than in Dahi, elections matter more. Whilst Schumpeter
controls the electorate by keeping them out of politics and Dáhl
controls them by indoctrination; Downs and his school control them
by ensitring that political activity leads to a maximization of
individual utility—income. Downs makes explicit the materialistic
view of man entertained by the other revisionists. He makes the
now familiar confusion between descri ption and prescription
encountered in Schwnpeter and is thus vulnerable to the same counter-.
arguments. At the climax of his thesis he finds utility
maximization unsatisfactory for explaining some features of political
behaviour and introducas the notion of social responsibility in an
attempt to shore up his case. It is my contention that this rescue
attempt is unsuccessful and leaves Down's brand of democracy with
a fatal flaw.
Early on in his thesis Downs makes a blunt statement:
- we do not take into consideration the whole personality of each
individual when we discuss what behaviour is rational for him.
We do not allow for the rich diversity of ends served by each of
his acts, the complexity of his motives, the way in which every part
of his life is intimately related to his emotional needs. We
assume that he approaches a situation with one eye on the gains
to be had, the other eye on costs, a delicate ability to balance
them, and a strong desire to follow wherever rationality leads him."
(57)
Downs statement may be taken in one of two ways:
a) Men do as a matter of fact approach situations in the light
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of a cost—benefit trade—off.
b) Men ought to approach situations in this way.
Now Downs does make the claim that: "To avoid ethical premises
we define democratic government descriptively." (58) He maintains
that: " - the central purpose of elections in a democracy is to
select a government. Therefore a citizen is rational in regard
to elections if his actions enable him t. play his part in selecting
a government efficiently." (59) Finally, "Upon this reasoning rests
the fundamental hypothesis of our model; parties formulate policies
in order to win elections, rather than hold elections in order to
formulate policies." (60)
There is a general difficulty about this position. To say
that an action is rational is to say that it coheres with a certain
framework of explanation, that is considered to be desirable. What
Downs offers is an explanation and commendation of political
behaviour of a certain variety. If we are to offer a descriptive
account of political behaviour then we must say what it is that
people do. There are difficulties in this course of action.
Where we confine choice to a particular paradigm such as utility
maximization, we are also narrowing it, since other paradigms, such
as moral dilemmas, are being excluded. Where we declare that a
given choice is rational we are thereby commending that paradigm.
On Downs own admission what he has done is to limit the construction
of human behaviour and action. Downs would readily admit that his
rational man would not suddenly change f rum one mode of behaviour
to another. Rational action under Downs thereby commends a society
in which the finest elements of men cannot be accorded recognition
or encouragement. Where in a society bargaining and opportunism
flourish, and are highly regarded there are strong pressures on
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the individual to follow. Mill declared that "The play, therefore,
of the political machine acts immediately upon the mind, and 'with
extraordinary power; but this is not all, it also acts upon
almost everything else by which the character of the mind is apt
to be formed." (61)
It is also the case in Downs that the rulers are as
acquisitive as the ruled. "The politiciaxm in our model never
seek office as a means of carrying out particular policies; their
only goal is to reap the rewards of holding office per se." (62)
That also has implications for society: "Now this is certain, that
the means by which the grand objects of desire may be attained,
depend almost wholly upon the political machine. When the political
machine is such that the grand objects of desire are seen to be the
reward, not of virtue, not of talent, but of subservience to the
will, and command over the affections of the ruling few; interest
with the man above to be the only means to the next step in wealth,
or power, or consideration, and so on; the means of pleasing the
man above, become in that case, the great object of pursuit. And
as the favours of the man above are necessarily limited - as some,
therefore, of the candidates for his favour can only obtain the
objects of their desire, by disappointing others - the arts of
supplanting rise into importance, and the whole of that tribe
denoted by the words intrigue, flattery, back—biting, treachery,
are the fruitful offspring of that political education which
government, where the interests of the subject many are but a
secondary object, cannot fail to produce. (63)
It would seem that an explanatory model of a political system,
and of democracy in particular, which does, " - not allow for the
rich diversity of ends served by each of his acts, the complexity
of his motives —n (6i) is contentious in the extreme. There is
not merely the valuative notion of rationality employed, there is
in addition a deductive outcome from the original premises themselves
which requires examination. Taking Down's cowent: "We assume that
he approaches a situation with one eye on the gains to be had, the
other eye on costs - government seeks to maximize political support;"
(65), there is implicit the notion of an equilibrium. The rational
voter in Down's democracy reacts to a situation to the extent that
anticipated gains exceed costs. Where he can no longer move to
a situation in which gains exceed costs, he is in equilibrium, and
in a state not merely desired but also desirable. The nature of
the costs and gains is irrelevant except as countervailing force
fields. Though a voter appears to act on a situation insofar as
he seeks to maximize gains, he in fact largely reacts to it since
the costs and gains themselves are significant only for equilibrium
purposes.
The above indicates certain results when contrasting the
situation facing a convinced democrat, and a Downsian democrat living
in a "safe" seat and supporting the dominant party. The convinced
democrat addresses himself to the moral obligation laid upon him
as a result of his conviction for democracy. He might consider
the position along the following lines. Since I am a democrat
I ought to turn out and vote in this election, even though my vote
may not of itself affect the outcome in this seat. Firther, I
ought also to vote on the basis of an informed choice, for to do
otherwise would denigrate the act of voting to an ape—like response.
The Downsian democrat cannot address himself to an obligation, since
to do so is to confound the explanatoiy model which Downs proposes.
He is bound to look at the election in terms of costs and benefits.
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This has really two effects:—
a) All information relating to the election becomes the subject
of a trade—off, i.e. Is it worth my acquiring this information?
b) The act of voting is suspect. Is it worth turning out to vote
in a safe seat?
(a) is a function of (b) and varies directly with it in that
almost any cost in acquiring information is not worthwhile if one's
particular constituency is a safe seat, since if support is for
the 'safe' party they will win despite such information as might
be obtainable by the individual voter, and if one's support is not
for the 'safe' party, the loss from the policies they enact will
be increased by any cost incurred in procuring information about
policies. Political activity becomes a means to a selfish end.
All equilibrium models are inherently selfish, based as they are
on self—referential assessments.
However, there is the situation of the Downsian who says
that democracy as a political system offers benefits in general
to him, which he would rather not do without and he must therefore
vote for that reason. This is not an argument from obligation as
the costs and benefits associated with the institution of an
elected government may- be long term as well as short term
phenomena.	 it there is nonetheless a difficulty here for Downs.
If in reacting to a situation such as the prospect of whether to
cast a vote I reckon merely the long term benefits which I
anticipate accruing to me from an elected government, it is
arguable that I have not assessed the situation very well. For
I have ignored the possibility that the benefits I seek from
representative government are not dependent in any direct way
upon the costs I incur in participating in the institution of voting.
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Once I apprehend that my act of voting plays a minimal part in
installing an elected government, then the cost of voting seems
likely to almost always outweigh the benefit. The benefits of
an elected government, whatever I might consider them to be,
arise in spite of what I do, rather than because of what I do.
I do not really see that Downs can object to this latter
argument. It is essentially merely an instance of rational
self interest, an ethic he appears to endorse in his assumption
that men approach a situation with one eye on the gains to be had,
and the other eye on costs. He does not stipulate that the gains
I apprehend can only accrue from any costs which I incur, and he
produces no ethical argument to say why the former ought to be the
case. Certainly on his premises there is no way in which an astute
citizen can face the charge that by not casting his vote, despite
a professed enthusiasm for democracy, he is thereby taking a moral
ho li day.
To some extent Downs appears to anticipate this dileimna,
since he concedes on the basis of his analysis that:
1) "rational citizens want democracy to work well so as to gain
its benefits and. it works best when the citizenry is well
informed;
2) it is individually irrational to be well informed". (66)
Downs attempts to extricate himself from this dilenmia by an
appeal to the concept of social responsibility. He argues that:
1) "Rational men in a democracy are motivated to some extent by
a sense of social responsibility, relatively independent of
their own short—run gains and losses.
2) If we view such responsibility as one part of the return from
voting it is possible that the cost of voting is outweighed
by its returns for swne but not all rational men". (67)
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In this appeal Downs attempts to shore up a fundamental weakness
in his position. lie declares that: "Since voting is one form
of insurance against this catastrophe, i.e. the fall of democracy,
every rational citizen receives some return from voting per se,
when voting is costly." We seem to have implicit the unargued
assertion that rational citizens prefer democracy to any other
political system. Yet why should they do so, except on the
grounds that it maximizes their utility? %hat rational citizens
want from situations facing them is benefits per se. It is a
further matter entirely to claim that they want the benefits of
democracy. If Downs is to achieve that he has to show that
democracy always and necessarily maximizes citizen benefits.
Understandably, he does not attempt to do that.
Downs claims the notion of social responsibility is independent
of short run gains and losses. It contrasts obliquely with his
rnininations that it may be rational for politicians to encourage
voters to be irrational. If the concept of social responsibility
is to stand Downs must admit another value in to his system other
than the rational self interest he has consistently espoused.
Social responsibility can be made to cover situations where there
is a net loss in the trade off between costs and benefits to the
individual.	 To be consistent social responsibility must be
construed not as an obligation on the part of the democrat, but
as one of the gains from democracy. &it it is difficult to see
how social responsibility will always be commensurate with self
interest. Downs appears to assume that social responsibility will
always represent a gain for each rational citizen. Nothing could
be further from the truth. For the powerful and well organized
social responsibility is an inconvenience, a cost it would not
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be rational to bear since it would minimize the net gains available.
Such groups may not need or want political equality or elections.
To appeal to social responsibility for them is not to appeal to a
long term gain, but to a system which limits their influence and
affords a measure of protection to their opponents. 1hy should
they regard the collapse of democracy as a catastrophe?
There is in addition the notorious difficulty that for the
individual voter, rational action encourages him to calculate whether
others will rally to the consideration of social responsibility.
If he considers that they will, what incentive remains for him to
vote on these grounds? It might be argued that this consideration
of how others will respond, is something he will have to include in
his calculations. But quite apart from the point that this will
lead to an infinite regress, there is the fact that Downs makes
no mention of the attitude of leaders towards the concept of social
responsibility. For weak parties there is a sense of protection
from the idea of social responsibility, but there are also costs in
the form of competing for survival with other parties. For strong
parties there is little incentive to remain in a state of competition
with its attendant uncertainties. Downs implies that there is a
sudden catastrophic cut-off point for democracy, but this need not
be the case. For all parties, an oligopolistic situation offers
the saving of uncertainty, their gravest cost. If the rational
voter seeks a trade-off, so also does the politician. If the
rational voter can act strategically, so also can the politician.
By co-operation, rather than competition, he can reap the rewards
of office.
Given his predilection for appetitive preferences and rational
self-interest, Downs has to derive social responsibility from
individual preferences. Yet paradoxically social responsibility
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appeals to a consideration of the political macrocosm. It implies
the existence of a uility function of a higher order than that
posited to exist for individuals, implying in turn that the rational
self-interest approach to politics breaks down at a crucial point.
The latter is the fact that individual actions have social
consequences which aggregate to the social environment.
Considering the difficulties entailed in accommodating the
concept of social responsibility in a rational self-interest model,
it is not surprising that such a move is abandoned by other theorists.
Some such notion, however, has to be introduced by them since in
their attempt to account for political behaviour in modern
democracies they have to explain, amongst other things, the
relatively high turn-out in general elections. This is of course
a problem for the market democrat since as we have seen with Downs,
the rationally self-interested voter can apprehend that his vote is
an infinitesimally small contribution in a safe constituency, towards
the final result. It is something of an irony that as the classical
construction of man surpasses in complexity the overt, acquisitive
simplicity of Downs construction of man, the notion of a macrocosm
perspective to voting becomes easier to accommodate. There is
simply no place for social responsibility in Down's economic man,
a concept far more readily entertained in Rousseau's political
theory of sentiment or Kant's social Contract as an idea of
reason. (69)
v. Tullock, Riker and the Disposal of Social Responsibility
Social responsibility appeared to be the essential weakness
for Downs and by implication for economic democracy. Yet Downs
is by no means representative of economic democracy, and there is
to be found amongst his contemporaries a pre-Nozick flavour,
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sufficient in the end to dispose of the besetting problem of
social responsibility. (70) This was not accomplished without
difficulty, but essentially the achievement occurred through both
a progressive diminution of the parameters of human action until
it sat firmly in one ilobbesian desire/action model, and a brilliant
bifurcation of public and private rationality (71) such that
however bizarre one's own conception of political acts, such as
voting might be, such a construction was always and everywhere publicly
efficacious. Social responsibility is redundant when it is
appreciated that a populace contains individuals who are absurd
enough to endow their political acts with a piety, purpose, and
significance wholly in excess of their own wants and appetitive
preferences. These are Rousseau's government of gods for whom
all political preferences are manifestations of responsibility.
Sufficient gods will ensure the survival of a rationally self—
interested community.
Tullock writes of his work 'The Vote Motive': "All the
propositions of this Book depend on the premise that governments
exist for our satisfaction not to promote our moral consciousness
or to encourage us in any way to honour or lead us to recognize
our obligations." (72) "It is an analysis of how people behave
in the world as it is, not how they should behave, it is behaviour
or positive economic theory of what is, not normative theory of
what should be." (73) Tallock also declares: "In modern economics
and in the political theory which is now developing out of
economics, the preference schedule has now substituted for man." (71i)
An integral part of this thesis is a persuasive account of
rationality which equates the latter with practical rationality.
The latter has a peculiarly stultifying effect on human action.
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It will be shown that if I vote for a party because I endorse its
principles, if I construe the act of voting as a moral act, rather
than a tie breaker leading to the formation of an administration,
I have acted irrationally. This conclusion, which inevitably means
that a good deal of voting behaviour is irrational, has attracted
little criticism. Not merely does it fail to cohere with moral
action, but it also conflicts with any concern with epistemic-
rationality.
S.I. Benn criticizes practical rationality: "An action is
practically rational if, given 'whatever beliefs the agent has, it
is done for reasons that relate to optimisin,g in terms of his ends.
A person would exhibit practical rationality (or at any rate formal
practical rationality) embracing an epistemically irrational belief
if, despite its failing to satisfy the relevant criteria of true
belief, he embraced it because it made him feel good and feeling good
matters more to him that having true beliefs. Similarly he would
exhibit a high degree of epistemic rationality but be practically
irrational if an obsessive concern for ensuring that his beliefs
were true prevented his attaining any of his goals - even perhaps
his goal of having true beliefs; for the extreme of episteinic
rationality may be total scepticism." (75)
Benn does not state that optimising in terms of ends relates
to utility and it is an important point that the optimising of an
action need not necessarily terminate in utility. A man faced with
a moral choice may undertake a course of action which does not ensue
in satisfaction. The difficulty with practical rationality as Benn
presents it is that it entails an indifference towards the end,
other than personal preference. It is a means—end instrumental
phenomenon. Practical rationality assimilates all questions about
ends to technical questions, omitting the issue of 'whether the end
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itself is desirable. Practical rationality per se is a licence
to grasp at the trivial as well as what is worthwhile, to construe
any end as desirable. Indeed it sets a primacy upon what is
quickly realized, upon the apparent, the concrete, the quantifiable.
In a macrocosm of practical rationality there seems no protective
area for what is intrinsically valuable, for achievements that are
laboured rather than inmiediate, shared rather than self—centred.
Given the relationship sketched so far between the norms of society
and the curriculum, the effect on education will be direct.
Practical rationality must of course take place within a
framework of beliefs, though these need not be true. And it is
the case that true beliefs may be a necessary condition for the
achievement of an action that is practically rational. Thus,
suppose that 'A' strongly desires a protectionist economic policy
and. proposes to vote for a party 'N' which advocates a strong free
market economic policy. A's action can be challenged on the basis
of the fact that his desired end of protection is wilikely to cohere
with the policy of party N. We cannot, however, on any theory
of practical rationality, criticize the end protection, per se.
In the sense of practical rationality, then, an action can be
irrational as a consequence of a lack of epistemic rationality.
Thus, in the example given, if A knew some economic theory, be would
appreciate the incompatibility between adherence to free market
economics and a strong advocacy of protection, hence he would not
vote for party N. The revisionists would admit the necessity for
holding true beliefs, insofar as these aid practical rationality.
But again, on this view, true beliefs would be merely a means and
not an end. The aid would be the utility accruing to the individual.
It is clear, too, on this view that the value of epistemic
rationality is only contingent. It is contingent in the sense
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that it is assumed that the acquiring of true beliefs entails a
cost on the part of the individual and that cost may be irrational
(in a practical rationality sense) if it is less than the expected
gain to be obtained, given the payment of the cost. A society
might then acknowledge an instrumental argument for developing
epistemic rationality, by government or private agencies, because
it does maximize practical rationality, but such a project would
entail costs and there remnns the issue of how that cost should
be supporled.
A somewhat related difficulty with this species of revisionist
democracy is anticipated by Beun who argues: "The difficulty in
the case of political participation is that a system would be
self—stultifying if it depended on numbers of people forming rational
beliefs about politics and acting on them, while yet for almost
anyone to do that would be to expend effort he could use to better
advantage elsewhere," (76) We need to ask, however, why it matters
that the system would be self—stultifying? Clearly for an ethic
of autonomy, of personal dignity, it matters since it is logically
necessary to the concept of autonomy that men choose the principles
by which they live. If men are to choose how to live they must
be given true beliefs about different styles of life. To
deliberately propagate false beliefs to an individual is to limit
his choice, because he has only misleading accounts from which to
choose, and to deny him respect by deciding for him on an issue
which he is not entitled to decide for himself, It is to treat
him as a moral child.
The revisionists do not of course mind on value grounds
whether the system is self—stultifying since they are only concerned
with the stability of the system and the maximization of utility
9?*
income. Downs appears to have become alarmed on contingent
grounds at the self—stultifying effect because it may threaten
the system, and hence he introduces his idea of social responsibility
which have already criticized. Downs noted that if personal
rationality requires that people act to maximize their utility
income, a rational voter will perceive that the chance of his own
vote making a crucial difference to the policies adopted, and so
to his utility income, is so small that voting would rarely be
worth the effort. Unless this can be supplemented in some way,
as Downs attempts to do with his concept of social responsibility,
a democracy of practical rationality would collapse.
The same dilemma essentially faces Biker and Ordesbook.
They extend " - the range of conditions that could count as costs
and benefits to include any consideration whatsoever that someone
could have as his reason for action." (77) Though Tullock provides
this same blanket coverage for action it is in fact clear that he
subscribes to practical rationality. In his work The Vote Motive,
Tullock states, "Democratic political structures are explained in
terms of how well they can be expected to get for people what they
really want." (78) Similarly he is driven with Downs to acknowledge
that in many situations voting is an irrational act. But this
problem is faced differently by Biker and Ordesbook. They argue
that, " - the conclusion that voting is an irrational act follows
from an incomplete and misleading specification of a citizen's
calculus." (79) They refer in particular to an equation of
Tullock's, evaluating the benefits of voting. Their point is that
Tullock defines 'B' which is the expected utility of voting, less
the expected utility of abstaining, in a function which is far too
restricted. In the Tullock equation B = PB - C, where C is the
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cost of voting, B is the differential benefit that an individual
voter receives from the success of his more preferred candidate
over his less preferred one, and P is the probability that the
citizen will by voting materially affect the outcome. Since P
is assumed to equal one divided by the number of voters, it is
asserted that PB must be a very small number so that C outweighs
PB, leaving R negative. But Biker and Ordesbook argue that Tullock
ignores the private benefit of voting which is substantial. The
factors contributing to it include the satisfaction of complying
with the ethic of voting, the satisfaction from affirming allegiance
to the political system, and the satisfaction from affirming a
partisan preference. These items are usually regarded as costs,
but for those who enjoy the act of informing themselves for the
decision, these supposed costs are actually benefits.
It is therefore easy to explain away the problem which faced
Downs and Tullock, viz, that people incurred the cost of voting in
the face of the most miniscule benefit. Such behaviour is easily
assimilated by claiming that though the benefit is miniscule in terms
of the chances of effecting a change of government, the benefit in
terms of private satisfaction, for example at the feeling of having
"done one's bit", easily outweighs the cost. Yet this explanation
has a dangerous superficiality about it. It may be possible to
explain such behaviour in these terms, but where exactly does this
lead? For the explanation does not mean that people did in fact
construe the act of voting in this way at all. To explain an action
in terms of private satisfaction is not really to say much about
it, at least where political behaviour is concerned. It is much
more significant to ask how an individual saw his action: there
might be all the difference in the world for political education
between voting as an instance of self—actualisation, and voting
because it makes me feel good.
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Biker and Ordesbook claim: " - behaviour is rational - an
assumption which entails an attempt to gain a benefit. Since in the
case of voting it turns out, on close analysis that getting a benefit
is logically related to breaking a tie, it follows that the closer
an outcome appears to be, the greater the chance of benefit also
appears." (80) in addition: " - we assume that participation is
rational in the sense that it consists of the examination of
alternative actions and the selection of that alternative which gives the
greatest expected utility." (81) The saving formula is that although
the act is irrational in that its public efficacy is very low, it
is rational in terms of private satisfaction. Thit there is something
seriously wrong with this concept of rationality. Granted that there
might be an, " - ideology- of obligation that leads men to participate
by reason of private incentives - ". (82) Any talk of obligation
is incongruous with incentives. In particular, if men participate
by obligation they logically do so because they think they ought,
not because of any benefits accruing to them. We would have to say
therefore that their act of voting was rational because they felt
under an obligation to vote. But here the term rational seems
redundant. Whatever the public efficacy of our act, our vote reflects
our obligation, and is therefore not prone to irrationality. Biker's
use of obligation will not do, unless we legislate to make satisfaction
tautological with the feelings accompanying the termination of each
and every act. In the latter situation as an explanation, the theory
would be bankrupt. "The explanatory force of the theory is reduced
to the research recipe: if the net costs seem too heavy to make an
act plausible that has nonetheless been done, find some compensatory
benefit to account for it: conversely, if the expected net benefits
should have been large enough to excite action that nevertheless did
Policy
Electoral Success
97
not take place, look for some countervailing cost." (83)
We have no means of knowing whether the voter is voting to
appoint a government per se or for reasons of private satisfaction.
Riker's position on the function of voting appears to be (8'i):—
Hi. Participation is rational in the sense that it consists of
the examination of alternative actions and the selection of that
alternative which yields the greatest expected utility-.
H2. Participation is publicly inefficacious insofar as it is
not related to tie—breaking but guided by private satisfaction.
It is nonetheless rational in terms of these private
satisfactions.
Now, Hi contains implicit the condition that selecting the
alternative yielding the greatest possible utility is logically
related to breaking a tie.
Suppose that voter A falls under explanatory hypothesis Hi.
He favours Protectionism in economic policy. He participates in
an election in which there are three parties:
Party T
	 Party U
	
Party V
Mixed TradeFree Trade	 Protectionistpolicy
Traditionally Traditionally Traditionally
Strong	 Strong	 Weak
In order to be subsumed under HI. voter A must concentrate on the
alternatives with a view to selecting that alternative which yields
the greatest possible utility. It is a necessary condition of his
selection behaviour that it be directed to breaking a tie. Now
it appears on past performance that a tie is most likely to emerge
between T and U. A is a protectionist and he can happily- reject
both because he disagrees with T's policy and because in rejecting
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T be has not violated the chance of breaking a tie. In terms of
its economic policy he would prefer to vote for V bnt this violates
the possibility of tie-breaking, since V is unlikely to win.
He therefore decides to vote for U.
Voter B also votes in this constituency. He also is a
protectionist, but in addition he obtains a good deal of
satisfaction from "supporting democracy", of which Toting 8 one
instance. B votes for party V because he has a preference for
protectionism. If he is challenged that his vote has been used
wastefully, because V will not win, his reply is that his
commitment is firstly to democracy, and second to protectionism.
On the Biker view, B's action is publicly inefficacious, yet B
is a convinced democrat and believes that in casting his vote
his action was efficacious in that it affirmed his support for
one part of the democratic apparatus.
We may take two further constituencies:-
Constituency 1
	
Constituency 2
Party A Party B Party X
	 Party T Party V
Chances Strong Weak	 Strong	 Strong Weak
In constituency 1, voter A disagrees equally with 4 and X.
In constituency 2, voter M disagrees with T. In constituency 1,
A, from the point of view of public efficacy must select with a
view to forming a government, and on this basis, B is out. Yet
he dislikes 4 and I intensely.	 We therefore have the paradox
that on grounds of public efficacy, he is disenfranchised. In 2,
on the same grounds, M is also disenfranchised, The logical
consequence of a policy of public efficacy in 2, is that the
system of public contestation ceases: empirically, this will
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not be the case simply because people will continue to vote on the
basis of irrational private satisfactions
All the emphasis in the Biker model is put on tie—breaking
with reference to personal preferenca. Insofar as tie—breaking
is causally connected with forming a government this is clearly
acceptable. But the model is persuasive in at least two ways.
In the first place it loads the activity of the individual
insofar as it represents a search for tie—breaking. In this
respect it minimizes or neglects the activity of persuasion,
discussion, argument, which may be considered part of political
activity. Allied to this is the presumption that there are
merely opinions and preferences instead of principles and judgeinents.
Biker may simply reply that a person may have a preference for
a party because of the extent to which it advances certain
principles. Bat this is at once both superficial and incongruous.
To say that we have a preference for party X because it favours
social justice is at least to suggest that we are not merely
influenced by the fact that party X is rather less likely than
party Y to gain enough seats to rule. Further, it belies the
fact that parties are themselves sometimes occupied with principle
and particularly that they are prepared to take the initiative on
'this issue', despite considerable apathy or opposition.
If people are merely bundles of opinions, aggregating
preferences, controlling leaders on the basis of their satisfaction
of those preferences, it is easy to see that there is little
scope for discussions of principle in party or goversent.
Yet empirically it is the case that parties do get occupied with
issues of principle: inflation, defence, human rights, monetarism,
state control. Does this present the economic democrat with
a telling objection?
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vi. Knowledge, Information, and the New Democrats
It is of course not a necessary conditi.n for my having a
preference for the freemarket economy, that I should understand the
fundamentals of Adam &nith's 'hidden hand'; at seems sufficient that
I can be described as having such a preference if I merely favour
abolition of government subsidies, minimal welfare benefits, abolition
of price control, low taxes, and so on. Yet there is a crucial
difference between preferring these socio-economic policies, i.e.
between falling neatly under the description of a free market
supporter and understanding and recognizing my-self as a free market
supporter. The point is that to qualify for the description or
undergo the categorization of "free market supporter" it is not a
necessary condition that I have the concept of the free market, much
less understand its alternatives.
To the new democrats it is a matter of sheer indifference
whether or not a man has the concept of a free market, or other
socio-economic concepts. 	 Indeed the atteinp to arrive at the
concept as opposed to further information aboat free market policies
and their possible effects on him, would be regarded as irrational,
since despite any private satisfaction gained by flaunting such
information to one's friends, no public efficacy would thereby accrue.
For the latter exists as a result of tie-breaking by utility
aggregation, and. does not therefore depend on conceptual sophistication.
If utility maximization is the key value we might ask 'why it
should be maximized through groups and indiriäuals, and not by
governments? We have here all the standard problems met first by
the classical utilitarians. Downs, Dalil, Biker and Tullock rest
their defence on the individuals awareness of his own preferences
and their possibility of realization. It is assumed by Downs, Biker
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and Tul]ock, and not argued, that governments, whom they fear,
will be under the control of individuals. Neither of these factors
is a logical truth about individuals or governments, much less
can it be built into democracy as such. We have already noted
that the system is actually antipathetic to the acquisition of
socio—political concepts. If information is a necessary means
to control governments it might be anticipated that an instrumental
argument can be found for knowledge, in the Revasionists. This,
however, is surprisingly difficult.
The most ambitious attempt to provide for the individual
aggregation of information, on instrumental grounds, is made by
Downs. "In order to find his current party differential, a voter
in a two party system must do the following: 1) examine all phases
of government action to find out where the two parties would
behave differently. 2) discover how each difference would affect
his utility income, and 3) aggregate the differences in utility
and arrive at a net figure which shows how much one party would
be better than the other. This is how a rational voter would
behave in a world of complete and costless information ..." (85)
Thit there are, as Downs acknowledges, varioms causes of
uncertainty surrounding the voters field of action. The basic
utility which Downs accords to information is that it reduces this
area of uncertainty and not that it enhances his view of the good
society. In particular information may assist voters in assigning
the responsibility to a party for a decline in their utility, in
assessing the repercussions on their utility of some proposed
course of action. Further, as a result of increased information
citizens may be able to introduce a new course of action to the
government. The instrumental value of information is further
evident in Down's discussion of party ideology " - many a voter
finds party ideologies useful because they remove the necessity
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of his relating every issue to his own philosophy. Ideologies
help him focus attention on the difference between parties; therefore
they can be used as samples of all the differentiating standards.
With this short cut a voter can save himself the cost of being
informed upon a wider range of issues." (86) Au ideology for
Downs is not a view of the good society: "According to our basic
hypothesis parties seek as their final ends the power, income,
and prestige that go with office. Ideologies develop out of this
desire as a means to gaining office." (87) In any case: "We contend
that the desire to obtain and keep office per se plays a larger role
in the practical operation of democratic politics than the desire
to implement ideological doctrines or serve particular social
groups." (88)
By means of a party's ideology, then, a voter can make a
forecast both of the more general policies a party is likely to
follow, and also its likely reaction to a particular turn of events,
for governments necessarily meet unanticipated. contingencies.
Downs wants to say that the ideology itself is not the outcome of
a politicians view of the good society, but is rather the politicians
view of what the voter sees as the good society. An ideology is
not here a recipe for the amelioration of the human condition, it
is part and parcel of the seduction of the voters. We might Intuit
that ideologies are the genera of event policies, and hence if
Downs can show that awareness of an ideology is instrumentally
useful, his democracy will entail an education. Unfortunately
Downs is by no means clear about the relationship between ideologies
and events, and as we have seen, between ideologies and the good
life. As Downs presents it an ideology seems to amount to no more
than a series of specific proposals for action. Now this could
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be of some instrumental value to the voter if he were able to
extrapolate from the list of events. Thus if an. ideology
contained events:-
1. Reduce taxes
2. Introduce selective pricing into the health service
3. Abolish subsidies:
the voter may be able to conclude:-
1j	 De—nationalize some state industries
5. Reduce welfare benefits.
But consider what the voter would need to know in. order to
successfully extrapolate (omitting chance guesswork). It is a
logically necessary condition of extrapolation that the data given
be reduced to a conunon trend line. In this example the
extrapolation is a function of the concepts of laissez—faire and
the free—market economic system. Subsequent items of policy
initiative are deduced on the basis of their commensurability with
that particular part of the socio—economic spectrum. Now Downs
makes the rationality of acquiring information a function of the
perceived probability that further investigation will disclose
something important.	 But, paradoxically, we can never estimate
the probability that it will disclose something important unless
we know something about it.
There is evidence that Downs anticipates this conclusion but
attempts to avoid it by stressing the inferiority of ideologies
compared with a knowledge of events. In essence Downs argues:
- the man who uses his ideology differential as a cost—saver
knows something about current affairs. But he does not know as
much as a citizen using issues to make his decisions, because there
are many more issues than philosophic axioms in politics. We call
such compromisers dogmatists because they look at doctrines rather
than behaviour when choosing a party to support." (89) Downs
lOi
fudges the issue here. Assuming Downs equates affairs with events
he makes the logical point that an ideology is at one remove from
a set of events. He then contends that a citizen studying issues
knows more than an ideologist because there are more issues than
philosophic axioms. Presumably he must say that the citizen
studying issues (events) knows more about the issues (events) i.e.
details, than the ideologist, who is not studying the issues, but
is looking at abstract items of policy. Thit the whole point of
knowing about issues and ideologies is to make a decision relating
to the future behaviour of a party. Yet how can one see an event
in a way sufficient to permit predictions without the use of a set
of concepts. It is empirically unsound to argue the activities of
party A in year 1 will be repeated on a one for one basis in year 10.
Parties are essentially amorphous groupings susceptible to the
ascendancy of different wings and themselves working within the
constraints of limited resources and sundry external forces.
Moreover, if parties are as responsive to societal pressures as
Downs suggests, it is empirically the case that their action may
be different from one period of government to the next.
'What I am suggesting then is that if event prediction in the
future is to be as reliable as Downs implies then such a prediction
must be a function not merely of present events, but of a conceptual
grasp of those events as functions of the socio—political spectrum
of parties. That an ideology is more than a mere 8horthand recording
of events, rather that the transposition of events into an ideology
requires a generalization of these events into more fundamental,
sophisticated libraries of concepts, of which events are mere
concrete instances.
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Dahi is less opaque than Downs on this matter of information,
but the locus of information is much more restricted. True Dahl
gives information an important place in his model of po]yarchy,
but information is contingent in the important sense that Dahl is
primarily concerned with the maintenance of democracy, its
sustenance, and not its logical properties. lIe notes that:
- whenever the citizen body is large the chances for extensive
participation and a high degree of public contestation depend to
some degree on the spread of reading, writing, literacy, education,
and newspaper or their equivalentst (90) Of course this is to
some extent catered for contingently in that an advanced economy
- distributes political resources and political skills to a vast
variety of individuals, groups, and organizations. Among these
skills and resources are knowledge, income, status, and esteem,
among specialized groups; skill in communicating and organizing,
and access to organizations, experts and elites." (91) Thit it is
clear that: " - the complexity and richness of beliefs about the
legitimacy of polyarchy no doubt increase with education, political
interest, and involvement." (92)
It is hardly surprising that Dahi goes no further than this,
for the focus of autonomy for Dahl is the group and not the
individual. Dahl 's value is autonomous pluralism. Essentially
the autonomous individual and a macrocosmic nétion of the good
society are seen as posing the threat of unfettered change into
uncertainty. Polyarchy accepts the fact of unequal political
influence hence the beliefs of the leaders and groups receive far
more attention than individuals. "Mien conflicts arise, as they
inevitably do, access to political resources helps individuals
and groups to prevent the settlement of the conflict by compulsion
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and coercion and to insist instead upon some degree of negotiation
and bargaining -. Thus systems of bargaining and negotiation grow
up within, parallel to, or in opposition to hierarchical arrangements;
and. these systems help to foster a political subculture with norms
that legitimate negotiation, bargaining, logrolling, give and
take, the gaining of consent, as against unilateral power or
coercion." (93) it is not the information that people possess,
rather their beliefs which are crucial to polyarchy, and in particilar
aflbelief in the legitimacy of the system. These beliefs must be
held unshakingly, and in blind faith. Dehi sets sufficient store
by them, to make it unnecessary to grapple with any concept of
social responsibility.
There seems something blatantly arbitrary about any political
theory- which does not provide for the very- basic distinction between
information and propaganda or indoctrination, especially when it
claims to be a refinement of democratic models
	 If we ask what
kind of understanding of political phenomena Dahl's voters will have,
we arrive against a blank wall, where group preferences are lumped
together without regard to their merit. Again, if we choose to
describe voters exclusively in terms of expressing attitudes and
registering opinions, we describe voting in such a way that implies
that voters have no responsibility to be well informed and to think
about the issues.
The latter is a reminder of the folly of supposing that the
revisionist thesis will be confined only to political activity.
It will taint any enterprise for whom the public criterion of a
ready calculus can be easily applied. Information can readily be
reduced to a means of "getting on", public activity to a "what's in
it for me" mentality. What is at risk in such a polity is the
public encouragement of activity which finds a purpose within itself.
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For there is no possible value Within such a system which justifies
these activities. If they are threatened then the possibility of
any criticism of the norms of society itself is also threatened.
&ich activities afford the material by which individuals can make
an objective appraisal of what is happening against other possible
alternatives. This further affords some recognition to the dignity
and integrity of the person because in such activities they are n•t
merely the instruments of another as in socialization. This is not
an argument for a "high culture" for a few.	 Rather it is
employing the logical point that the mind is not a given pre-nata
entity, and therefore the developnent of a person must involve
social influences. In addition there is the empirical point that
in some societies that developnent is institutionalised and funded
by public money with a measure of control in the light of what is
thought valuable in society. It is therefore reasonable to suggest
not merely that a means-end social ethic Will transfer to a
succeeding generation of individuals, but also that such an ethic
Will insist that it is quite properly influential on new members of
society. It is to debar the inclusion of conflicting ideals into
education, to preclude debate on different views of man and society.
There seems little that can be recognized as democratic in such a
position.
vii. Conclusion
To sum up, the following points apply in relation to the new
democrats:
1. Market democrats deny that their systems are valuative, yet
notions of self-interested rational individuals, minimum government,
and utility maximization, represent the "good life" favoured by
the new democrats. Their particular conception of democracy was
unfolded in the guise of description. At best they can be charged
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with confusing description and explanation. They claim to be
descriptive, but then follow the style of explanation by
proscribing some features of human behaviour and fastening upon
others.
2. No justification was offered for the rationally self-interested
individual, other than his apparent self-evidence. The revisionist
system claims to correspond to and hence explain political
behaviour; insofar as it claims that men are centres of preferences
and that these preferences ought to be satisfied :in any democratic
political system, the system is also offering a justification.
3. Rational political action was construed on a means-end basis.
This denigrates an important aspect of some empirical political
behaviour and merely demonstrates how ill-adqpted the model is to
coping with this. 	 Indeed what have the new democrats had to
do in order to apply their paradigm of political behaviour to
reality? Ingenious and acrobatic attempts are made to explain
away continued adherence to traditional democratic nonns such as
voting, responsibility, loyalty. For the system to 'work as they
believe it should, Biker and Ordesbook have to omit the "finer
properties of man" from political behaviour, Tullock has to
substitute the preference schedule for men, Downs vainly attempts
to square 'social responsibility' with his utility maximizers,
Dahl has to ensure an unshakeable belief in the legitimacy of his
polyarchy, and Schumpeter recommends that the masses be simply
kept out of politics.
4. Market theorists differ in the matter of necessary- and sufficient
conditions for democracy. All the theorists considered seem to
find elections a necessary condition of democracy.
	 it for
109
pluralists the existence of autonomouis groups is a necessary, and.
not far short of a sufficient condition for democracy. For elitists,
groups are neither necessary nor sufficient, and for economic
democrats provision for private utility maximisation appears to
be a necessary condition.
5. This crude and. ill—fashioned model can do little to explain
the most eminent feature of the democratic polity namely that
it affords the opportunity whereby the engagement in politics
precisely need not be a one—dimensional means—end relationship.
Though it is nowhere explicitly stated the gravest suspicion is
warranted that the revisionist thesis in general rests on an
antiquated philosophy of mind in which all enterprises in which
men engage are enterprises of utility. This is fallacious.
Though pursuing enterprises will increase the utility income of
the person for whom these enterprises are worthwhile, those
enterprises are not themselves enterprises of happiness. Whilst
the revisionists seem bent on equating democracy with the society
which maximizes happiness, they do not seem to appreciate that
the former does not require that what everyone in that society is
doing is just pursuing the maximization of utility. Hence they
do not see that amongst the things that make men happy is being
taken up or involved in a vast range of projects or commitments.
In particular, they do not see that a participatory political and
social system can afford the opportunities for just those sort of
involvement and commitment
6. The above lapse is an unfortunate one, f or in empirical terms
the surest way to eliminate the public opportunities for utility
maximization or happiness, is to translate every activity, every
conceivable rewarding undertaking into a utility calculus, Such
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a currency licenses only those things which it is apt to measure,
the evanescent, the superficial, the slick; omitting challenge,
purpose, obligation, creativity. If these points were recognized,
if politics were construed as affording opportunities for
enhancement and attachment, the revisionists would not have to
legislate such absurdities into their systems in the vain attempt
to find a "societal cement" to prevent their shallow utility
democracies from arimbling. It seems monstrous that any paradigm
of democracy should legislate for a split between public efficacy
and private irrational satisfaction in the very act of voting. For
public efficacy might be better served by the seemingly sentimental
act of "doing one's bit for democracy", by casting a vote. More to
the point, public efficacy on the I?iker model seems to require that
a man stand aside from attitudes which be takes seriously at a deep
level and be aliented from his convictions, merely to become a
strategic voter. The monumental indictment to be levelled at the
extreme revisionist wing is that it makes an attack on individual
integrity. It requires that an individual neglect those actions
and decisions which flow from the projects and attitudes with which
he is most closely identified, in favour of a societal optim1
condition of having a clear cut majority administration. It is thus
a violation of individual integrity. Some people 's commitment to
political interests just is at once more thorough going and serious
than their pursuit of various objects of taste. Men do engage in
projects connected with the support of some cause: abolition of
Field Sports, Nuclear Disarmament. There are in addition other
aims in political participation which flow from some more general
disposition towards human conduct and character, such as hatred of
injustice or of cruelty. To proscribe all such desires is to admit
1IL1
for political activity only the most blatant egoistic motivation.
Yet the departing point of revisionism was the failure of earlier
democratic theory to account for political activity in a democracy.
In place of the lofty concepts of early democratic theory, the new
democrats offer a public criterion of agreement on moral and political
questions which is as redundant as it is universal.
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chapter iii - Moral Democrats and Education
i. Introduction
Earlier in this discussion I drew a distinction between moral
and market conceptions of democracy. In the second chapter I
considered various market theorists and in this chapter I propose to
consider several moral theorists. I have already made preliminary
points about the possibility of a very general relationship between
ethics, epistemology, politics and education, and an attempt was
made to apply this to Plato's Republic, and also consider the
applicability of this model to liberal democracy. (1) It was
suggested that both conceptions of democracy had important implications
for the aims and concept of education. (2) For example, if it is
held that evaluating the constitutions, norms, and goals of the
political and social macrocosm is a task for the majority of citizens,
then clearly some kind of preparation is necessary for this.
Moreover, if a particular conception of democracy entertained the
ideal of the critical citizen, then a preparation which enshrines
these values is necessary. For a critical citizen is one who can
consider the worth or otherwise of that which is around him. This
he cannot do, logically, unless he has other ideals with which to
compare norms and values that are current.
I have considered market democracy in detail and argued that
it has important defects both in its logical and empirical properties,
but also ii its implications for education. (3) I want now to
elaborate on the concept of traditionalR or "Ioral theories of
democracy, and in particular argue that they have implicit the notion
of a WdynamicN political equality which revisionists consider
chimerical. I do not 'want to suggest that this particular concept
is evident 'within the institutions of modem liberal democracies:
indeed I acknowledge that it is not. Thit I do want to suggest that
it is integral to the developuent of democratic theory, even though
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it. application in liberal democracy is tightly controlled. The
latter phrase requires come elucidation.
In chapter I it was noted that the different conceptions of
democracy held in coon the view that a change of government on a
regular statutory basis, was a necessary feature of a democratic
society. ( i ) Liberal democracy entails political equality in the
sense of one man one vote and the possibility of changing the
government by constitutional means.	 The latter of course where it
is to be effective rather than nominal, entails freedom of speech,
association, and Judicial independence. Rit the equality provision
does not go beyond that of formal political equality. It does not
extei, for example, to the possibility either of social and economic
equality, or of participation beyond the mere political level to the
institution of work. Liberalism and iti corollary of privatization
do not of themselves directly support any form of political organization,
but primarily a particular form of economic life. Whereas the
state had been the fountain of the good life in Athens (5), it was
a potential threat to the latter for the liberals. Qhat the
utilitarians achieved was the harnessing of democratic ideas including
equality, and resentuent against arbitrary power, and promoting
through them a form of social and political organization that afforded
liberalism most of what it wanted, especially the division between the
public and the private in people's lives. Pro. the pen of
John Stuart Mill sufficient was written f.r the inference to be drawn
that there was an inverse relationship between state intervention and
a free people. (6) The sovereign rule of pluralism remains a monument
to the success of this doctrine. whilst Mill did not elevate his
reservations about the deleterious effects of state power to the status
of an axiom, I have tried t. show that the most formidable exponent
of pluralism today, has so acted, for how else could he defend his
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prograsme of political indoctrination. (7)
Liberals, and their specifically political wing, pluralism,
have taken, then, 'what are fundamentally democratic ideas and
employed them to buttress a font of social organization a short
of a public moral life and rational social institutions. The
liberal democratic state does provide formal political equality,
it does invoke challenges to arbitrary power, it does stress personal
freedom, but it does not permit such values to measure either its
obsession with privatization or its economic system of industrial
capitalism. Above all, it does not appear to acknowledge that such
values issue logically in an education of the sort I have already
spoken about. (8) Yet there is a body of theorists whose work is
a challenge to the precepts of the above model. iQhat these
theorists did was to continue to develop democratic ideas and
eventually arrived, not at a total state, but a society cosmitted
to educating for the critical citizen.
labelling theorists into rival schools of thought, is I admit
a hazardous enterprise. It is perfectly true that there is much
in comon between Schumpeter and Locke (9) yet I have placed
Schumpeter in one category and Locke in another. This is not a
matter of chronology: locke could be classified es a revisionist
with his lack of attachment to elections, his view of politics as
a regulative activity, his indifference to the political literacy
of the mass of the people, his belief in a "private" pleasure
calculus, and his minial state. IocI, however, introduced the
notion of 'tacit' consent, and. attempted to apply the standard of
Natural Law to politics. In so doing he laid, however embryonically,
the foundations for a political role for the majority, and a standard
of political rectitude beyond expediency. Yet he 'was not prepared
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for the majority of men and women to exercise direct political control.
Though I acknowledge thai that the dividing line at the point
where I have drawn it is not a clear one, as in the case of Locke,
it is nonetheless I believe, a defensible one. J.S. Mill, as I
have suggested, has important similarities with the market democrats.
He was a staunch advocate of proportional representation (10) and
admitted state intervention with reluctance. Yet Mill also perceived
the possibility of government as a means of ameliorating the moral
life and experience of the ordinary man and woman. No ambiguity
attaches to the classification of Rousseau as a 'moral' democrat;
It is indeed a fascinating exercise to oppose the beliefs of
Rousseau and Dahi. The former had a horror of partial associations
which Dahi considers the hallmark of polyarchy. Additionally there
can be no ambiguity on the position of Kant and T.li. Green.
It follows, therefore, that the moral or traditional democratic
theorists whom I discuss may be considered along a continuum,
extending from a clouded perception that there is indeed a moral
dimension to politics, to the position where this moral dimension
becomes paramount, as in Kant, finally to T.H. Green, where the moral
dimension becomes sufficiently imperative for it to be inconceivable
for such a society to be without education. I have stated already
that whatever the latter might also entail, it will include the critical
examination of society. There is, I would submit, an enormous
contrast between utilitarian man, and the postulates of Kantian
ethics. when the latter, with its axiom that men should be treated
as an end, and not merely as a means is applied to polttics, it
entails a much tighter demand on governments, than the utilitarians,
for a political system allowing the greatest possible human freedom
to its citizens. In particular, it is not a logical impossibility
to envisage a political tyranny, yet also a happy society. Yet the
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early utilitarians seemed to stipulate just such an impossibility. (ii)
Since their prime value, however, was happiness, it would seem that
the extent of power and the nature of power of such a government is
beside the point if it could make society happier than the
representative institutions could. Of course it was felt that
happiness arose from pursuing one 's own interests, and that governments
placed restrictions upon society, ultimately affecting such pursuits.
it this cannot rise to the status of a logical impossibility, it
is a mere empirical generalization, elevated into the status of an
axiom by Bentham. Thus I would argue that it is always possible to
envisage a greater amount of happiness accruing to society from the
actions of a benevolent despot. In such a situation the classical
utilitarian would have to champion the former society against
democracy and therefore I conclude that the connection between
classical utilitarianism and democracy is essentially contingent.
Kant cannot be so readily dismissed because for him, freedom from
arbitrary power was an essential precondition of moral agency.
In the discussion so far I have employed the term "dynamic"
political equality, and I must at this point explain its use.
Dynamic political equality entails two notions. In the first place
it contains a belief in the possibility and desirability of the
amelioration of men. To some extent it links with the notion of
virtue in ancient political thought insofar as it contains the property
of cognitive developuent. Additionally it envisages that provision
shall be made within the institutions of society, especially the
political system, for the means of hnsn improvement. Dynamic
political equality is the hallmark of moral democrats, as is the
preoccupation with the political system as the principal means of
amelioration. It is thus also the contrasting feature 'with market
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democrats with their formal "passive" political equality.
It should be evident from the points made so far, that "dynamic"
political equality is not manifest equally, or to the same degree,
in moral democrats. Indeed, had it been so, and acknowledged as
having been so, my thesis would be redundant. Bather, the concept
of dynamic political equality evolves in these theorists, rather
than appears explicitly.	 Liberal democracy is the uneasy snal&Ce
of the market and moral theories of democracy. As such, dynamic
political equality, if acknowledged unambiguously, would threaten
some cardinal values of market democracy. What I want to argue
about moral democratic theories is that the presence of a moral
imperative to educate their members, is guaranteed by the truth of
the ethical properties integral to the theory. For example, in
many respects T.li. Green represents the acme of this perception of
conceptual entailment, in his idea of the right to education.
Green acknowledged a prima fade motivation for social action within
the particular ethical propositions he held. 	 A sincere assent to
the latter entailed the recognition of a moral imperative. His
doctrine of self—realization, properly understood, was a refusal
to acknowledge the primacy of instrumental reasons for education,
and a recognition that the ethical properties were themselves
sufficient and proper motivation. Thus an imperative to educate
has here the status of a primary value, freed from the snares of
utilitarian considerations. Insofar as liberal democrats want the
inkeritance of moral democratic theories, and they do, they must,
to be consistent, acknowledge the imperatives iaanent in those
theories. At present they are not prepared to do this, but my
aim is to point out that such an imperative exists in the case of
education.
I an not concerned with the point that societies do take steps
of one sort or another to pass on their beliefs, skills, norms, from
one generation to another. I am concerned rather with the
relationship between the concept of education and the primary values
immanent within their particular political system, and. in particular
within liberal democracy. It is the failure to recognize the link
between these values and education that is threatening to emaciate
the aims of education to a mere endorsement of current economic
requirements, and not any suggestion that such a manoeuvre is circular.
We have the concept of education that we do, partly because of these
values, and it is the failure to perceive this value laden nature of
the concept which threatens, when its utilitarian effects come under
suspicion. (12) Indeed the liberal democrat is now on the horns of
a dilemma. He has the vestiges of a liberal education, which he
cannot now justify and only hanker after, yet at the same time the
former is also found t. be ill-suited to modern utilitarian
aspirations. The malaise of education in a declining economy is
a damning indictaent of the liberal-democrats' paper-thin appreciation
of his political heritage. Dewey's warning on the dangers of trade
education is appositeg
 'Education would then become an instrument of
perpetuating unchanged the existing industrial order of society, instead
of operating as a means of its transformation." (13)
There is, however, besides the value ascendancy of education,
another theme bequeathed by moral democrats which again is ianent
in liberal democracy, but again tightly controlled. It is the matter
that involvement by citizens within the political system itself
required an ability to formulate and express ideas. That formal,
procedural equality was not in itself a sufficient condition, though
a necessary one, for popular control of governments. The primary
means of controlling this strand of thought has been the existence
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of a representative democracy with its concept of authorisation.
Yet as Mill saw, some representatives are better than others and
the problem of selection then ultimately turns on the fund of
infoimed judgement in the public at large. "A democracy has enough
to do in providing itself with an amount of mental competency
sufficient for its own proper work, that of superintendence and
check". (Vt) Nonetheless, the implications of this doctrine were
brilliantly checked by Locke through the device of tacit consent.
ii. Locke and the Levellers
That a connection was anticipated between consent and education
prior to Locke, is clear from the work of the Leve]iers. It is
moreover clear that the notion of consent was definitely stronger
than Locke's doctrine of tacit consent. Locke's preoccupation
with the supremacy of the legislative seemingly radical with its
implied ascendancy over the executive is seen in the context of
the Putney debates, to be quite reactionary. In the former debates,
Bainsborough produced a doctrine of consent which implied that:
- parliament must be inferior to, and limited in power by the
people who choose its members, - every individual's consent to what
is done by the government depends upon his persaial enjoyment of
some actual share in the political process; that is, at least in
his possession of the franchise." (15) overton and Lilburne
envisaged annual parliaments, the separation of powers and a
redistribution of seats among constituencies. Rainsborough forges
an even stronger notion of consent during the Patney Debates:
"- everyman that is to live under a government ought first by his
own consent to put himself under that government; and I do think
that the poorest man in Eigland is not at all bound in a strict
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sense to the government that he haUi not had a voice to put
himself under." (16)
Active consent of this order presupposes an ability to choose
between alternatives, but it may be objected that not very much is
8aid of this particular implication by the Levellers. However,
the Levellers exhibit an understandable preoccupati.n with the
institutional deficiencies and corruption of their day. An
independent judiciary and a reformed and ascendent House of
Commons appeared to be more urgent short term priorities, a point
neglected by Dahl (17) In his polemic on the inefficacy of
institutional checks in a democracy. In fact, in his "Certain
Articles", Overton included the demand: "that in all parts or Counties
of the Realme of igland, and Dominions of Wales destitute of
Free—Schooles (for the due nurture and education of children) may
have a competent number of such Schooles, founded, erected, and
indowed at the publique charges of those respective Counties and
places so destitute, that few or none of the free men of igland
may for the future be ignorant of reading and writing." (18)
Rainsborough was advocating a form of self assumed obligation
which needs to be contrasted with the abstract individualism and
tacit consent of Locke. Notions of self—assumed obligation logically
presuppose that individuals perceive their own interest, for
insofar as they cannot differentiate between their own situation,
their own circumstances, and that of a ebiinged situation or
circumstance it seems illegitimate to talk of their assuming an
obligation. In order for individuals to form perceptions of
political, social, and moral relationships there must be provision
for a moral and social education. The latter imperative is
partly a logical one. A moral and social standpoint does not
arise automatically fro an inbuilt perceptive programme. Bather,
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it develops pan passu with moral and political practice.
"Individuals learn to look critically at their own actions, and
also at the rules and principles that order their social practices
and the institutions of liberal democracy." (19) "Consciousness
is not d±vorced from fox!ns of social life; if individuals are to
do more than merely authorize representatives to act for them, they
must be given the means to do it." (20)
I am suggesting then that it is more than mere coincidence
that an emphasis on the importance of education for citizens varies
directly with notions of consent entertained by different thinkers.
Locke of course could not accept the views of men like Rainsborough
and Overton. The latter's statement on freedom shows how far he
differed from Locke: "For by natura]ibirth, all men are equally
and alike borne to like propriety, liberty and freedome, and as we
are delivered of God by the hand of nature into this world, everyone
with a naturall, innate freedome and propriety even so are we to live,
every-one equally and alike to enjoy his Birthright and priviledge;
even all where of God by nature hath made him free." (21) By-
contrast, Locke wrote for a substantial propertied order, and has
more in common with Schumpeter than Rousseau and Green. Locke,
however, is instructive in that he advocates a metaphysical and
ethical doctrine of potential revolutionary implications, yet manages
to assimilate political action to that of action appropriate to
private conduct. "For Lode there is nothing inherently different
in learning how to make decisions in political matters from learning
how to dispose of one's property." (22) Locke is happy to single
out property rather than knowledge as the quintessence of political
man.
Locke was not much less of a democrat than James Mill; the
latter would undoubtedly have supported Locke 's thoroughly
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utilitarian conjecture that legislators: " - are themselves subject
to the Laws they have made; which is a new and near tie upon them,
to take care, that they make them for the publick good." (23)
His insistence on the supremacy of the legislature, and government
under the rule of law was a modest but significant reforming stand.
11Jfl(j so whoever has the legislature or Supreme Power of any
Commonwealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws,
promulgated and known to the People, not by Extemporary Decrees;
by indifferent and upright Judges, who are to decide Controversies
by the Laws." (2'i)
For Locke, democracy consists in the majority making law
through a supreme legislature."
"The Majority may imploy all that power in making Laws for the
Community from time to time, and Executing those laws by Officers
of their own appointing; and then the Form of Government is a perfect
Democracy. For the Form of Government depending upon the placing
of the Supreme power, which is the Legislature - of these the Community
may make (25) compounded and mixed Forms of Government, as they think
good." Though he considers some form of mixed government the logic
of his utilitarian considerations is that oligarchy and monarchy
are less likely to care for the public good. In addition, Locke
is insistent that the legislature meet regularly, which also
mitigates against absolutism.
Locke's notion of consent is primarily limited to an approval
of the particular political system per se and not to an examination
of each law- on its merits. His view appears to be that the former
justifies the latter. Yet his argument relating to the initial
establishment of the political system is itself a weak one. No
moral justification is offered for the establishment of the procedural
device of majority rule, it emerges simply as the most efficacious
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device for securing the unity of society. Thus he writes:
- it is necessary the body should move that way whither the
greater force carries it which is the consent of the majority -
or else it is impossible that it should act or continue to act as
one body, one community, which the consent of everybody that united
into it, agreed that it should; and so every one is bound by that
consent to be concluded by the majority." (26)
An argument emerges here, viz:
1. Without the consent of the majority it is impossible the Body
remain one.
2. Every individual uniting into it agreed that it th)uld remain one.
3. Therefore every individual is bound by that agreement to agree
to the conclusion of the majority.	 Iktt there is a lacuna
in this argument. Only the insertion of an additional premise
will give a valid argument.
Thus:
la. With the consent of the majority it is impossible that the Body
should not remain one.
In fact (la) is not a logical truth.
1hat Locke 's analogy assumes is:
i) Equal political determination and feeling between every atomistic
individual on every issue.
ii) An identity between particular laws and the community such that
refusal to agree to a law was also refusal to comply with the
community per se.
Yet laws themselves alter the very basis of the community and
society into which we entered. There is no contradiction in
accepting a community as properly constituted, and yet not
acquiescing in some of its laws. Yet Locke assumes that the latter
action destroys the community. Farther, the analogy also breaks
130
down if we assume that different intensities of feeling exist
between different individuals on the matter of political action.
Thus the majority may not in fact represent the 'heaviest' weight
or the strongest pull on the Body
It has long been recognized that there is a measure of
dissonance between Locke's political theory, and his epistemology. (27)
The peculiar passivity of the former is due to its being founded on
a powerful predestination ethic, of Calvinism (28), the latter is
democratic. Locke's Calvinism led him to equate the propertied
with the rational, and poverty with idleness. Essentially therefore
Locke finds no moral imperative as a result of which the state may
legitimately act for the amelioration of men. He would not
acknowledge with Green, that: " - law serves a moral end because it
helps to create certain conditions of life." (29) Nor could he
say with Green, that: "Moral agency is not merely an agency by which
an end is attained but an agency determined by an idea on the part
of the agent, by his conception of an end or function." (30)
It was essentially the conjunction of these two propositions, which
Locke would not accept: that certain conditions of life were
necessary for the determination of the idea on the part of the
agent, for his conception of an end of function. Indeed, he would
not consider it possible that the state could create such conditions.
Locke s prepared to grant only the successful a place in
grappling with the problems of the conmiunity. He does not feel
obliged to grant the facility of considering substantive issues
to the bulk of the population. Lack of property was evidence of
lack of moral and rational fibre. It is hard to escape the
conclusion that the poor had forfeited their spark of rationality
by their failure to succeed materially, or at least they had shown
it to be ill—placed. By the same token, by failing in the index of
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rationality, they had forfeited their right to participation in the
political life of the community, that is they had forfeited their
right to education.
It has been argued that "throughout his work Locke opposed
authoritarianism in intellectual life." (31) To the extent to
which this is true, however, it does nothing to mitigate the dead hand
of his political conclusions. For it was his political stance, and
not his intellectual virtues, which influenced his views on education.
It is not coincidental that in his educational theory, Locke's
emphasis is more on character and less on the specific content of
political knowledge. This is because Locke thinks that certain states
are self evidently desirable such that there can be no dispute about
them. They depend for their realization on enlightened leadership
and corporate acceptance. There is a happy coincidence between
outward material prosperity and inward merit.
"Though I have said - that all Men by Nature are equal, I
cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of Equality, Age or
Virtue may give men a just Precedency; Excellence of Parts and Merit
may place others above the common levelz Birth may subject some,
and Alliance or Benefits others, to pay an observance to those whome
nature, Gratitude or other respects may have made it due." (32)
This alliance between prosperity and character can be endured
because there is no Platonic hierarchy of "political" knowledge.
Insofar as it appeals to the senses, in some degree the property of
all, Locke's epistemology is essentially democratic. In Lockean
empiricism the subject is passive, he is receptive, reflexive,
responsive in the constitution of experience. Even moral knowledge
is grounded in sense experience for without the senses reason would
lack its raw material.
- of experience. In that all our knowledge is founded,
and train that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation
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employed either about external sensible objects, or about the
internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by
ourselves, is that which supplies our understanding with all the mat-
erials of thinking." (33)
Thit there is an element of determinism about this which
Locke readily admits.
"Men, then, come to be furnished 'with fewer or more simple
ideas from without, according as the objects they converse with
afford greater or less variety; and from the operation of their
minds, within, according as they more or less reflect on them." (3ti)
It is a corollary of this statement that our unequal possession
of property makes us see the virtues of being in society differently.
Granted, there is no scope here for philosopher kings searching for
a reality denied to those who are limited to mere appearances.
Yet, locke's epistemology merely invites attention to focus on
the sense limitations of the ordinary individual. Ideas come
from experience, and are the materials of reason and knowledge,
yet experience differs from one individual to another. Locke's
educated man is one who has developed his understanding and gifts
assiduously through his experience of the social, intellectual,
and political worlds, so that he is equipped to tackle the problems
of private and public life.
"The improvement of the understanding is for two ends: first,
for our own increase of knowledge; secondly, to enable us to
deliver and make out that knowledge to others. The latter of these;
if it be not the chief end of study in a gentleman yet it is at
least equal to the other, since the greatest part of his business
and usefulness in the world is by the influence of what he says
or writes to others." (35)
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The product of such a system is an enlightened 'all rounder'.
"The business of education - is not, as I think, to make them perfect
in any one of the sciences, but so to open and dispose their minds
as may best make them capable of any when they shall apply themselves
to it. If men are for a long time accustomed only to one sort or
method of thoughts, their minds grow stiff in it, and do not readily
turn to another." (36)
His educational programme is one for rulers:
- gentleman, whose proper calling is the service of his country-,
and so is most properly concerned in moral and political knowledge.
And thus the studies which more inunediately belong to his calling
are those which treat of virtues and vices of civil society and
the arts of government, and so will take in also law and history." (37)
It might be argued that this account of the relationships
between ethics, epistemology, and education, in .ocke, fails to
take account of his interpretation of the Law of Nature, and it is
the latter, rather than his adherence to predestination which should
be considered. Further, that if the latter is given its due
importance, my hypothesis will not hold. I want to suggest,
however, that the Law of Nature is for Locke merely an external
standard, about which most men may be deluded or mistaken. The
Law of Nature does not therefore, in Locke, have drastic political
implications; in particular, in the way in which he presents it,
it permits a bifurcation between ethics and politics. The latter
amounts to an enforced division between the ideals and methods of
democracy, repeated by Schumpeter, which permits both the limitation
on mass political activity, especially autonomy, and the non—recognition
of the intrinsic right of a community member to an education, so
that the course of society may be continually presented as a do ed
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question. We do not find such a division in Rousseau, for example,
where education is both the means and the exemplification of
democratic ideals. It is through education, that self—assumed
obligation, the consideration of, and conclusion on, substantive
issues, is made possible.
What I mean by the externality of Natural Law in Locke, is
that it fails to influence the key value in Locke's system, that
of liberty. It fails to promote and define liberty for the mass
of the people, who are to be left in and condemned to a state of
perpetual ignorance. (38) Natural Law is necessary for Locke,
in that " - in Locke one sets up, by consent and contract, a political
system which guarantees the natural rights which one has as a
consequence of Natural Law." (39) subsequently " - he allows a
rather egalitarian theory of property justified by Natural Law and
labour, to be weakened by a theory of money justified by universal
consent." ('so) Natural Law is on one level, that of general moral
obligations, but in addition there are particular political
obligations, on another level.
It is soon apparent that the relationship between Natural Law
and the particular political obligations of the Social Contract is
not one of reciprocity. Natural Law is both a decree of divine
will and a dictate of reason. It is not only consent which creates
a duty of obedience but there also arises a general duty of obedience
from Natural Law. (41) Notoriously, Locke could ground the
obligation of tacit consent, in its most significant manifestation
of the inheritance of property, not merely in social utility but
in Natural Law.
"In his theory of personal tacit consent - Locke again tends
to weaken the claims of Natural Law and rights, just as his theory
of money justified by universal consent had weakened them." (42)
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Though locke's social arrangements then, draw support from
Natural Law, it would appear that they are not to be compared
with the standards of the former. The denigration of Natural Law,
however, is not complete until the doctrine of liberty. Locke
believes that individuals are motivated by pleasure and pain (1i3),
but he also believes that salvation, or rather the desire for
salvation, manifests itself in "unease" and the path to salvation
is one composed of "unease". Since the mass of the people
experience "unease" in abundance, through a poor material existence,
this would seem to auger veil for their salvation, and bode ill
for the affluent. However, Locke thinks that there is a
qualitative difference between the "unease" arising from material
deprivation and that conducive to salvation. In addition, some
individuals are defective because lack of uneasiness. Salvation
is the greatest good, but:
" - the greater visible good does not always raise men's
desires in proportion to the greatness it appears, and is acknowledged
to have -. The reason whereof is evident from the nature of
our happiness and misery itself. All present pain, whatever it be,
makes a part of our present misery; but all absent good does not at
any time make a necessary part of our present happiness, nor the
absence of it makes a part of our misery." ('')
Clearly basic needs for food, shelter, vannth, can create a
level of unease sufficient to stifle the unease for salvation.
"Conduct is moral only to the extent that the uneasiness of
salvation is strong enough to override the uneasiness of immediate
appetites and passions. The uneasiness over salvation would have
to be very great to outweigh the uneasiness of hunger, but if the
basic needs were satisfied and their continued satisfaction more or
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less guaranteed by a large store of secure property, then a
relatively weak uneasiness over salvation would outweigh the
uneasiness arising from the threat of non—satisfaction of basic
needs." (1i5)
The implication of Locke's position for the moral life of
the mass of men is clear: they are incapable of moral conduct.
What is not immediately apparent is that they are by the same
token incapable of liberty. "To the extent that an individual 's
conduct is determined by the immediate flow of uneasiness, his
conduct cannot be free, rational or moral. Liberty is the power
of the agents' mind to intervene in the stream of passional
determinations. The capability of the mind to intervene appears
to depend on a higher passion being split off from the lower
passions. This higher passion is the desire for salvation, and
it is the strength of this desire which determines the mind's
capability to intervene in the flow of immediate or lower uneasiness
which would otherwise determine action. Thus free, rational and
moral conduct coincide and they depend upon the relative strength
of the desire for salvation as opposed to the strength of earthly
desires." (1k6)
Though there is liberty then in suspending the operation of
desire, pending an examination thereof, few can attain it. Locke
however does not always acknowledge this. " - we have a power to
suspend the prosecution of this or that desire, as everyone daily
may experiment in himself." (1&7) Where he does perceive the
deprived condition of most men, Locke simply abandons it to base his
reforms on the propertied.
"These men's opportunities of knowledge and inquiry are
commonly as narrow as their fortunes - a great part of mankind are,
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by the natural and unalterable state of things in this world,
and the constitution of human affairs, unavoidably given over to
invincible ignorance of those proofs on which others build, and
which are necessary to establish those opinions; the greatest part
of men, having much to do to get the means of living, are not in
a condition to look after those of learned and laborious inquiries." ('iS)
The liberty of the intellectual appears to be the paradigm case
of freedom for Locke:
"This is the hinge on which turns the liberty of intellectual
beings in their constant endeavours after, and a steady prosecution
of true felicity, that they can suspend this prosecution in particular
cases, till they have looked before them, and informed themselves
whether that particular thing which is then proposed or desired
lie in the way to their main end, and make a real part of that which
is their greatest good." (1i9)
The final irony, however, is that:
- morality is the proper science and business of mankind
in general - ". (50)
The mass of the people is not merely in a hopeless state of
ignorance, it is to remain there. We might conclude at this point
by noting that Locke is a good deal more honest than some of his
commentators have been in their suggestions that salvation is a
possible path for all men.
"But the precise path to salvation is not clearly set out
for men and they must find their own way, both in their reflection
and in their works." (51)
The mass of the people then, derive no liberty from the Lockean
state. Their condition is arguably far more wretched than it was
prior to the social state since they , ba ai obligation to respect
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the accumulation and inheritance of property. These obligations
are not mere products of the Social Contract, they are suppor1ed
by Natural Law. Yet they themselves are owed no obligations of
moment from others, for there is no property to respect and little
to gain from stability. Natural Law is external to them in that
they cannot by the action of obligations within society appropriate
the means of salvation and experience liberty. For the majority
of Locke 'a state, then, liberty is chimerical and the Contract
a pyrrhiC vict.ry.
Thus it may seem that of Locke there is nothing more to be
said. His political system and ethical precepts appear to be
an exemplification of passive political equality. The Laws of
Nature, the sensation of unease, are necessary but not sufficient
conditions of salvation, and of Liberty. Locke, however, bequeathes
here a legacy of continual moment within Liberal Democratic theory-.
For having enunciated the several necessary conditions for liberty,
Locke thereby unwittingly provides the basis of argument whereby
those conditions should be made sufficient. It should be noted
that the reason why many people cannot attain liberty is according
to Locke, their urgent, current, unease for obtaining the necessities
of life. It is this which prevents attention to the desire for
salvation. Locke does not at any time change this handicap into
a moral argument against the majority of men enjoying liberty:
it is merely that their circumstances do not pernit it. Yet by
his very attempt to argae for moral agency, partly on the basis of
a transcendental standard (Natural Law), partly on a universal human
faculty (reason) and partly on the existence of moral knowledge
(" - morality is the proper science and business of mankind in
general - " (52)), Locke creates the situation whereby one can
always ask that material circumstances be remedied in order to
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provide a sufficient condition for liberty.
Locke might argue that such a transaction would conflict
with moral considerations in that it would alter the distribution
of property and wealth,already consented to. [kit such a consent
was purely tacit. A man can will his property to his heir, who
has not laboured for it, nor left over an abundance for others.
Indeed, if I.ocke believed that one's own consent was an expression
of one 'a natural equality, of the natural rights one has in virtue
of natural law, he ought to have considered the special character of
unanimous consent far more carefully than he did. It is because
Natural Law remains as a standard for Locke, albeit an external one,
that there remains a continual tendency within liberal democratic
theory- for moral agency to be actualised not merely within the area
of consent to political arrangements but within other spheres of
social control. The logic of this view to actualise moral agency
is that the antecedent conditions to acts like voting should also be
provided.
"If consent is to exist in some significant sense, then at
a minimum, there are two conditions necessary. First consent has
to be seen as something that arises from the acts of citizens. Now
it is frequently regarded as a matter for government manipulation;
consent is something that governments can (and should) manufacture;
enlist, forge, generate, arouse or maximize. Secondly, if citizens
are to consent then, as in the social practice of promising, they
must be able to ascertain what kind of commithient they are
undertaking and whether good reasons exist for them to do so". (53)
The first consideration requires a direct participatory
involvement in the community, the second, an education such that men
can question the values and ends of the society in which they live
and know sufficient to make choices between one avenue and another.
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What liberal democrats have from Locke is an uneasy alliance
between consent and voting, which is always open to challenge.
"Unlike promising, liberal democratic voting, for example,
allows citizens to vote only at times, and on matters chosen by
others, and in voting, citizens choose representatives who will
then detennine the content of their political obligation." (51k)
It is important to remember that the challenge is a moral one.
Doubtless the importance of moral agency has been greatly reinforced
by other theorists such as Kant but the importance of Locke is
that in his work, as the hero of liberal democrats, the justification
of a far more participatory society can be found, and by implication,
of an educative society.
As long as the citizen is seen as a centre of private
consciousness, exercising private choices, this tension in
liberal—democracy does not become apparent. Indeed, moral reasons
may even seem to require increasing privatization, so that the
deliberations of the subject and the actions of the subject, indeed
be his and his alone. Thit there is another perspective to private
choice. It is that the latter is a consequence of closed public
choices. The lockean state is the acme of closed public choice,
founded as it is on the supposed non—controversial premise of
protecting property. Thereafter all choices are private choices.
Where, however, choices are public, where the citizen is a moral
chooser, and not a passive recipient of obligations'cariously
undertaken, the moral and political dimension of public life
requires inculcation. As an example, for Schumpeter we are
assumed to be rational only about our immediate wants, not about
public life in general. The corollary of this position is that
the only knowledge the citizen requires, outside his own private
interests, which may be called political knowledge, is knowing
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how to fulfil the function of choosing a representative. Though
it would be plausible for Locke to argue that choices were largely
private choices because the government's impact on the individual was
minimal, that could not be said today in a modern liberal democracy
where public life impinges much more often on private life. Thus
it would seem on the liberal—democrats own premise of private choice
and moral agency-, rather more than the mere mechanics of choosing
representatives should be provided for the citizen.
iii. Rousseau, consent and education
That Rousseau recognizes that education is crucial to a
participatory theory of consent is clear from the attention which he
devotes to the former. A number of points emerge in his thesis
most importantly that he requires a transformation of society, as
Locke did not, in order to facilitate his notion of consent and
that he recognized an entitlement to education for the citizens of
his social contract, in order to realize consent. Consent for
Rousseau was nothing if it was not active, if it did not emanate from
the will. Yet how could a citizen will that which he did not know
or approve or opine that which he could not understand? For
Rousseau, it is crucial that the citizen be able to grapple with the
issues of his time, and not merely authorize representatives to
obligate him on every issue. The only way in which the individual
can maintain the original principle of nature and exist for others
is by universalising his identity and having as his concern the
conunon good. Education can ensure that the individual comes to
feel that his good lies in following this way.
Rousseau establishes a logical relationship between consent
and education. We consent only where our will conforms to our
actions, and it is education which ensures our will conforms to our
actions.
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"]e17 free action is produced by the concurrence of two
causes; one moral, i.e. the Will which determines the act, the other
physical, i.e. the power which executes it." (55)
It is education which transforms the Will so that actions
accord with virtue, and are moral actions.
Locke was concerned only with tacit consent for the bulk
of his state, Rousseau was concerned with virtue. The
transformation of Dnile was to make it possible for him to be
a party with others in deliberations to decide the social arrangements
to which he should be subject. If we ask why this should be so,
the answer can only be that it was necessary in order that Huile
preserve his freedom and yet be in society. Fnile was not merely
entitled to be free within society, for that freedom required a will
that was his and his alone.
"Indeed, the freedom of man's will as distinct from physical
matter is in a sense the root of Rousseau's political thought; the
virtuous society must be free because citizens are slaves, (i.e. not
trnly men) if they do not freely will the laws that govern them." (56)
Rousseau does not specifically distinguish between empirically
necessary and logically necessary conditions of democracy.
Notwithstanding it seems that the General Will must count as a
logically necessary condition, since if the Will becomes particular,
the state is " - necessarily altered in substance" (57), and
- all reform beccitnes impossible." (58) In the Social Contract,
Rousseau details what are in fact empirically necessary conditions
for democracy, noting that, " - all these conditions could not
exist without virtue." Education is logically necessary to
democracy in that what (59) Rousseau understands by Democracy is
a political society in which there is a common denominator, in that
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men live as they are and not as others want them to be. To live as
they- are requires, as Rousseau saw, that men be able to resist the
social construction of the post—division of labour society.
"In the state of nature, desires are limited and pity is not
stifled by artificial passions, since "goodness" merely requires
the absence of an intention to ham others, man is maturally good.
In contrast, virtue is not natural; virtue requires the mastery of
natural impulsions and the intention to act well towards others,
and hence presupposes that men have learned to think within
society." (60)
The point i8 that though men are naturally good, in society
deliberation is required in order to arrive at an optimal solution
for all. The acme of education is to ensure that such deliberation
emanate solely from the idli of a free creature, who is yet in the
midst of society. On this Rousseau is adamant: "- my freedom
consists in this very thing, that I can will what is for my own
good, or what I esteem as such Without any external compulsion." (61)
It is the fruit of education, for Rousseau, to retain man's virtue
within society, such that laws which appear to impinge on individual
autonomy, actually enhance it. Thus he says of Thale:
"The public good, which to others is a mere pretext, is a
real motive for him. It is not true that he gains nothing from
the laws, they give him courage to be just -. It is not true that
they have failed to make him free; they have taught him to rule
himself." (62)
In identifying our own good. with the public good, it is
possible to ensure that our Will conforms to our actions by making
laws our laws. Thus our actions in society become moral
actions because they are in accordance with laws that we have Willed
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and alienation is avoided. It is education that produces the
free individual within society and facilitates the emergence of
the general will. Such a process is not primarily one of
intellectual accommodation: it cannot be so for Rousseau since
he recognizes that the power of reasoning differs greatly from one
individual to another. Rather, it reflects an ideal of fraternity
not an individualistic, abstract, intellectual process.
Virtue is the overall aim of education. Since Rousseau
requires an egalitarian society, a participatory society, in which
citizens will all relate to one another, he favours education for
all by the state. Education must be for all if men are not to
be manipulated by others. Manipulation was the hallmark of the
post—division of labour society. Man in the state of nature could
recognize such insincerity, but education could be deleterious
to such a quality:
"Human nature was not at bottom better then than now; but
men found their security in the ease with which they could see
through one another, and this advantage, of which we no longer feel
the value, prevented their having many vices." (63)
"The question is no longer whether a man is honest, but
whether he is clever. Rewards are lavished on wit and ingenuity,
while virtue is left unhonoured. There are a thousand prizes
for fine discourses, and none for good actions. We have physicists,
geometricians, chemists, astronomers, poets, musicians and painters
in plenty, but have no longer a citizen among us -". (61i)
What Rousseau comes close to suggesting is that an appropriate
moral education is a sufficient education for citizenship in a
democracy; certainly that it is a necessary condition, for he
considers insincerity to be incompatible with citizenship. Men
will not be able to universalize their will if others are an
unknown quantity. Deception and manipulation were dissonant
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with fraternity. There was no greater failing produced by
intellectual progress than the substitution of envy for compassion
amongst men, and the harnessing of self improvement to greed. It
was compassion and not reason that was the prime civilizer of men.
Of the former, he states:
- it is rather in this natural feeling than in any subtle
arguments that we must look for the cause of that repugnance, which
every- man would experience in doing evil, even independence of the
maxims of education. Although it might belong to Socrates and
other minds of the like craft to acquire virtue by reason, the
human race would long since have ceased to be had its preservation
depended only on the reasonings of the individuals composing it." (65)
The vices which Rousseau identifies, lack of sincerity, lack
of integrity, date from the introduction of property: "It now
became the interest of men to appear what they were really not.
To be and to seem became two totally different things, and from
this distinction sprang insolent pomp and cheating trickery-, with
all the vices that go on their train." (66)
It would appear that modern man sacrificed integrity when he
grasped at material wants:
"In reality, the source of all these differences is that the
savage lives within himself, while social men lives constantly
outside himself, and only knows how to live in the opinion of others,
so that he seems to receive the consciousness of his own existence
merely from the judgement of others concerning him." (67)
The corollary is that such a man fails to take his measure
from just laws, and his standard of right from the public good.
It is these which Rousseau intends shall reflect a quintissential
standard of right.
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Education is indispensab e in such a moral regeneration since
it can reflect those moral values which are the source and
sustenance of Rousseau's polity.
"To form citizens is not the work of a day; and in order to
have men it is necessary to educate them when they are children." (68)
It seems, too, that other passions may arise and smother those
implanted by the educator, unless education is in the hands of the
state. Rousseau postulates education as an empirically necessary
condition for popular government: "Public education under the
regulations prescribed by the government, and under magistrates
established by the sovereign, is one of the fundamental rules of
popular or legitimate government. If children are brought up in
the bosom of equality; if they are imbued with the laws of the State
and the precepts of the general will; if they are taught to respect
these above all things; if they are surrounded by examples and
objects which constantly remind them of the tender mother who
nourishes them, of the love she bears them, of the inestiable
benefits they receive from her, and of the return they owe her,
we cannot doubt that they will learn to cherish one another,
virtually as brothers, to will nothing contrary to the will of
society, to substitute the actions of men and citizens for the futile
and vain babbling of sophists - ". ( 69)
The logic of Rousseau's position is that men must cleave to
an association if they are to have any moral life at all. He
rejects the Hobbesian state of nature with its wickedness. Simply
because men had no idea of virtue in the state of nature this would
not be a sufficient reason for arguing that they were therefore
wicked. Egoistic man was a contingent fact not a logically
necessary concomitant of moral and social awareness, nor an
irresistable innate tabs, waiting to emerge.
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Rousseau's point on the importance of an association in relation
to the moral life was a logical point. Rousseau did not fall to the
fallacy of the individualists such as Locke, who postulated an
equivalence betiieen choice and moral choice such that choice moral
choice. The choice between the consumption of a packet of sweets
or the purchase of a bar of soap is not, prima facie, a moral
choice. What Rousseau appreciated, however, was that the advent
of an association such as the state, presents men with a moral choice,
namely whether they ought or ought not to adhere to it. What
Rousseau wanted to achieve, of course, was to show that the state
was not merely a respectable moral alternative to be considered, but
that it could enhance the moral life, by presenting a variety of
situations in which men would have to consider their own lives in
relation to others. The instrument of its success would be education.
If the association was to fulfil these aims it was necessary
that it be one to which all men could relate, in which they could
all have an interest, on which their survival depends. It is true
empirically that no society can tolerate more than a certain degree
of dissension at which point the concept of agreed nonns and rules
becomes null and void. Similarly a democracy can degenerate to the
point wher. it becomes mere majority rule, devoid of any respect for
persons. Rousseau built in the latter value by his refusal to
assign the will without prior public discussion in the sovereign body.
It thus has to becone association to which they can all relate, in
which they all have an interest, on which their survival depends.
It follows from Rousseau's philosophy of mind that the relationship
will depend for its efficacy on emotion rather than on reason, and
on continuing self interest. If there is to be a conflict between
reason and self interest, Rousseau is certain that self interest
will win. Hence his fear of lesser associations. If the latter
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arise men will not merely perceive that membership is in their
interests but also may be weaned by affection as a result of
proximity and familiarity. It is necessary then both that the
state be total and proximate. If we are heirs to the same father,
if we are brothers in dependency, if we cannot move in any direction
one without the other, we are bound to perceive the benefits of
cooperation.
The central importance of education to Rousseau's democracy,
and the conceptual rather than empirical connection of the two,
is seen paradigmatically in the notion of the General Will. It
represents the political counterpart of the categorical Imperative.
The General Will is essentially negative in that it represents
a criteriwhich laws must satisfy, a moral criteria, yet of itself
it rules in nothing particular. It seems to be analytic that the
General Will is always right. For without the distraction of
partial associations, men will on the basis of their love and loyalty
to the state, decide on the basis of honesty and integrity.
I argued earlier that the moral life was inseparable from an association.
It should now be apparent that for Rousseau, only the state, of all
associations, can make men moral. This is logically so, because
morality obtains only when men relate to one another as equals and
they are only equal as citizens, for they must all alike relate
their individual wills to the general will. Virtue for Rousseau
is the conformity of particular wills with the general will.
Affiliate them with various lesser associations and men will compete
by any trickery possible.
Now in the matter of conformity to the General Will, Rousseau
does not think that all men are capable of following the promptings
of reason unaided. However he does claim an equality of sentiment
amongst men. Of the various methods to effect conformity with the
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general will: " - patriotism is the most efficacious - ". (70)
Certainly, reason cannot do the job, for: ft - no people has ever
been made into a nation of philosophers - ". (71) Virtue requires
a virtuous will and it is for this reason that Rousseau relies on
education rather than repression, He stresses to the Poles that:
- it is education that you must count on to shape the souls of
the citizens in a national pattern and so to direct their opinions,
their likes and dislikes that they shall be patriotic by inclination,
passionately, of necessity." (72)
Their education, moreover, ought to be communal: "I do not like
at all these lines you draw between your schools and academies with
the result that your rich nobles are brought up differently, and
in different institutions, from your poor ones. Since all of
them are equal under Poland's constitution, they should be brought
up together, and in the same way; and if completely free public
schools are out of the question, you must at least make your
schools cheap enough for the poor nobles to afford." (73)
The concept of the General Will entails a vital difference
between Rousseau's conception of the Public Interest and that of
liberal theorists. Under Rousseau the public interest will be
established by the General Will, (71i ), and will not therefore be
merely an abstract logical condition of a group, "the public".
For this logical point is not itself a sufficient condition for
an empirical consensus by a particular public about the value to
them of a particular policy. It is not a guarantee that such a
consensus and such a policy ever will arise, only that it may arise.
Liberals overlook, as Rousseau did not, the fact that there is a
crucial empirical dimension to the notion of the public interest.
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For a particular policy to be rationally defensible as being in the
public interest in a democracy it must be the case not merely that
people will all benefit as members of the public, but that they
agree that they will benefit. In order to satisfy the latter
condition, people need first to be able to conceive of themselves
as members of the public. In liberal political theory, however,
the latter is problematic because of the fact that the two most
influential expressions of democracy in recent years have been the
politics of pluralism, and the politics of elitism. (75) in the
former variant of democracy the state is relegated to the role of an
emaciated referee helplessly observing the warring conduct of
autonomous groups, out of whose conflict will be born the public
interest. In the latter case a wedge is driven firmly into place
between the politicians and the politically infantile masses.
The public interest here is to be identified with the pronouncements
of the elite.
It was Rousseau's profound contribution to democratic thought
not merely to envisage the logical possibilities of public interest
polijicd's but to appreciate the crucial need for an affective
dimension to public interest policies. The General Will functioned
not merely as logical criteriof the public interest but as an
affective touchstone. It was the standard by which the individual
citizen adjudicated his desires and those of others, as a member of
the public. Rousseau's horror of partial associations arises from
his conviction that there is no necessary connection between logical
truth and the ready acceptance of a particular empirical function
of that truth. For pluralists such as Dahl, the public interest is
ad hoc, empirical, and the end result of the interplay of private
associations. For Rousseau, it is an objective criterion, "a
real motivew. Moreover, in no sense can the pluralist public
151
interest be rescued by alleging that it approximates to Rousseau's
'will of all'. Firstly, the latter is always second best for
Rousseau, (76), and moreover as the partial associations increase
in size and decrease in number, "the differences become less numerous
and give a less general result." (77) Secondly, it spans a
continuum of degeneration from the General Will. 	 Nunmrous
associations will not be far removed from the process of deliberation
of numerous voters since the associations will represent the interests
of like-minded citizens. It should be noted that Rousseau did not
consider here any difference in resource inputs by any citizens
or associations of information, communications, or finance.
Thus the numerous associations can conveniently be presumed to be
equal in strength. Insofar as the small associations represent
in their aims and objectives the views of like-minded citizens,
they are not far from the views of each citizen which comprises
the association. However, the larger the association becomes,
the further removed are its aims and objectives from each individual
citizen, it being assumed that the views of each citizen differ to
an extent from those of another citizen. In such a situation each
citizen in an association has to desire not merely that his own
aims are realized, but more important, has to modify his own aims
in the light of the aims of the association as a whole. That is,
if he wishes to be rational, he will have to acknowledge that the
aims of the larger association reflect his own aims only to a
limited extent and therefore his support for the association
requires in some measure that he sees what is good or right in the
aims of the association as a whole.
The latter affection or loyalty to the association may from
a psychological point of view, manifest itself in various forms.
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The citizen may attempt some form of self deception, or he may
increasingly identify in a highly emotional way with the aims of
the association. But in either case Rousseau's point holds in that
the will of the association; "becomes general in relation to its
members, while it remains particular in relation to the State." (78)
For the citizen is giving a commitment to the aims and objectives of
the partial association, over and above the commitment to his own
aims and objectives. Whatever compromise takes place between his
own political interests and those of others, takes place within the
parameters of the association's values, and not those of the state.
Thus Rousseau argues that: "if there are partial societies, it is
best to have as many as possible and to prevent them from being
unequal - ". (79)
Pluralists, however, cannot claim that their partial
associations operate in the latter way. Pluralists are at least
consistent in their treatment of partial associations in that they
extend the same formal equality to partial associations as they
do to the franchise. The former does nothing to mitigate enormous
differences in resource inputs, articulation, access to ruling elites,
and bargaining power. The effect of the latter is that the
strength of an interest is no guide to its moral worth. Formal
equality does not and cannot guarantee the representation of the
interests of the poor and under—privileged. Rather it encourages
the strength of thOse groups with a vested interest to defend, with
an established foothold within society, as against those attempting
to put forward alternative courses of action in social and. economic
policy. Moreoever, neither does it guarantee that the protagonist
groups are of approximately equal strength so that an acceptable
compromise emerges. There is no mechanism within the formal
equality of the liberal democratic political system to ensure that
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the interests of consumers shall match that of producers.
My point, however, is that the public interest still has a
role to play- in the liberal democrats' political vocabulary.
	 Its
role is to function as an emotive cry, to suggest that the interests
for which a group is fighting are identical with those of the
public. (80) It functions in this way because it contains the
vestiges of a moral imperative. Liberals way use the public
interest 8logan in the way in which they do because their political
heritage is not merely liberal but also democratic. I have tried
to show in an earlier chapter, that liberals could not defend their
political practices without this democratic heritage.
Rousseau is able to hang his concept of education on the
General Will. He is able to do this because the latter is the
ultimate criteriariof value for the citizen. (81) It is the telos
of the inoffensive savage in the state of nature. The appreciation
of it is inextricably connected with a moral transformation from
natural goodness to virtue. (82) Because the general will is the
will of the virtuous citizen it is incorrect to perceive education
merely as an instrumental process. The moral transformation from
savage to citizen is conceptually inseparable from the standard of
political right. But because Rousseau envisages a democratic
society, the standard of political right expresses not merely a moral
ideal but an end which is in principle attainable. For we have
said earlier that it is a logically necessary condition for a
democratic society that "Imoving how to live" shomld not be the
preserve of philosopher—kings or autocrats. There is no stronger
partial association than that of a philosopher—king or an autocrat.
Because the General Will is a function of the deliberations of all
the citizens and not of the aims of partial associations it secures
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value to the moral transformation of each individual citizen.
The transformation is not accomplished to suit the whim of an elite,
but because each citizen is a value in relation to the General Will.
If a citizen is denied this moral transformation the standard of
political right is violated, and the tangible outcome of the
discussions of the body politic is the poorer. It follows that
any attempt to emasculate this activity of moral transformation under
the guise of training, vocational considerations, preparing for work,
is also a violation of the standard of political right. Knowledge
for living may supplement knowledge of how to live, morally, however,
it cannot supplant it.
Liberal democrats, however, have no such standard of political
right, that they will consistently acknowledge. They thus adhere
to a paper thin concept of education, whose values fluctuate
according largely to their economic fortunes. Though it has been
argued that an appropriate political education is in the interests
of a democracy this argument is much weaker than it first appears, (83)
depending on how democracy is understood. For to Schuinpeter it
could not appear self-evidently good or desirable that citizens
be taught the mechanics of putting pressure on governments in order
that policies accord more with their aims and objectives. Much
less would it appear self-evident that citizens be taught the
traditional values of democracy: respect for persons, autonomy,
tolerance, dignity. For to elitist democratic theorists it is
axiomatic that such values are respected only by the elite when it
comes to the domain of public affairs. Politics, in the main, is
not something to be entrusted to citizens, for reasons I have already
discussed. A political education is, therefore, for elitist
democrats, something of a misnomer. It is not a necessary condition
of the survival of elitist democratic societies that there be an
155
appropriate political education, indeed, as I have implied
elsewhere, political education is likely to challenge such a regime.
Rather, citizens need only to perform an act of selection on a
periodic basis, with the function of ensuring that there is always
a government. If we ask by what criteria such a selection should
be made, the answer seems to be simply that party which ensures
sufficient stability for the optimal conduct of private interests.
In the same way an appropriate political education seems dissonant
with the perspective of pluralistic democrats. For the essential
feature of a pluralist democracy is its assimilation of political
activity to a paradigm of want—satisfaction, based on the market
economy. Tolerance, respect for persons, autonomy, dignity, have
an indelible hostility towards government activity. It seems
axiomatic for the pluralist that public authority and activity
is irreconcilible with the above values. What the pluralist wants
to see then, Is not the critical examination of society in the
light of such values, but rather the steadfast acceptance of a
justified "privatization" of such values. What the pluralist is
asking for is better expressed by the terms socialization,
indoctrination and possibly training, than education. (81&)
The notion of a discrete activity "political education" is
itself something of a sop to liberals in that it reflects the
separation between politics and society, dear to the heart of
liberals. For the latter, politics is essentially a regulative
activity, endorsing existing social norms and institutions.
Similarly, the function of education is to endorse social
consciousness, not to transform it. Society is an instrument
for man's needs and desires, not a necessary characteristic for
his moral perfection.
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By contrast, I have tried to show that in Rousseau there is
the prodigious developnent of a creative role for the political
sphere. Instead of being a shadow of private relations, as in
liberalism, it is the author of social consciousness. 	 Political
arrangements are the life blood of morality in the regenerated
society. Political society is an expression of man's freedom.
Virtue, which jg the fruit of education, is not the possession of
a philosopher-king, but of an ordinary citizen, alert to the vanity
and self-seeking attributes (intellectual or otherwise) of civilization.
On this view: "Democratic education - must ensure that all people
can identify and will resist the claims of special interests.
The people of a democracy must also be skilled in detecting the
person or group that puts their own interests ahead of the community -".
(85) And as a broader consideration: "Democratic education must
give to men and women the sense of security and purpose that allows
them to confront, without any ambiguity, the tasks of the time,
and it must help all of them to distinguish between leaders who
make such a commitment, and those who do not." (86)
The role of the Legislator in Rousseau, does nothing to
undermine the primacy of education and the role of the citizen.
The Legislator is essentially a temporary phenomenon, born of the
necessary immaturity of the citizens at the inception of the virtuous
society. Since abstract knowledge is not the prime aim of education
the legislator is not another philosopher-king. His position
derives from the fact that education cannot take effect overnight
and Rousseau was concerned with the establishment of conditions in
society as a whole, which pexinits members of society to participate
on equal terms in a civil association based on the principle of
freedom.
"One of Rousseau's most basic moral principles was that men
did not need great knowledge in order to lead a virtuous life." (87)
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it is the function of the lawgiver only to be the architect
of social institutions.
"The legislator is the engineer who invents the machine -," (88)
[kit his function is strictly limited to the establishment of
desirable institutions.
"He, therefore, who draws up the laws has, or should have, no
right of legislation, and the people cannot, even if it wishes,
deprive itself of this incommunicable right, because, according to
the fundamental compact, only the general will can bind the
individuals, and there can be no assurance that a particular will
is in conformity- with the general will, until it has been put to
the free vote of the people." (89)
Rousseau is explicit on the reasons for the legislator:
"For a young people to be able to relish sound principles of political
theory and follow the fundamental rules of statecraft, the effect
would have to become the cause; the social spirit, which should
be created by these institutions, would have to preside over their
very foundation; and men would have to be before law what they
should become by means of law." (90)
It is this immaturity which also makes necessary the civic
religion. Yet again the latter is provisional; it should be seen
as subservient to the politics of the emerging state.
"We should not - conclude - that politics and religion have
among us a common object, but that, in the first periods of nations,
the one is used as an instrument for the other." (91)
The civic religion is part of the mechanism for the
transformation of consciousness and the developuent of moral
liberty which allows men to see collectively created and imposed
laws as extensions of, not merely constraints upon, their freedom.
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Criticisms of the role of the lawgiver and theconstitution of
the civic religion, ignore the fact that the political association
will have a momentum of its own. Though it is nowhere explicitly
stated, it is empirically the case that coninunication will facilitate
an emerging political consciousness which will support the society in
question. Pateman argues that: "The members of a participatory
association are continuously educating themselves in a fashi
that serves to maintain their political association in being." (92)
This exposure to a wide range of ideas, moreover, makes it more
likely that a citizen will consider the public interest in forming
his political opinions. It is a necessary condition to the
consideration of the public interest by an individual, that he be
aware of an interest other than his own, or those similar to his own.
There is, moreover, the point that fraternity is an elusive
ideal in the face of differences in perception and reasoning.
To provide exclusive emphasis in education on the autonomous
intellectual would exacerbate these differences and lead to dissent
and agitation for self-assumed obligation. The latter cannot occur
in Rousseau for the following reason. Since the General Will is the
logical criterion for all laws dissent becomes a procedural rather
than a substantive error. That is, my dissent is not in fact due
to a difference from my fellow citizens on substantive grounds, on
the merits of a particular issue, it is due to my failing to properly
carry out the psychological exercise of universalizing ray will.
By making virtue not merely a function of political society but also
coterminous with fraternity and unity, rather than with reason and
autonomy, Rousseau neatly sidesteps thorny issues of dissent and
self-assumed obligation. 	 By stressing sentiment rather than
reason Rousseau was fastening upon and emphasizing equality.
Paradoxically this was something of a conservative move as Roche notes:
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"On the whole, it must be said that Rousseau bases his hopes on a
develoilnent of the feelings of men rather than upon their capacity
for self—improvement." (93)
All this is not necessarily to imply that reason would clash
with fraternity. Given that one considers that others have a
contribution to make to truth, then to be seriously committed to
the pursuit of truth entails some due deference to others.
Concepts do not evolve in a day and what Rousseau achieved iii
relation to the concept of democracy, was to show, in contrast to
Locke, that a participatory society was a defensible end result of
combining moral agency with fraternity. Rousseau demonstrated
the conceptual necessity of education in (his) democracy by making
it the keystone of moral agency. In so doing, Roasseau made the
vital leap from a naturalistic self interested political structure
to a rationally defensible moral polity. It is only in the climate
of the latter that it is logically possible to stipulate education
as a primary social value, rather than relegate it to a family of
instromental processes. For if the political strmcture is to take
its standard merely from men as they are, not as they ought to be,
there will be no value sanction Within that structure for resisting
all those immediate and diverse pressures which prey upon
educational institutions to give to these interests what they "need",
be it engineers, thrusting business executives, or obsequious
employees. There will, in particular, be no value sanction for
such institutions to produce pupils and students, vith a propensity
to take the moral view of life. For the latter might entail sundry
consequences for powerful institutions and accepted norms in society.
Conceivably such people may not readily identify with a work ethic,
or a competitive ethos, or a corporation bureaucracy, or simply a
predetermined work role. 'What a moral polity achieves is to provide
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a framework for a justification of children's futures in terms other
than a who l ehearted commitment to an instrumental role, suited to
the immediate gratification of society. The aim of education in
a moral polity should be to act as the conscience of society-, not
its willing tool, The General Will is the conscience of Rousseau's
democracy, a constant reminder of the importance of morality.
What was absent in market democracy was a standard of moral agency
by which to assess the conduct of inststitutions and social and
economic behaviour in general. Downs and. Tullock fastened on and
canvassed for an individualism which was essentially an abstraction,
omitting the finer properties of man. Hence their individualism
rapidly degenerated into a naturalistic social and political setting,
devoid of any objective standard of political right.
Implicit in the above is the suggestion that there is a connection
between the individualistic and moral agency approaches to society,
albeit a tortuous one to analyse. It is a connection that
evolves further in the work of Kant.
iv. Kant
Kant reaffirmed the moral liberty of man by asserting the
freedom of the goodwill. His principle of man as an end in himself
may be taken to mean that all men count equally in determining
actions by which many are affected. 	 In this respect the principle
of the good will may be regarded as giving an ethical basis for
democracy. Though it is true that Kant was suspicious of democracy,
allowance ought to be made for the fact that he was writing under
the impact of the reign of terror. Moie important, however, is that
Kant's stress on reason does not substantiate the same political
structure as that of Rousseau, with his emphasis on sentiment.
For Kant, man is essentially free and rational, thus only some
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end set by reason can provide the basic value in a moral code that
will respect man's dignity. Thit the ability to reason, though it
is a necessary condition for a citizen, is not sufficient.
A citizen must be possessed of a measure of economic independence.
"To be fit to vote, a person must have an independent position
among the people. He must therefore be not just a part of the
commonwealth, but be a member of it, i.e. he must by his own free
will actively participate in a community of other people. 	 it
this latter quality makes it necessary- to distinguish between the
active and passive citizen. Apprentices to merchants or tradesmen,
servants who are not employed by the state, minors - women in
general and all those who are obliged to depend for their living
(i.e. for food and protection) on the offices of others (excluding
the state) - all of these people have no civil personality, and
their existence is, so to speak, purely inherent." (9i)
The distinction which Kant makes between passive and active
citizens is not to be understood as a pemianent barrier against the
progress of a "passive" citizen. Not merely should it be possible
for the latter to progress, the legislature should ensure that
no laws inhibit such a movement.
- the positive laws to which the voters agree, of whatever
sort they may be, must not be at variance with the natural laws
of freedom and with the corresponding equality of all members of
the people whereby they are allowed to work their way up from
their passive condition to an active one." (95)
Kant is adamant that: "The legislative power can belong
only to the united will of the people. For since all right is
supposed to emanate from this power, the laws it gives must be
absolutely incapable of doing anyone an injustice. Now if someone
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makes depositions for another person, it is always possible that
he may thereby do him an injustice, although this is never possible
in the case of decisions he makes for himself -. Thus only the
unanimous and combined will of everyone whereby each decides the
same for all and all decide the same for each - in other words, the
general united will of the people - can legislate." (96)
Thus Kant resists the possible benefits of other political
regimes: &it this welfare must not be understood as synonymous
with the well—being and happiness of the citizens, for it may well
be possible to attain this in a more convenient and desirable way
within a state of nature - or even under a despotic regime. On the
contrary, the welfare of the state should be seen as that condition
in which the constitution most closely approximates to the principle
of right; and reason, by a categorical imperative, obliges us to
strive for its realization." (97)
Kant therefore favours a moral polity, one devoted to the welfare
of its citizens, in which there is participation for all active
citizens, and the possibility of passive citizens progressing to
become active citizens. His dispute with democracy is primarily
connected with the idea of the separation of Powers.
"Republicanism is that political principle whereby the
executive power (the government) is separated from the legislative
power. Despotism prevails in a state if the laws are made and
arbitrarily executed by one and the same power, and it reflects the
will of the people only in so far as the ruler treats the will of the
people as his own private will. - democracy, in the truest sense
of the word, is necessarily a despotism, because it establishes an
executive power through which all the citizens may make decisions
about (and indeed against) the single individual without his consent,
so that decisions are made by all the people and yet not by all the
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people; and this means that the genera]. will is in contradiction
with itself, and thus also with freedom." (98)
Kant insists, however, that " - if the mode of government is
to accord with the concept of right, it must be based on the
representative system." (99)
Republicanism then is a refinement of democratic government,
which retains the latter's popular base, but follows a strict
separation of powers.
The political implications of Kant's several ethical doctrines,
are various.
"According to the principle of humanity, the dignity of
each individual man is an essential requirement of the moral law,
and according to the principle of autonomy, the moral law is willed
by every rational being and required by him as the law he should
submit to. These principles have a liberal, even a democratic
air, and Kant's other notion of a universal kingdom of ends in which
all men are legislating members, extends the ethical into a
somewhat political sphere." (100)
For Kant man is essentially free and rational, thus only
some end set by reason can provide the basic value in a moral code
that will respect man's dignity. If the notion of autonomy is
applied to politics it would require a constitution allowing the
greatest possible human freedom to its citizens. Iit the latter
could be the freedom to indulge in private interests for gain; it
could not be the freedom to diminish the human condition. The
latter would accrue from a desire for private gain, and not from
a noble motive. Kant, then, had an ideal of respect and his
freedom was the freedom which was an essential precondition of
moral agency.
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"Now I say that man, and in general every rational being exists
as an end in himself, not merely as a means for arbitrary use by
this or that will; he must in all his actions, whether they are
directed to himself or to some other rational beings, always be
viewed at the same time as an end." (101)
Further, such a principle: " - consequently imposes a limit
on arbitrary treathient." (102) The government must adhere to a
Principle of Right. This latter principle " - is basically only
an application of the universal principle of morality as laid down
in the Categorical Imperative, to the sphere of law, and thus also
applies to the sphere of politics. If this principle is applied
to politics it is necessary that there should be established a
constitution allowing the greatest possible human freedom in
accordance with laws which ensure the freedom of all the others." (103)
The above forms the test of right action in society. "Every
action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each
individual's will to coexist with the freedom of everyone else in
accordance with a universal law is right." (iOu ) This freedom is
limited by its effects:
- the principles of morality bind, not because we desire the
ends attained by them, but because they are the sort of principles
that a being of goodwill - would adopt." (105)
The moral law has significance both as a standard of political
right and, subjectively, as a motive for the public good, the latter
in marked contrast to the mockery of the public interest in
empirical political theory. The former also leads directly to
a commitment to educate. In this respect Kant's position is
essentially similar to that of Rousseau. The argument of the
above may be followed in this way.
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"The moral law, which itself does not require a justification,
proves not merely the possibility of freedom, but that it really
belongs to beings who recognize this Law as binding on themselves.
The moral law is in fact a law of the causality of free agents -1 (106)
It is in this way that the General Will forces men to be free, and
that the recognition of the General Will itself reflects a
community of free people. Again, the General Will is a criterion:
- freedom is considered as a sort of causality not subject to
empirical principles of determination in regard to actions possible
by it, which are phenomena in the world of sense -". (107)
Rousseau's distaste for flattery and vanity within a cultured society
and his belief in the sincerity of the common people is echoed in
Kant: "While the moral law, therefore, is a formal determining
principle of action by practical pure reason - it is also a
subjective determining principle, i.e. a motive to this action, in
as much as it has influence on the morality of the subject, and
produces a feeling conducive to the influence of the law on the will.
Thus the respect for the law is not a motive to morality, but is
morality itself subjectively considered as a motive - ." (108)
There can be no greater contrast between the political
implications of this statement and that of an ethic of rational
self—interest. (i09) For the latter, the final and determining
principle of right is not merely to be found within the individual 'a
own patterns of desire, but itself provides no reference point for an
achievement or standard which is essentially public rather than
private. Public achievements and standards are only possible
insofar as they can be reckoned worthwhile within the individual 'a
pleasure calculus. The latter, may frequently entail the most
extraordinary abuse of others. For in an ethic of rational
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self-interest if a man can obtain what he desires with the minimum of
cost, so much the better. His situation is optimised. where others
are "deluded" into following a commitment to a public morality
rather than themselves. For example, he profits most when others
agree to modify pay increases to assist the control of inflation,
thus allowing his high pay increases to retain their real purchasing
power.
For Kant, however, the moral law not merely is able to serve
as a public standard of political right, but also itself inheres a
motive to public morality. It might be said of the Kantian citizen
what was said of Rousseau's Thiile: "The public good, which to
others is a mere pretext, is a real motive for him." (110)
In addition, there is the point that a Kantian ethic logically
presupposes some kind of public dimension. The principle of
universalisability and its corollary of respect for persons,
entail that transactions occur between persons. It is an
inherently social ethic, and an ethic in which the public morality,
behaviour towards others, is as valuable as towards oneself. The
greatest fallacy one can entertain about a self-interested ethic is
that it contains a maxim of equality. No such maxim is present,
and it is a nonsense to try to create the impression of such a value
by the imposition of so called "moral side-constraints." (iii)
Such a device merely disguises the fact that individuals differ in
the extent to which they can effectively pursue an interest, and
indeed, in the extent to which they can even conceive of an interest.
The belief that achieving the public good would count as a
reason for action which Kant and Rousseau had in mind, is the result
of granting that the former is of some moral value. Where a public
morality, rather than one of self-interest is accepted, there arise
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reasons both instrumental and intrinsic to the former, for arguing
that an education must be provided. In a sense these reasons are
difficult to comparthentalize. Education might be required to stop
the exploitation of the young by helping them to frame alternatives
for the future, without being at the complete mercy of family
economic circumstances, or sub—cultural values. The former might
include a critical examination of the work ethic, an awareness of
different careers, and an experience of ideals of service and
citizenship. In a moral polity which valued ideals of the sort
propagated by Kant, such activities would not be merely
instrumentally good, they would be required by the very values of
public morality. It may be as well, that the same'iues would demand
a participatory society. If that is so, the latter would also
demand that individuals were able to grasp the issues concerning
those areas in which they were participants, otherwise talk of
work—place democracy, or economic democracy, would be cant.
These values of respect for persons, the dignity of man, the moral
law, are public values. That is where theb' force lies. But their
acceptance requires not merely some kind of participatory society,
it requires too that generations be allowed to become moral
participants in that society.
In his philosophy of history, Kant construed. history as a
progress towards rationality. He rejected the suggestion that the
question of progress could be solved by appealing to experience.
"We must, therefore, he says, look for a principle outside experience.
We can find it in the moral character of man. To advance the spread
of rationality is a moral obligation, for this advance is the only
way in which our moral nature can be fully realized. " (113)
In terms of how this should be achieved within the educational
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system, Kant is explicit. He favours a moral code and the use of
examples.
"1 do not know why the educators of youth have not long since
made use of this propensity of reason to enter with pleasure upon
the most subtle examination of the practical questions that are
thrown up; and why they have not, after first laying the foundation
of a purely moral catechism, reached through the biographies of
ancient and modern times with the view of having at hand instances
of the duties laid down, in which, especially by comparison of
similar actions under different circumstances, they might exercise
this critical judgement of their scholars in remarking their greater
or less moral significance." (113)
- they could hope with confidence that the frequent practice
of knowing and approving good conduct in all its purity and on the
other hand of remarking with regret or contempt the least deviation
from it, although it may be pursued only as a sport in which children
may compete with one another, yet will leave a lasting impression of
esteem on the one hand and disgust on the other; and so, by mere
habit of looking on such actions as deserving approval or blame,
a good foundation would be laid for uprightness in the future course
of life." (lilt)
If we hold that to advance the spread of rationality is a moral
obligation then, ipso facto, it must be done for its own sake, and not
for arty results or consequences which may as a matter of fact accrue
for such a process. Now such a movement towards rationality, under
such terms is necessarily going to preclude activities like
indoctrination and conditioning which denigrate the place of reason
in man and thus defeat the very purpose of the move. It might be
suggested that, as a matter of empirical fact, such processes will
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be conducive to the attainment of rationality, but this idli not
neutralise the moral condition that persons should be treated as ends,
and never merely as means. Firther, the intention to advance the spread
of rationality places empirical and logical limitations upon the possible
means envisaged to achieve this. It is logically necessary that the
means envisaged be experiences of a structured kind within those areas
of knowledge which are exemplificationa of reasons.
Given then, Kant's belief in the moral autonomy of the individual,
and the inevitable progress towards rationality, his support for a
government responsible to the people is an entirely legitimate move,
as is the inference made from the same premise, of a coomitment to
education in its normative sense, rather than processes which sacrificed
respect for the individual as a moral agent. Both are the logical
outcome of his value attribution to individuals. One cannot, irithout
contradiction, proclaim a degree of primacy to the notion of
individuals as ends in themselves, as moral agents and then defend
autocracy as a form of state government, since the latter is the
negation of reasonableness. The autocrat, logically, is claiming
an entitlement that he is not prepared to accord to others, namely
the enjoyment of power over their destinies. The autocrat might claim
that his position was in fact entirely reasonable. Re took coend
over the chaos which was persiating. Thus the autocrat's ultimate
value is stability, which he is clearly not prepared to reason about
with his subjects, since otherwise why was it necessary in the first
place for him to have to take coaind. If wo pressed him on this issue,
he might reply that in any case he was not dealing with moral agents. The
problem is, however, that his index of a moral agent would be one who
agreed with him on the indispensability of an autocrat to maintain
stability. The democrat and the educator, must, logically, produce
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reasons for the course they advocate; they must convince and
persuade by argument rather than by force or surreptitious influence.
For Kant, sovereignty resides in the people and government must
be open. The people have the right of public criticism of those in
authority. Kant follows Voltaire in declaring that: " - freedom of
the pen is the only safeguard of the rights of the people, although
it must not transcend the bounds of respect and devotion towards
the existing constitution, which should itself create a liberal
attitude of mind among the subjects." (115) Reiss writes that
the trend of Kant's thinking in his unpublished notes: " - makes
it - abundantly plain that, according to him, sovereignty resides
or originates in the people which ought to possess legislative
power." (116) Kant thinks that the idea of a Contract is in fact
- merely an idea of reason which nonetheless has undoubted practical
reality; for it can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in
such a way that they could have been produced by the united will
of a whole nation, and to regard each subject - as if he had
consented within the general will." (117) This view is confirmed
in a passage from the Social Contract. "The idea that men have
made a Contract to establish the state means rather that they have
been prepared to submit their own personal will in matters
extenial to them to a universal will - the will of reason," (118)
In their political implications, the ethics of Kant point not
merely to a moral and democratic polity, but to a society which is
educative rather than merely regulatory. The government would be
at once an exemplification of the principle of moral autonomy, by
being responsible to the people, and also an agency through which
society could further the declared aims of rationality and moral
agency. It follows then that education is a primary value in
the Kantian moral polity. Less obviously, it also follows that
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individuals do not necessarily have to acquiesce in or attempt to
control the content of such a programme. The thrust of Kant's
writing above, is that though autonomy means the ability to determine
for oneself what one ought to do, it does not logically follow that
everything one chooses to do is therefore morally right. The
conceptof autonomy refers as much as anything else to the individual's
subjective capacity to impose restrictions freely on what he chooses
to do, so that the individual can choose to act morally by
voluntarily constraining his selfish desires in order to act in an
unselfish or disinterested manner. In the same way, the principle
of moral autonomy is not necessarily violated whenever a person is
subjected to external compulsion, for the latter may be morally
justified to the extent that it is necessary to get the person to
act morally. In particular we may liken the pupil to the passive
subject of Kant's commonwealth being coaxed towards freedom and
rationality.
On this view, if participation within institutions is required,
it will be necessary because it contributes towards the independence
and. freedom of the subject, whereas on the liberal view, (119),
participation may be conceded simply because it leads to a higher
output in industry. Kant is much more consistent here than liberal
democrats. The latter reason that consenting to obey the law is
a necessary condition of having an obligation to obey the law,
but then identify consent with both one overt act (voting) and
acquiescence by simply following the law. The corollary is that
a person is morally right to obey the law because they have consented
to do so, rather than morally right to obey the laws, because in
turn, the law is morally right. For if the law is found to be
morally right the act of consent is superfluous, and the denigration
of moral agency.
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For the latter to operate in a moral polity, it requires an
education which will produce the critical citizen. The liberal
democratic view does not necessarily require this, since both
participation and. the act of consent may take place on considerations
decided by elites, and not for moral reasons. (120) Participation
for greater productivity, and consent to an amorphous political
package which may subsequently be modified or abandoned, do not
encourage moral agency. Yet what must be noted is that in their use
of consent, obligation, participation, even individualism, liberals
use terms with a moral connotation. Liberal democracy has a "moral"
strain and it is the latter which provides the argument for
education.
Like Rousseau, T.H. Green and J.S. Mill, Kant favoured dynamic
political equality; i.e. that the political institutions of society,
instead of merely according formal political equality, enhance
substantive political equality, insofar as they act in such a way
as to make the institutional provisions for controlling the affairs
of the state, the instruments for the moral and cognitive
amelioration of the individual, in Kant's case with a view to the
attainment of autonomy, in Rousseau's with a view to fraternity.
Kant is conservative only in the sense that he would rather no
freedom, if freedom merely meant dependency on the will of another.
Thus independence materially was a precondition of moral freedom
and institutional freedom.
In his concern for the autonomous will, for freedom as
rationality, Kant endorses in his society education in its normative
sense. For paradigmatically, the inteiition to educate logically
entails the intention to develop rationality, though the latter is
not of course a sufficient condition of the former, It was left
to T.H. Green to extend further this notion and develop it into a
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right to education. A commitment to moral autonomy precludes
those processes of imparting information which have an implicit
disregard for the moral worth of the individual, viz. indoctrination,
conditioning, even training. What is endemic, then, in this
Kantian position is the intention to develop mind in a morally
acceptable manner. 	 ich an intention is an intention to educate.
Kant advocates responsible government because he considers it the
only government worthy of rational agents. It is the logical
complement of envisaging men as moral agents. Contingently,
responsible government will assist the developnent of rationality
because it presupposes the exercise of judgement and reason on the
part of men. The conduct of politics will, on this view, itself
comprise part of the moral education of the conununity, as it did
with J.S. Mill. This includes the process of deliberating about
the ends of life, settling disputes, deliberating about what ought
to be done. These values logically presuppose the commitment to
educate. Men are not born with morality, despite Socratic
bewilderment about the possibilities of it being taught. Neither
are they born with the propensity to reason. Not just any
upbringing will produce the citizen of a moral polity. For if we
are to reason about ends, it must, logically must, be under some
conceptual construction, which itself will be the fruit of
concepts before it.
v. Green
Kantian considerations of dignity and respect lead ultimately,
as Green saw, to an imperative on institutional provision. Green
recognized a reciprocal relationship between individuals and the
state. The individual has a claim on society arising out of his
rational moral nature. Green's contribution was to appreciate
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not merely that the latter required a moral polity, respecting men
as rational beings, but he went further than Kant and Rousseau, in
perceiving that a moral polity may be required to strive for the
means whereby the potential of men could become actual. The
latter may well amount to economic provisions and widespread
institutional reform. Full moral participation in social life was
for Green the highest form of self—development, and to create the
possibility of such participation was the end of society.
For Green, governments cannot make men moral by laws, but they
can remove many of the obstacles that stand in the way of moral
development. The Kantian ideal requires that members of society
meet as moral agents, that they treat each other with respect, that
all are free to think and act for themselves, and that their thought
and actions are guided and controlled by full moral responsibility.
Because this is inherently the ideal nature of a community and of a
person, this opportunity ought to be open to everyone, to realize
such a life up to the limit of his capacities. Hence, society
cannot aim at less than giving all men the right to moral self
determination. The logic of this position is the provision by the
state of education. Sabine remarks of Green: " - he regarded
education as the most important function, and he conceived that the
chief difference between ancient and modem civilizations lay in the
degree in which the modern nation opens to all men goods which in
antiquity were reserved to an aristocracy." (121)
The whole idea of a right for Green, arises out of the nature
of man as a moralleing seeking his self perfection; it is a claim of
the individual arising out of his rational nature to the free exercise
of some category. It is on this premi that Green defends the
right to education:
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"To educate one's children is no doubt a moral duty, and it is
not one of these duties, like that of paying debts, of which the
neglect directly interferes with the rights of someone else.
It might seem therefore to be a duty with which positive law should
have nothing to do, any more than with the duty of striving after a
noble life. On the other hand, the neglect of it does tend to
prevent the growth of the capacity for beneficially exercising the
rights on the part of those whose education is neglected, and it is
on this account, not as a purely moral duty on the part of the parent,
but as the prevention of a hindrance to the capacity of rights on the
part of children, that education should be enforced by the state." (122)
Education encapsulates an identity between society and the
individual: it actualizes our capacity as persons " - only through
society is anyone enabled to give that effect to the idea of himself
as the object of his actions, to the idea of himself without which
the idea would remain like that of space to a man who had neither
the sense of sight nor touch." (123)
For Green, the fruit of education is self realization. This
training cannot do. Democracy is inconceivable without the
attribution of certain capacities to individuals common to them,
and reliance on communicating them. Training leans too far towards
the atomistic individual, does not partake of the common life.
There is a further common characteristic between education and
democracy. Bosanquet said of a genuine human achievement that it
is not diminished by being shared. The implication of Kant's
kingdom of ends is that the ultimate moral community is coextensive
with mankind. It is a level of human achievement embracing and
superseding the spheres of work, leisure, personal relationships,
and citizenship. The only good which is common to all who may
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pursue it, is that which consists in the universal will to be good,
to make the best of humanity. Mime claims that for Green:
- the highest level of rational activity is that of self—
consistent or non—competitive human achievement. At this level all
the subordinate levels of rationality find a place." (121i)
Education connotes this acme of activity. The activity
embraces mutual understanding and respect, and it is in this sense
that Green's conunents should be understood.
"Since a democratic community depends on mutual understanding
there can be no effective democracy without an educated people.
Education therefore is the state's concern; not only education of
the young, but also adult education." (125)
The point about education is that it gives reality to the
capacities of will and reason. It recognizes the capacity in a man
of being determined to action by the idea of a possible satisfaction
of himself, the capacity of conceiving the perfection of his nature
as an object to be attained by action. To train him is to offer
the antithesis of any recognition of innate capacity: it is to
manipulate him towards artificial confines. To educate him is to
pay full recognition to his moral potential. Education is both a
moral expression of the Common Good, and a means of furthering the
latter.
"Moral agency is not merely an agency by which an end is
attained, or an idea realized, or a function fulfilled, but an agency
detennined by an idea on the part of the agent, by his conception of
an end or function; and the state would be brought into being and
sustained by merely natural as opposed to moral agency, unless there
were a consciousness of ends - and of ends the same in principle with
that served by the state itself - on the part of those by whom it
is brought into being, and sustained." (126)
177
Green recognizes that the state could exist to serve merely
natural means but he requires that the state be construed as a moral
artifact, and that it cherish a continuing moral conunituent. The
latter will apply through education. The fruit of this process is
a consciousness of the Common Good. The state's justification is
its contribution to the moral life. Ideally, all institutions
should reflect an overall moral purpose.
"The moral progress of mankind has no reality except as
resulting in the formation of more perfect individual characters;
but on the other hand every progress towards perfection on this part
of the individual character presupposes some embodiment or expression
of itself by the self realising principle in what may be called the
organisation of life." (127)
It is not an exaggeration to say that in Green, 'moral democracy'
reaches its climax. For here institutions are the external
expression of the moral progress of mankind, and the material through
which the idea of perfection must be realized.	 We need only note
in addition the pre—eminent role of reason as the organization of
the moral idea of self perfection to be attained, in order to
appreciate that the education system was the moral nurture par excellence.
"The determination of will by reason, then, which constitutes
moral freedom or autonomy, must mean its determination by an object
which a person, willing, in respect of his reason, presents to himself,
that object consisting in the realization of an ideal of perfection
in and by himself." (128)
Considered in their moral authorship all civic institutions
are sacred. Green refers to the state explicitly:
"The real function of govermnent being to maintain conditions
of life in which morality shall be pible." (129)
Pre-.eniinent in conditions for morality is facility for the
develoiinent of reason, involving at least some resource redistribution
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for education. The redistribution is justified because it
provides for moral developnent. In the same way, 80 also is the
state justified. It follows, however, that the form of the state
must be in accord with moral precepts.
vi. John Stuart Mill
If Green is the acme of the moral conception of democracy
amongst historical theorists, J.S. Mill is a salutary and final
reminder of the point made already in relation to Locke, namely
the difficulty of classifying theorists into a neat division of
moral and market exponents.
J.S. Mill stands at the junction of moral and market theories.
Though Benthani and James Mill never wavered in their indifference to
all but utility, J.S. Mill saw not merely that the logic of a
hedonist position was a disdain for the dignity of man, but also
that self—conceptualisation was logically a function of the world
in which men live, and could be altered if that world was altered.
Despite his devotion to the principle of utility, Mill was hardly
consistent in his views:
"It is in the third chapter of Liberty, in which he discusses
'individuality', as one of the elements of well being that Mill
without knowing it, abandons utilitarianjm. In it he makes the
un—utilitarian complaint that individual spontaneity is hardly
recognized by common modes of thinking as having any intrinsic
worth, deserving any regard on its own account. He then mentions
with approval the doctrine of self—realization by Von Humboldt.
It really is of importance says Mill, not only what men do, but
also what manner of men they are that do it." (130)
The notion of self improvement introduces a further valde
which Mill never successfully accommodated with utility. His
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attitude to democracy is correspondingly different from Bentham and
James Mill. J.S. Mill supports representative government because it
educates the governed, not simply because it better assures their
happiness. Mill's resistance to government intervention in the life
of the individual must be seen in the light of his desire for self
improvement: " - there is a part of the life of every person who has
come to years of discretion, within which, the individuality of that
person ought to reign." (131) On the other hand, he warns: " - there
are other things of which the demand of the market is by no means a test,
things of which the utility does not consist in ministering to
inclinations, nor in serving the daily uses of life, and the want of
which is least felt where the need. is greatest. This is peculiarly
true of those things which are chiefly useful as tending to raise the
character of Imman beings." (132)
Mill goes so far as to declare that: " - any well—intentioned and
tolerably- civilized government may think, without presumption, that it
does or ought to possess a degree of cultivation above the average of
the community which it rules, and it should therefore be capable of
offering better education, and better instruction to the people, than
the greater number of them would spontaneously demand." (133)
His commiiment to a rather more exalted notion of men than his
utilitarian predecessors is shown in his criticism of Bentham: "The
sense of honour and personal dignity - - that feeling of personal
exaltation and degredation which acts independently of other peopls
opinions, or even in defiance of it; the love of beauty, the passion of
the artist; the love of order, of congruity, of consistency in all things,
and conformity to their end; the love of power, not in the limited form
of power over other human beings, but abstract power, the power of
making our volitions effectual; the love of action, the thirst for
movement and activity, a principle scarcely of less influence in human
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life than its opposite, the love of peace -. None of these
powerful constituents of human nature are thought worthy- of a
place among the springs of action -." (131i)
Mill was certainly an optimist on the possibilities of the
spread of civilized influences on the majority of men, but he does
not seem to have been ignorant of the plight of the mass of the
people in his day. He writes of them: "It is not sufficiently
considered how little there is in most men's ordinary lives to give
any largeness either to their conceptions or to their sentiments.
Their work is a routine; not a labour of love, but of self—interest
in the most elementary foxin, the satisfaction of daily wants;
neither the thing done, nor the process of doing it, introduces
the mind to thoughts of feelings extending beyond individuals;
if instructive books are within their reach, there is no stimulus
to read them; and in most cases the individual has no access to any
person of cultivation much superior to his own." (135)
Mill, unlike market theorists, was not prepared to let things
rest there. Against the view that men should continue in that
condition he urges that:
"What is wanted is, the means of making ignorance aware of
itself and able to profit by knowledge; accustoming minds which Imow
only routine to act upon, and feel the value of principles, teaching
them to compare different modes of action, and learn, by the use of
their reason, to distinguish the best." (136)
There could be no greater contrast with market theories than
the conception of popular government endorsed by Mill which:
- presents an opportunity to the citizen not to satisfy his
wants but to realize his potential - - - participation and self
government are good in themselves because of their capacity to
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develop the moral qualities of independence, responsibility and
care for others." The citizen is, " - an actor realizing his moral
potentialities and his freedom through public life." (137)
vii. Conclusion
Whilst I consider Mill primarily a moral democrat, he is a
powerful example of the "tension" I have outlined which is inherent
in liberal democracy, between limited participation in liberal
democracy and the idea of moral agency. The point has already
been mentioned in relation to Locke. (138) Liberals like Locke and
Mill are willing to employ democratic apparatus, insofar as they
facilitate the exercise of individualism, but they are not prepared
to give unqualified support to the notion of moral agency on a
universal basis. Specifically they do not acknowledge that cherished
principles such as the free market economy or minimum government
may have to be modified in the light of adherence to the value of
moral agency. It is fair to say of course that Mill was prepared
to envisage this more than Locke.
What is apparent at this stage is both that there is a "moral"
strand to the concept of democracy and in that strand education has
not merely a contingent but a necessary place. This contrasts with
the position I discussed in an earlier chapter where I considered
"market" approaches to democracy and tried to show that in that strand
there was no necessary position for education. The moral conception
of democracy has been presented as an idea which has evolved through
several thinkers. Potentially it may present a challenge to some
liberal democratic ideas and institutions. This point is discussed
further, and its educational implications are considered in the last
chapter. J.S. Mill is further discussed in the concluding chapter
in relation to the educational implications of both conceptions of
democracy-. Finally, I have at several points hinted at important
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differences between education and training and this I also
intend to clarify and discuss. (139)
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Chapter IV
	
Conclusion - Market Democracy and Education
is Introduction
It has already been stressed that philosophy of education has
had a paucity of comment to make on the relationship between
democracy and education. (1) No doubt in part, this can be
attributed to the fact that philosophy in common with other disciplines
has its preoccupations, fashions, and priorities, and that the
foregoing have simply not centred on political concepts. Indeed,
it might be argued that in Dewey's seminal work on Democracy and
Education, political concepts are already overshadowed by educational
and social considerations. (2) Ironically pure educational
considerations, whether of the progressive variety or of the
conceptual school, came to the fore in the wake of Idealism, a school
of thought patently political. (3) Perhaps this explains some
unselfconscious neglect of political factors in the philosophy of
education. Instead, the concept of education, the curriculum,
moral education, and the nature of intrinsic justification became
core theories.
That political factors are at last coming into fashion does
nothing to alleviate the problem to which I have addressed myself. ('i)
Democracy still appears to be regarded as above controversy by
philosophers of education. (5) whilst i believe the attention to
political factors to be inescapably correct, I still maintain that
the concept of democracy employed within philosophy of education must
be revised, in order to do the work required of it. (6)
Essentially what is amiss is that liberal democracy has not
been analysed into its component streams of thought, as occurs in
Chapter I. Instead, the most recent manifestation of the new
concern with political considerations, has been a marked emphasis
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upon the means—end orientation of market democracy. (7) Typically,
it has issued in a concern for work, training and happiness, with a
woeful inattention to criticism and evaluation of social goals. In
view of the conclusions of Chapteril, this is precisely what one
would expect to happen. In that chapter, elitists, pluralists,
and economic democrats, were examined, and found to favour the
status quo in politics.
The eclipse of the criticism of social goals in favour of
immediate work—related considerations may be represented by the
collapse of the distinction between knowledge of how one ought to live,
that is views on what sort of society one favours, 'what its institutions
and practices should be like, in which direction it should be moving,
and knowledge lbr living, including principally vocational skills.
There are obvious and immediate implications for the educational
system of this position. Clearly if it is held that knowledge of
how one ought to live requires acquaintance with theoretical knowledge
and should be the province of all, then an intellectual education
for all is necessary. Specifically it will be shown that the latter
entails a conversance with areas such as historical, literary,
religious, and moral knowledge, as well as including a programme of
practical subjects. By contrast an avowed market theorist can argue
that his system permits some to pursue intrinsic areas of knowledge
but he is not committed to the positive thesis that all shall be so
treated. These different positions in relation to particular
conceptions of democracy and their knowledge correlates, will be
examined in detail. (8)
ii. Market Democracy and Utilitarianism
Is market democracy merely a modern formulation, and if not does
it differ at all in its educational implications from classical
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utilitariansim and the work of Mill, traditional bastions of liberal
democracy?
My argument is that market democracy has its roots in classical
utilitarian political theory, but its implications for education in
terms of citizenship, happiness, and the curriculum, are different
from those of utilitarianism in certain important respects.
I imply elsewhere that happiness as a key value is an
unsatisfactory basis on which to rest democracy. (9) It might be
objected that the utilitarians themselves produced ample and well
tried arguments for democracy, and yet were ethical hedonists.
Thit this is far too sweeping. In terms of the modern applications
of utility there are in fact vital differences from the utilitarians,
and there is moreover the point that happiness led in ilobbes to anything
but a democratic polity. Bentham and James Mill were as much
preoccupied with men's selfishness as with their happiness. In old
age Bentham showed a regard for the fallibility of rulers essentially
different from the position Which ultimately obtains in Barrow.
"If self-preference has place in every human breast, then, if
rulers are men, so must it have in every ruling breast. Government
has, accordingly, under every form comprehending laws and institutions,
had for its object the greatest happiness, not of those over whom,
but of those by whom it has been exercised, the interests not of the
many, but of the few, or even of the one, has been the prevalent
interest and to that interest all others have been, at all times
sacrificed." (io)
Bentham's distrust of rulers puts him sharply at odds with
Schumpeter's watch-dog rulers, with their impoverished electoral
endorsement. It puts him at odds too, with Dáhl's public
indoctrination programme in the norms of polyarchy.
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The essence of the classical utilitarian position lay in the
degree of discontent felt by the public as a function of the insecurity
of tenure by the rulers. By placing a limit on the tenure of public
office, and allowing the public demonstration of discontent or approval
of leaders, the utilitarians hoped to effect an identity between the
happiness of the rulers and that of the people. 1here happiness as
vocational enmeshment, apolitical education, or citizen indoctrination
function as aims of education, the possibility looms of a planned
attempt to nullify or at least subdue the emergence of public
discontent. If it is the possibility and the efficacy of public
discontent which is the central plank of the utilitarian case for
democracy then Dáhl, Schumpeter, Riker, Barrow, et.al., go along 'way
towards instituting arrangements to destroy this. The problem of
public discontent, and what to do about it is a cardinal issue between
market and moral democrats. Steintrager argues that in respect of
moral aptitude the ability of the people was at a maximum under the
utilitarian system of government. (ii) This is an exaggeration insofar
as there seems no good reason to equate discontent with rulers with
moral disquiet. 1,lhat I think is probable is that the latter will
have a tendency to diminish in the face of the detenained pursuit of
enmeshment, whether within polyarchy or economic democracy, and within
the apolitical mass of Shumpeter.
In one recent view of happiness as enmesbment in work roles, (12),
it is hard to see how Mill and Bentham would countenance the central
directive apparatus necessary to ensure that schools would pursue
enmeshment. Certainly happiness for the subject here is not independent
of governmental planning agencies,and policies. In the classical
utilitarians iL manifestly was independent. The latter always
recognized a potential desire on the part of governments to dominate
i9
their subjects. In James Mill men are taught to love virtue, to
know the institutions of government, and to judge their rulers.
In market democracy they are to disregard virtue, to either (for the
elitist) ignore the institutions of government, or to use them for
their own particular ends and secure maximum personal utility.
The utilitarians are the forerunners of the modern pluralista
insofar as they construe a manS happiness to be indissolubly linked
with the pursuit of his interests, and construe the role of
government as a champion of law and order. Clearly this leaves
important differences between them and modern market democrats.
There is no sense in which James Mill and Bentham could countenance
Dahi's immovable polyarchical nonns, Above all the emphasis of the
extreme market wing on the pursuit of rational self—interest would
have jettisoned the utilitarians cherished belief in the possibility
of an identity of self and community interests. Especially, the
notion that an individual's non—political activity might actually
profit from the public—spirited behaviour of his colleagues. (13)
Essentially for Mill and Bentham ignorance was curable whereas
selfishness was not. Modern market theorists however would not
endorse this view. Ekiovledge would be desirable for the indivithial
to the extent that it would assist in the pursuit of his vents.
In a loose sense what distinguishes modern market theorists from the
utilitarians is simply their more sophisticated conclusion of the
view that knowledge is power, and ignorance is weakness. For Mill
and Bentham it was public knowledge of rulers actions, plus the
right to enforce their opinions of these actions, that contained
rulers. For Schumpeter, knowledge of political processes and
policies not merely is power but rightfully is power, which it ii
better not to allow into the bands of the electorate. For Dahi,
the widespread inculcation of the noims of polyarchy is a sufficient
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condition for its survival. For Downs, the knowledge of the
catastrophic results of the fall of democracy is supposed to be
sufficient to support a long run preference for democracy over and
above short run utility functions. For Biker and Tulluck, knowledge
of the likely behaviour of others is conducive to miniudsing costs
and benefits of actions.
Given Mill's aim of educating and enfranchising the masses, he
is to that extent at variance with elitists. It is likely too that
Bentham would ridicule Down's attempt to maintain a higher order
utility preference over and above short run utility functions. (14)
(hi the face of it apart from sharing with modem market democrats a
predilection for utility, Mill might seem closer to pluralists than
other market democrats. Mill's fundamentally descriptive (15) notion
of representation, and his idea of interests as preferences to constrain
governments appear to support this view. Representation is necessary
for Mill because without it, there will not exist sufficient means
to ensure that the various interests in the community are not coerced,
and hence happiness put at risk. Dot Mill was conscious of the
danger of sinister interests and the wholesale indoctrination of the
pluralista would have stunted the very consciousness he hoped to
arouse by education.
Undoubtedly Hobbes makes a further contribution t. explaining
the roots of the market conception of democracy. There is much in
common between the comments of Bobbes and the opening disclaimers
of Riker and Tullock. (16) For ITobbes society was not necessary
for man's moral perfection, in the sense that the latter itself was
a characteristic which could be readily dispensed with. Bather
society was an instrument for fulfilling his needs and desires.
Again, much of the modern market relationship between desire and
action is seen in Hobbes. When Ilobbes uses moral language it can
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often be seen to involve placing labels on previously observed
tendencies or behaviour patterns.
wpelicity is a continual progress of the desire, from one object
to another; the attaining of the former being still but the way to the
latter. The cause whereof is, that the object of a man's desire, is
not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time, but to assure
for ever, the way of his future desire. And therefore the voluntary
actions and inclinations of all men, tend not only to the procuring,
but also to the assuring of a contented life - ". (17)
If society operates like a natural mechanism, and man as a unit
of that mechanism is to be regarded as an object of observation, like
any other natural phenomenon, it is convenient that, like a natural
phenomenon, he behaves rather than acts. The latter presumption is
tantamount to an article of faith in the work of modern market theorists
such as Pullock and Dahi. It is followed by another thoroughly
Hobbesian stances
"1hataoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire; that
is it, which he for his part calleth good." (18)
Hobbes and modern market theorists are at one in stipulating
rationality as an instrumental good. The rational man, whether for
Downs or ilobbes, is the man who can clearly perceive his oivn long
term interests, and the means by which to achieve them.
I am not suggesting that the influences at work in the world of
flobbes were the same as those affecting the modem market democrat.
Doubtless Robbes sought to apply the seventeenth century scientific
revolution to social thought whilst Downs and Tullock were applying
twentieth century- cost benefit trade—offs and the concept of the
econonu.c free rider to politics. The conclusion in either case was
a down—grading in the character of politics and the model of the
moral man, insofar as he was seen to cherish "pre—scientific" illusions
about his influence on politics and his "obligation" to the political
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system. The implications of this view of man are broader than
politics, and permeate education also.
liobbes example points to a further weakness in the market
conception of democracy, namely that there is no conceptual connection
between a hedonistic ethic and democracy. It is fundamentally a
matter of empirical debate whether in fact democracy is the moat apt
form of political organization in the egoistic universe. Hobbes,
with his conceni about order and stability did not think so. Men could
not live in society without unfettered coercive power. Pure egoism
can issue in unqualified indulgence, which is conducive to anything
from quarrelsome behaviour to civil war. To constrain the sovereign
power would itself be to constrain indulgence by the sovereign and
thus run counter to the original ethic.
Ironically Downs fears the collapse of democracy in much the
same terms as Hobbes. (19) The former has good reason to, since his
creature of rational self interest may perceive that the much vaunted
long run preference for democracy is in fact a gross deception.
Unlike the utilitarians Downs did not believe that all gained equally
from democracy and correspondingly, not all have as much to lose from
the collapse of democracy. Yet if Downs and his fellow economic
democrats are to maintain democracy and stave off its collapse, they
must hold out the spectre of a disaster in order to cultivate a preference
for democracy. Though not all gain equally from democracy, for an
economic democracy to survive all wst think they do. whilst
James Mill, in the sanguine belief that some could represent the
interests of others, could comnend happiness as an aim of education,
the economic democrat with his Hobbesian
	 man' premise, must
mount a gigantic exercise in deception in order to ensure the survival
of democracy. The deception is not merely that the collapse of
democracy is equally disastrous for all, but also the fact that Dois
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is venturing an intuitive finding in the guise of an empirical
generalization. No evidence is in fact offered to show that the
collapse of democracy will as a matter of fact be catastrophic. The
implications for education are not simply inferior to James and
John Stuart Mill, but arguably also, inferior to a right wing anarchist
position represented by Nozick, (20) who is the logical extension of
the economic democrats, yet hardly one suspects, the prophet of
chaos. For John Stuart Mill, the task of an informed public is to
test the integrity of politicians. Education is to make men capable
of judging the aims and intentions of their leaders. For the
economic democrats, men are to learn that they depend upon the survival
of democracy for their continual satisfaction even though the latter
is decidedly doubtful and certainly inequitable in its results.
Such a deception could not occur in Nozick's state because of the
existence of moral side constraints. Men could not be used as fodder
to maintain a system which prospered a few inordinately.
It is true also, that in marked contrast to elitists, the
utilitarians found it necessary to attempt a rational political
structure which incorporated the people at large. James Mill
considered that ignorance was curable by education whereas selfishness
was not: Schuinpeter and Sartorl. would deny the former and remain
silent on the latter. The prime function of a ruling elite for
Schumpeter as for Hobbes, is to maintain order; if in so doing it is
defending its own corner that is by the way. For Mill a vigorous
prograne of education, including civics was the answer, for Schumpeter,
miniuimn political considerations in education must follow.
iii. Citizenship. Market Democracy and Education
For market theorists such as Barrow (21) and DaM, democracy is
to be defended on the grounds that it promotes happiness or stability,
and not because it enshrines certain moral principles. It is lack
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of trust in the latter principles which leads to the elevation of
institutional structures and the enhancement of a unitary principle
such as happiness. In the market democracy of Robert Dahi, it is
groups that are the focal point of political activity. Citizens of
polyarchy are to be subject to a thorough progranmie of indoctrination
in the norms of polyarchy. This is important for Dahi because there
are no public criteria, other than group strength for the resolution
of group conflicts.
Thus there is in Dahi 's calculus no reckoning for the moral
worth of a particular project, merely the relative strength of the
different groups involved. Dahi 's aim is that bargaining should
take place within a framework of consensus about the proper conduct
of politics: hiring lawyers to dispute over contractual obli,gations
instead of hit men. What might threaten such a consensus, however,
is the perception of some parties that the whole political machinery
is loaded against them. That for example, success in obtaining
group demands is a function of several variables distributed in an
arbitrary manner, such as economic power, access to information, and
contact with politically influential and articulate persons. Indoct-
rination in the values of polyarchy is supposed to ensure that the
members of the less fortunate groups do not enjoy such a perception.
Theoretically Dahl's pluralism, in contrast to Schumpeter's
elitism, represents a more subtle attempt to solve the problem of a
disenchanted and politically iimiature populace. The aim is that
citizens shall make a ready transfer from their belief in the equity
of polyarchy itself, to their belief in the equity of a particular
result of policy formation.DahI, then, certainly does not neglect the
idea of citizenship as an aim of education, but orientates it towards
the status quo, by the inculcation of consensus norms. It is reverence
by all for the rules of the game, which is the quintessence of
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citizenship in Dahl'a polyarchy.
The whole notion of citizenship would doubtiese be an anathema ti
Schumpeter. Insofar as there are citizens in Shumpeter 'a democracy,
their role is limited to an occasional endorsement of a clutch of
policies, usually on a quinquennial basis. Givam that Schumpeter
proscribes political activity for the vast majority, apart from the
former events, he would presumably acquiesce in a curriculum which
gave a smattering of drama, art, and sport, rather than any sort of
political education. I have mentioned previously the very basic
questions which arise from the stark Naturalistic position Schumpeter
occupies here. (22) A rather different alternative here from
Schumpeter, would be to follow the Economic Democrats, and turn
politics into a utility commodity, with consensus,, in the form of
support for democracy, achieved by presenting it *s a long run
preference function, and particular policies as hort term preferences.
The difficulty with this position, and it is surely one of the reasons
why a theorist like Dahi leans heavily on indoctrination, is that
the long run preference for democrasy may empirically be functionally
dependent upon short run utility curves for particular policy
objectives.
Though it appears intuitively that an Economic Democrat ought
to favour citizenship as an aim of education, it is also apparent
that the prosecution of such an aim may put an immense strain on the
political system. For since to the Economic Democrat, democratic
political structures are to be explained in terms of getting people
what they want, then presumably an important aspect of citizenship is
knowing how to get what one wants from the political system. Nov it
is clear, I think, that content for such a progre as the above can
be readily prescribed, but it is not clear that the system could
fulfil the demands placed upon it. For there is a limit to the
resources which the co—amity has to dispose of, and if the pressure
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on those resources increases, because of improved citizen
articulation, there will ultimately be a fall in individual utility.
Nov an Economic Democrat such as Downs, might reply that
an important aspect of an education for citizenship would be the
presentation of a long run preference for democracy, so that adverse
changes in individual utility functions were counterbalanced by an
overall coiiiment to the democratic system. I have already stressed
the difficulties inherent in maintaining this overall preference for
democracy. (23) If the latter is to be effective for each
individual, they must not merely experience disutility at the thought
of democracy dissolving, but also most must not perceive that to
sustain democracy does not require the active support of every citizen.
In many cases this Will amount not so much to adopting certain
practices, as refraining from others. Thus a citizen may acimowledge
that if wholesale bribing of public officials occurred this would
constitute a threat to democracy and as such represent potential
disutility for citizens. But he could also argue that providing
only he, or only a few citizens, were to bribe public officials,
democracy, and hence his long run preference, would still largely
be satisfied, and he would have significantly raised his short run
utility function.
The more extreme exponents on the market wing (2&) could reply
with an additional ploy. They could argue that on their model, long
run adherence to the democratic political structure could be effected
by including within an education for citizenship publicly efficacious
bat irrational sentiments in favour of democracy. For example,
they might cultivate and encourage obligations and sentiments towards
democracy in individuals, which they consider wholly unrealistic
and naive for an individual to entertain in relation to his political
role in a democracy. Yet such a course of action might be highly
efficacious in terms of preserving the democratic political structure
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in the face of highly fluctuating utility functions. The rational
individual for these theorists, is the one who perceives that
democracy continues in spite of what he doea rather thzin because of
what he does. It is not he, but the naive and deluded citizen,
with a grossly inflated view of the importance of his role in the
political structure, who in fact supports and sustains democracy.
All this I think bequeathes a conceptual problem to the theorist
here. It seems that education for citizenship consists at least in
part in the initiation of individuals into norms held to be publicly
efficacious but also irrational. That is, they would be learning
that which was deemed in relation to each individual citizen to be
palpably false. To maintain itself such a society would deliberately
propagate that which is untrue. The inculcation of false beliefs,
whatever else it amounts to, cannot be a process of education. (2)
Given the connections discussed earlier between politics and
education, it follows that for the market theorist, a public education
is an enterprise of utility. It follows that the latter does not
prohibit the democratic elitist from advocating a severely intellectual
cuiculum for a few, or permitting the indulgence of a minority of
select schools, financed by private money, but of course qua
utility they would only be for a few, since the system itself
requires only a few leaders. We cannot challenge the elitist on
the grounds that his intellectual curriculum negates the utility
function of training leaders for he can readily reply that a training
in mathematics, latin and literature amounts to appropriate preparation
for political leadership. The argimtent would then hinge on what
amounted to a suitable preparation for leadership and degenerate into
a largely empirical exchange. It seems implicit in the elitist
position that he is committed to a 'high culture' view of politics
203
with a self—justifying axis. The latter is a logically necessary
condition for a democratic elitist, since otherwise his leadership
would have to be continually verified by the vast majority of citizens,
and his limitation of popular control to the endorsement of one elite
group of leader, rather than another, would be purely arbitrary-
fiat. It is the elitist claim that the populace simply do not know
'what they are doing in the political sphere, that constitutes his high
culture view of politics. It would be absurd to pretend either that
such a group would support education for citizenship on a widespread
basis, or that their opposition to widespread political involvement
would not lead them to favour some aspects of the curriculum more
than others, and these not directly related to politics. Critical
thought would be the prime antipathy to the democratic elitist,
challenging as it does the kernel of his high culture view of politic..
(kie effect of this position would be ultimately to divorce men
from involvement of a non—instrumental kind in the political rea]m.
If the voter in an elitist democracy i. restricted merely to the
endorsement of party policies, and. is meant to keep out of politics,
his involvement i. intentionally held at an instrumental level.
Not every voter may perceive his role in such a way, but empirically
it is the case that any attempt to extend his activities beyond
registering approval or dissent in an election would be to exceed
his 'proper' place. It seems that an education for citizenship,
logically must concern itself with the role of the citizen though
clearly it i. likely to include other aspects of the political system.
In limiting the role of the citizen to an endorsement of policy
bundles only, education for citizenship would be disseminating an
instrumental approach to politics for the mass of the public.
The fact that some voters might perchance equate such an act of
voting with far more grandiose considerations, pethaps on a level
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with the irrational members of the economic democrats' polity, does
not negate the logical point that the function of the citizen
conimmicated in schools, issues from intentionality and is therefore
a necessary, not merely a contingent, feature of education within an
elitist democracy.
I have already shown that problems about perceived and
prescribed citizen roles are not peculiar to the e]iti8t. (26)
I want to make one further point by suggesting that this whole
relationship within market democracies between private irrationality
and public efficacy, is asyimnetrical. It is important from the point
of view of education to notice that the irrational bolstering and
support of the democratic process by some apparently misguided voters,
is not reciprocated. Though some voters are prepared to construe
their commilment to democracy seriously, as a matter of obligation,
and loyalty, their endeavours are insupportable within the norms of
market democracy. For the values of market democracy are essentially
instrumental and therefore do not feedback via the educational system
any commendation for behaviour of a non—instrumental kind. Of course
the prescribed curriculum is only one of several influences upon
voter behaviour and personal values. it to the extent to which conduct
outside the purely instrumental is neither reinforced by the curriculum
nor by any results accruing directly from voter actions, the non—
instrumental aspect of politics will tend to diminish.
Pluralists are not exempt from this charge. The group which
participates to further a radical cause in which it believes, but
with the prospect of only small gains if any, renders a bonus to the
pluralist machine by supporting the very claims of pluralism to be
an open society. Yet pluralists are opposed to anything more than
incremental change in their exposition of public administration. (27)
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The pluralist thus has an insidious bonus. His theory of social
change decries radical reform, yet the existence of attempts at the
latter is efficacious in labelling pluralism an open society.
Though citizenship is a wholly instrumental undertaking for the
pluralist in that it is merely for the pursuit of preferences, Within
indoctrinated norms, yet, perversely, the pluralist benefits from some
deviant groups participating in politics.
iv. Market Democracy and the aims of education
I have already discussed citizenship as an aim of education
in market democracy. Are there any other plausible aims? On the
basis of the discussion of market democracy in this essay it would
be unsurprising to find utility emerging as an aim of education.
The latter obtrudes at various points into government publication
on education. (28) In one recent study, Robin Barrow takes the
psychological state happiness and (29) elevates it to the status of
a value, a guiding principle for society, education, and the
individual in liberal democracy. In addition, happiness is equated
with enmeshment in one's work. The postulation of happiness as a
key value both makes for an insecure foundation for democracy, and
leads to results for the individual which are not necessary features
of a democratic society, and acme of which might be deemed morally
repugnant. For example the selection and training of individuals
for work roles at the age of thirteen onwards is not an empirically
necessary condition of democracy. b.r*her there are serious
problems about happiness as an aim or indeed the aim of education.
It has already been stated elsewhere that education is not a necessary-
path to happiness, for many uneducated people are perfectly happy. (30)
It is also concerned with having expectations of life that are
matched by circumstances and it is the attempt to achieve this that
leads the massive orchestration of education for work in contemporary
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literature.
The postulation of happiness or work enmeebment as a key value (31)
is incompatible with the ideal of the dignity of man, which is itself
central to moral democratic thoht and therefore to that extent
incompatible with democracy. It further seems that such a society in
which happiness as enmeshment was the supreme value, would not be
educating its citizens, but socialising and training them. (32) It is
true too that public discontent (33) will have a tendency to be stifled
at source in the face of a determined enmeshment policy. The latter
entails a ready identification with work, an institution whose norms
it is logically possible to be critical of. thmeshed citizens,
however, are not critical citizens, they are by definition contented
'with their work role. Given the priority of contentment with work,
and the role of the educational system in harnessing citizens to their
work role: given also that some work roles are extremely limited in the
range of cognitive and conceptual demands they make from the occupant
of the role, the result seems to be an output of persons from the
educational system who largely relate judgenients about the norms and
practices of society with judgements about work. In this respect it
seems that a policy of enmeshment nullifies the moral aptitude of people
and weakens the possibility of a literate body of citizens. The
coup de grace to this whole policy is that the allegation of excessive
state interference, a chestuut of conservatives and liberals, applies
here to their own number. For it is hard to see how the pursuit by
schools of worker enmeshment can issue in anything less than state
organization and planning, if not plain direction. It is true too that
Dahi's polyarchy with its wholesale indoctrination of the young suggests
an encroachment on individuals' lives of greater moment than the mere
institution of legislation designed to afford some measure of social
equality.
The naturalistic ethic of market democracy lends itself also to
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the postulation of a preparation for work as an aim of education.
An argument such as 'all men have to work, therefore all men ought to
be prepared for work' has an incipient appeal to a market democrat.
A less stark position can argue simply that the aim of education is
to fit papils to be useful members of society. But this is
platitudinous until we Iaiov the society in question. Maiy Warnock
argues that: "To be prepared to some extent for work is an educational
need." (31i) She tackles the issue on coninon—sense grounds:
"Comnon sense at any rate inclines us to think of education as a
preparation for life: and of life as better if the people living it have
roles to fill, useful things to do." (35)
Warnock's proposition that education should reflect the values
of existing society, neglects the fact that the values of society are
various, and it is not clear that the preservation of society is
equivalent to the preservation of all those values. Indeed I shall be
suggesting that it would be preferable to have the values iimnanent in
a moral conception of democracy, rather than those of market democracy.
This is not to say that schools should entirely neglect skills and
performances applicable to work, it is rather to suggest that the
naturalistic and utility base of market democracy will not permit 'work
to be eximined and considered on a rational basis. Rather it seems that
under a market democracy work might readily become the aim of education.
The values inuanent in a moral conception of democracy are not at present
reflected in the world of work. Warnock's position is essentially
similar to that of Barrow in that she is asking for the ready acceptance
of the work values of industrial capitalism and the preparation of
children for work roles therein. (36) Work again is the chief
embodiment of the status quo and preparation for work the principal aim
of education. For the individual who has passed through such a
process of education, the values of work would not be open to rational
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Inspection. We eventually discover why it is that for Warnock work
activities are so ameliorating:
"Wevalue them because we want to be in control of things, on
however small a scale, and it is a source of satisfaction to be so.
For to be able to control or adapt things is to exercise our freedom.
Work is therefore a proof of human freedom." (37)
In Alan Silitoe's novel, Saturday Night and &inday Morning, it
appears that the lathe operator's freedom consisted in flights of
fantasy and anticipation concerning excursions entirely outside his
work. Warnock does not attempt to show how a production line worker
can be in control of things, or obtain satisfaction in placing a bolt
regularly on a chassis. IQhere is the freedom for the worker on an
incessantly moving line, unless it be found in stopping it, by some
clandestine means, on a regular basis? Again the connuent applies
that this makes for an insecure foundation for democracy. The critical
citizen is sacrificed in favour of the status quo.
Warnock attempts to preserve the freedom ideal by arguing for
imagination having a place on the curriculum. Thit Warnock makes no
distinction between imagination and fantasy. Her acceptance of the
values of capitalism leads to the negation of imagination. She declares
of work and imagination:
"I have related these two values by arguing that each in a different
way is to be seen as a matter of freedom, or indeed as a contributing
part of freedom. For the ability to work is plainly the ability to be
an active agent, to chsinge things rather than just let them happen.
To work is to control rather than be controlled. On the other hand,
the imagination is the precondition without which any freedom is
possible. It is the means by which a future can be envisaged, which
is different from the present." (38)
There are two possible alternatives: either Warnock is following
a highly stipulative definition of work, which is merely assumed, and/or
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she does not wish to refer to the majority of workers in industrial
capitalism. The di8tinctiOn which might apply here is that between work
and labour, adumbrated by P. Herbst:
"labour is contingently related to its product. Artifacts of
the same kind may- be produced by radically different productive
processes." (39)
Thus Warnock may construe labour as being an inappropriate
caricature of the situation of the worker in industrial capitalism,
but if this is so, she nowhere substantiates it. The point of Herbst's
distinction is that on his view, imagination is possible in relation
to work but not in relation to labour.
"Work is conceived to be a species of unalienated action, labour
is activity tending to alienation. In order to work well a workman
needs to love or value that at which he works." ('tO)
Because Wamock denies any attempt to modify capitalism, then
insofar as imagination is encouraged, it seems inimical to any
enmeabment with work for the reasons I have recently given.
In practice the market aim of work appears more cautiously in
government publications. The D.E. S. points out that:
"Ethication plays an important part in strengthening the foundations
of our society, including its economic basis." (lii)
Jit it has also institutionalised this:
"In July the Departanent issued a circular letter to all Chief
Ethication Officers setting out the part which schools can play in the
industrial strategy and inviting them to review, and if necessary revise
their arrangements for school - industrial liaison." ('i2)
This trend of bridging a merely contingent separation between school
and work has gathered strength. In a iecent consultative, the
suggestion is made "The Secretaries of State consider that substantial
attention should be given at the secondary stage to the relationship
between school work and preparation for working life." (li3)
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It is suggested that one of the aims of education should be:
- to help pupils acquire knowledge and skills relevant to adult
life and employment in a fast-changing world." ('i4)
1:t must never be forgotten, as I insisted earlier, that liberal
democracy is a compound of moral and market conceptions of democracy.
Thus vocational considerations appear unobtrusive in government papers
because in the aims of education as a whole, they are complemented with
moral aims. 1it we must not allow tbis seemingly innocuous combination
to lull us into a false sense of security. One must ruthlessly enquire
into the moral aims which a thorough-going market theorist could
consistently endorse. Given the notion of market democracy sketched
so far, a moral education in market democracy seems a limited exercise.
Thus if the moral aims of the market conception come to the fore in
liberal democracy certain conclusions can be drawn. On the elitist
model one might conjecture that for potential leaders, moral education
might approximate to an inculcation of the character of Locke 's Ekiglish
gentleman, with a breadth of experience of what we might term 'culture'
and an impregnable sense of where he and society are going. This of
course would be reserved to the few, but for the rest, pace Locke, the
most that it seems logically possible to achieve is an ethics of belief.
For to go beyond this, to encourage autonomy, a sense of inquiry, a
demand for reasons for institutions and practices, seems ipso facto
to exceed the basic premise of democratic elitism viz, that most men are
incapable of detezmning their future in relation to a political and
social macrocosm.
In fact of course this in exactly what happens when attempts are
made to introduce moral education into other market educational
considerations. Its emphasis is status quo: moral education is
character trning, and the good character is one adjusted, i.e.
conforming to the norms of the social and economic world which greets
him:
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"Thus, if at a school there were a way of developing in children
a good character - this would be to look ahead to the rest of life.
It would conform to the general aims of education on which we have so
frequently insisted." (i5)
(hi her side Warnook has the logical point that:
to be morally good is to have a certain sort of character
not a certain sort of ability - ". (1i6)
1it her construction is that to be morally good is to be as
society would have one be. It has already been argued that in a
thorough going market democracy the images prevalent in society are
wholly restrictive. (t7) If there is a moral education in market
democracy, it is deterministic and self congratulatory, ultimate]y
self—stultifying. It appears now in any case that moral education
should be an addition to core subjects, along with health education,
preparation for parenthood, and an adult role in family life. (1k8)
There are good reasons I tMnk for suggesting that a character training
subservient to the norms of society is the acme of moral education in
market democracy. Indeed in this suggestion there lurks the principle
of happiness, especially happiness as enmeshnient which we have
encountered before. (i9) I must reiterate that I am aware of the
logical point that character training must have a social basis insofar
as there are linguistic and ethical presuppositions which are only
intelligible in the context of social life. 	 it this is not my
criticism of this brand of moral education. My point is rather that
whilst linguistic and ethical presuppositions are logically necessary
to any- conception of a social self, that is the self as a social actor,
I can find no conceptual or empirical reason for the further inference
that the particular Images of current social life must themselves,
without exception, be endorsed as good and right. The latter can only
arise from elevating a contingent property to the level of a logical
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truth. For though some form of social conception logically iiust
figure in the education of character, it does not follow that its
endorsement as the form of social life should also occur.
The prime difficulty for the market conception is that the latter
will indeed tend to happen because the naturalistic ethic of market (50)
democracy is geared to the images, desires, and aspirations of the
present and ininediate. This is not merely apparent in the strongly
political material of these theorists, though clearly it exists there.
it it is apparent also in the search for stability Within society and
the championing of utility for that end. This applies to Downs, Riker
and Tullock with their emphasis on human action as the mediating function
betweenwants and their satisfaction. There 'would, however, be little
dIfficulty in extending it to Dahl and Schumpeter, for the former
advocates polyarchical indoctrination because it maximizes happiness and
the latter could well argue that the trouble with people is that
politics makes them unhappy. Indeed, happiness is the panacea for the
market democrat if we follow the implication of the market view that all
desire is for happiness, and all action is motivated by desire. (51)
There is no such thing as a motivating 'ought', rather it is the
thought of my own happiness 'which prompts me to act. This position
in turn sheds further light on moral education and work roles in such
a society. It is logically possible for men to engage in rational
reflection about their own role in society. The lack of a meta—value
principle in society, whilst not a causally sufficient reason for
engagement in rational reflection about one's role, does seem to be a
logically necessary one. For though under the aegis of the supreme
principle of happiness I may engage in rational calculation about my
station in society, my duties and responsibilities, I cannot engage in
rational reflection about the same, since to do so would be to call into
question the worth of the principle of happiness. There is an insidious
psychological twist to the latter, which follows from the stipulated
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importance of happiness as a psychological principle in explaining hnian
action. That is, there would be something odd about my wanting to
engage in rational reflection about my station in society. That is
because happiness on the market model is not merely a moral principle
but functions also as a synonym for the psychological state of
homeostasis. Any sign of a desire for rational reflection on the
moral plane, as opposed to rational calculation, is also then an
indication of a psychological disequilibrium, which in turn is
morally undesirable.
The juxtaposition of happiness as a value and happiness as
homeostasie leads for example to the ready identification of the desire
for equality as a symptom of a fundamental psychological disequilibrium.
The desire for equality, that is, is in reality a psychological
disturbance which can be remedied by ensuring a more perfect match
between an indi'ridual's skills, dispositions, and experiences, and his
work roles. If the latter is achieved then the desire for equality,
which like other desires arises from a fundamental state of
disequilibrium, dll cease. It is this identity between happiness
and homeostasis which is the antecedent to the slide towards happiness
as a supreme value principle.
It is hard to resist the view that for market theorists, happiness
as an aim of education, is equivalent to uaintaining homeostasis.
Conflicting ideals and forms of life leading to rational reflection about
societal institutions and goals are clearly out of court, threatnng
as they do the principle of happiness. Ilomeostasis is best maintained
by preserving rather than removing existing inequalities. Hence
education is likely to be highly selective with a curriculum differentiated
for different grades of schooling. An education for market democracy
entails both a firm commitment to the production of an appropriate supply
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of labour for industry and the possibility of rational calculation
for the happiness of the individual. The fonner entails a ready
acquiescence in the demands of industry which may entail the bulk of
the schools population attaining only a very limited repertoire of
skills and no proficiency in evaluating the aims and methods of
industry itself. I have already argaed against any synonymity between
rational reflection and rational calculation. (52) I am happy,
however, to extend the argument further and proceed with an equivalence
relationship between the two. Even in the case of the equivalence
relation, it is a necessary condition for rational calculation
concerning my role, that I attend to reasons for being what I am.
Whilst it is logically possible to feel happy after rational
calculation concerning one's role, it is empirically by no means certain
that this would be the result. Indeed, the possibility of rational
calculation suggests a degree of detachment from one 's immediate
environment that hardly seems possible in the case of an individual
educated under the aegis of homeostasis. For the possibility of
rational calculation in relation to a role presupposes comparing that
role with other roles in order to judge how better or worse off one
is. If we abandon the presumed equivalence between rational reflection
and rational calculation, and revert to the former, then it is difficult
to see how the worker who is also trained to be a happy worker, can
have the necessary conceptual facility to indulge in rational reflection,
the first requirement of which is to examine the role objectively.
v. Market Democracy and the Curriculum
Market Democracy does have some broader implications for the
curriculum than simply education for citizenship. I have suggested
that in a market democracy political enterprises are enterprises of
utility. I want to venture an important argument here that activities
on the curriculum, normally deemed to be of intrinsic worth, (53) will
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be devoid of any instrumental support in a market democracy.
The latter may seem an outrageous coument initially, since to
suggest that some activities are of intrinsic worth, is ipso facto,
to argue that no further justification for their pursuit is necessary.
There is, however, a fallacy here. For to say that certain activities
are of an intrinsic worth says nothing about how such activities are
to be provided, to whom, and in what proportion to other activities.
That is to say that an activity is of intrinsic worth, is still not
to say anything about its provision or distribution. 'What we are
claiming when we say that an activity is intrinsically worthwhile is
that the reasons for pursuing such an activity are to be found only
within the parameters, axioms, and precepts of the activity itself.
Thit what we are also talking about and are concerned with in relation
to the formal curriculum is the matter of planned, intended learning
experiences. It is thus a further question as to the mech inics •f
distributing those planned experiences and I see no reason for insisting
that an activity that is intrinsically valuable cannot at the same
time be included within the curriculum on instrumental grounds.
I can see no logical reason, that is, for arguing that because reasons
for the pursuit of the activity are internal to the activity there
cannot also be other reasons for pursuing the activity. Even if it
were true that all reasons for pursuing the activity were internal to
it, the presentation of the activity for pursuit by others and in
competition with other activities seems to amount to a set of
circumstances manifestly external to the activity. For though an
activity may be of this nature it cannot of itself tell us hoiv far it
should be pursued, how often, when, at what age. I mast emphasise
that I am not trying here to make any novel claim about the concept
of the intrinsic, simply to employ the concept as it stands along the
lines of existing educational literature. Predominantly this involves
literature and history rather than metalwork and craft.
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I would therefore argue that instrumental arguments can be
adduced for allegedly intrinsically valuable activities. For example,
we might acknowledge that mathematics is a subject of intrinsic worth,
but also argue that it is useful for an individual to be able to cost
out purchases, assess how much wallpaper he requires for a living room,
or the cost of a new carpet. The point about these arguments is that
they are contingent on what is thought to be useful or desirable for
people in a particular society to know. They are not located within
the activity itself. Yet they are potentially important for the
curriculum since the latter is a reflection of the nozins of a
particular society and not an unchanging immovable structure. Because
the pursuit of 1kiglish Literature is held by its converts to be
intrinsically worthwhile says nothing in itself about the extent to
'which it should be provided. It seems that a thorough—going market
theorist can readily and plausibly argue that such an activity must
take second place on the curriculum in favour of let us say "the world
of work", since he is reflecting the value of utility which is the
concern central to his society. It will not help the literature
enthusiast to meet the market theorist on the same ground by suggesting
that literature also affords utility. For the market theorist in
planning the curriculum may be considering the utility to society of
work—related activities and argue that these activities afford greater
utility in this respect. I do not want to pursue a rival utility
conflict, but merely point out that in advocating utility the literature
enthusiast has implicitly recognized an instrumental dimension to
curriculum provision. If there be any doubt that the latter is an
instrumental argument, one need only point out that the literature
enthusiast can hardly concur with the suggestion that it is utility
he is pursuing all the time and not literature
In fact of course market theorists will take up different positions,
that is they will use different instrumental considerations, depending
on their own particular persuasion, pluralist, elitist, or economic.
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The mOst interesting variant will be that adopted by the elitist
for whom politics itself is an esoteric activity, though not necessarily
one with an intrinsic justification. The elitist may hold that for
the majority curriculum such activities cannot be given first priority
on the curriculum, (a) since such activities are necessarily difficult
for most people perhaps because they involve restricted (51i) limguistic
and conceptual properties or because they involve the criticism of and
reflection on different ideals of life which are inaccessible for most
people, and (b) most people in society have to earn their living by
pursuing routine and elementary skills which take most of their time
to master and these vocational requirements should self-evidently
come first. Of course there would be no prohibition on elite schools
to teach this to potential leaders. It is possible too that a
pluralist might require such activities to remain a low priority
insofar as they might encourage reflections antipathetic to the norms
of pluralism.
If I am correct in maintaining, (a), that such activities can
legitimately in the matter of provision be supported and opposed by
instrumental arguments, and (b), that a market polity, because of its
inherent value paradigms of utility and the status quo, logically
must supply instrumental arguments for educational provision, the
implication is not merely that 'intrinsic' activities are potentially
unlikely to receive much provision on a 'majority' curriculum, 1t that
such a grasp of these activities as is likely t. occur, is likely to
be devalued for its holders, by the whole means-end ethos of market
democracy. Its lack of an iiediate "pay-off", its impotence in
finding jobs, its cemflict of ideas with current norms, its recondite
nature, will find no compensating reinforcement for i to student,
Its low status within public currency, peer group, and sub culture
will stunt its pursuit quite as much as an inferior place on the
formal curriculum. The very fact that such activities are public,
i.e. within the educational system, does not isolate them from
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political considerations, but renders them vulnerable to cost effective
measurement and all the conglomerates of a market administration.
Ironically the instrumental argument for the provision of 'intrinsic'
activities prove. a very poor weapon for the market theorist who
intuit. that poetry is superior to pushpin. For if all enterprises
are enterprise, of utility the market theorist who favours poetry must
set about the dubious empirical exercise of defending it on grounds
of utility. It is ultimately my contention that the moral conception
of democracy can marshal much stronger arguments for 'intrinsic'
activities (55), but it is probably right that I should consider here
the most serious attempt to marshal arguments within a utility calculus,
for such activities J.S. Mill considered the whole problem of the
compatibility between activities of intrinsic worth, and. a societal
ethic of utility. Mill wanted to save his principle of utility from
the attack that it cannot and does not allow for the dignity of man.
He declares that: "It is quite compatible with the principle of utility
to recognize the fact some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and
more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in
estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity,
the estimating of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity
alone." (56)
Clearly it 1. compatible with a utility principle to recognize
some kinds of pleasure as more desirable and more valuable than others,
but only on the grounds of producing greater happinessl Mill attempts
to avoid this conclusion by the introduction of the terms quantity and
quality. It leads him inexorably to the moral democratic conception
of dignity. The reason is that the notions of quantity and quality
alone, will not do the work Mill requires of them. Of course it is
plausible to argue that a short experience of one pursuit may produce
greater happiness in aggregate than a more lengthy experience of another
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pursuit, but upon analysis this merely translates to the conclusion
that the brief experience produces a greater quantity of utile
than the latter. There is no objection to the notion of quantity
here, providing only that quantity is equivalent to "produces a
greater number of utile in a shorter time." Essentially what I am
trying to say is that the principle of utility is a concept necessarily
geared to effects; it is not a property which inheres in the subject
matter itself, and by which we may distinguish one experience as more
worthwhile than another in respect of its form, structure, use of
imagery, excellence of style or whatever.
Since Mill is striving for a distinction based on the latter lines,
he has ultimately to abandon the principle of utility for another value
in the assessment of pleasures, namely that if all, or almost all,
who have had experience of both sorts of pleasures, prefer ones that
one is the more desirable. In particular, this is how quality in
pleasures is to be decided on.
"If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted
with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even
though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent
and would not resign it for any uan3?ty of the other pleasure which
their nature is capable of, we ar justified in ascribing to the preferred
enjoyment a superiority in quaiito far out—weighing quantity as
to render it, in comparison, of small account." (57)
This position appears compatible with an elitist such as
Schumpeter, since the appeal is to those who are competently acquainted
with activity. However, it is not yet apparent, though Mill
eventually intended this, that such enjoyment should be popularised.
It is in attempting to save the principle of utility that Mill
enunciates a principle of dignity which takes him beyond the maricet
conception of democracy and links him at thIs point with the moral
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conception of democracy. The latter principle arises in Mill 'a
distinction between happiness and contennent.
"It is indisputable that the being whose capacities of enjoyment
are low, has the greatest chance of having them fully satisfied;
and a highly endowed being will always feel that any happiness which
he can look for, as the world is constituted, is imperfect. Thit he
can learn to bear its imperfections, if they are at all bearable; and
they will not make him envy the being who is indeed unconscious of
the imperfections, but only because he feels not at all the good
which those imperfections qualify." (58)
Dignity it seems for Mill, is a feeling or capacity- for feeling
which men possess in proportion to their higher faculties. It is an
essential part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong such
that nothing which conflicts with it could be an object of desire to
then. It is this notion of dignity that the extreme market wing
legislates out of their model of (59) political behaviour. Mill
desparately strives to include it, but he does not save his position
very much here. If we allow his premise of dignity, it only leads
him into inconsistency, for if I have this sense of dignity, am I
thereby exempt from contributing to the general happiness? Unless
Mill can show that the greatest amount of general happiness will be
generated by following our sense of dignity, he places the being with
higher faculties in an impossible position, for to contribute to
the general happiness he can confound his sense of dignity. For the
one compelling 'ought' and 'right' which Mill will allow is
contribution to the general happiness. Yet it will be a purely
empirical matter whether the objects of the general happiness will
be in conflict with dignity or not; indeed Mill seems implicitly to
recognize that they will be. (ke low pleasure may generate a much
greater amount of happiness than several high. We do not have any
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general principle which will protect the "dignity" which Mill
apprehends. Moreover, there seems no compelling reason why a man
must necessarily prefer the higher to the lower pleasures. Mill wants
to rest his case on the recorded opinions of all who have experience
of both sorts of pleasure. The pleasure which they opt for is the
most desirable pleasure. Mill's argument here is essentially
circular. To experience both sorts of pleasures requires a
being "capable of the higher pleasures - ". (60) This being,
however, because of his capabilities, requires more to make him
happy -. Hence the lover pleasures are not able to satisfy him.
- he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower
grade of existence." (61) Thus the lover pleasures cannot provide the
enjoyment to him that they yield to the gourmet or the professional
seducer. Mill has simply stipulated that the one needs higher
pleasures. The rest of his argument merely confirms his stipulation.
Mill's argument here is persuasive in that we do intuit a
capacity for higher pleasures to some beings and that we further intuit
that some pleasures are more desirable than others. The difficulty
is that Mill wants to sell this proposition solely within the bounds
of the principle of utility and:
"irrespective of any feelings of moral obligation to prefer
it - ", (62) (i.e. the higher pleasures). He wants to root this
proposition in a feeling, "a sense of dignity". (63)
Mill is in fact trying to make a subjective impression do the
work of a moral principle. Resting as he does on the principle of
utility, Mill can only save the situation by claiming that the higher
pleasures are to be preferred, because those who have experienced both
sorts of pleasure have preferred them. This, however, will not do.
Not merely because, as argued above, the superior being has an inbuilt
preference for higher pleasures, but also because, to succeed in his
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plea, Mill has not only to show that such pleasures are desirable,
he haa also to show that they are desired, and desired to the extent
that they dll contribute more to the general happiness than the
lower pleasures. What in essence he tries to argue onto from
this position is that since such pleasures are regar&ed as preferable
by the cultivated, the dissemination of character improvement
amongst the majority will lead to a like preference, and hence a
greater amount of happiness.
I do not at thIs point want to follow Mill into the relationship
between a moral conception of democracy and his belief in the dignity
of men, though as I have suggested, that logically ii where his
aspirations lead us. (61&) Whatever the merits of Mill's attempted
defence of utility, it is worth noting that the different market
variants of democracy cannot empirically conform to is model of
the political process. Though it is true that elitists are logically
bound to concur with his preference for a cultivated minority, they
will not share his belief in the possibility of ameliorating the
majority by such a diet. A high culture position properly understood
maintains the efficacy of two—culture systems and the folly of
attempting to rear the populace on conceptions, modes of thought,
and criticism, inherently elitist. For the crude economic democrat,
ameliorating the masses is a highly questionable exercise for politics,
and one best proscribed from political practice. Where the market
democrat parts company from Mill, is in divorcing a majority of men
from involvement of a non—instrumental kind in the p.litical sphere.
It time excludes an important dimension of man recogmized by thinkers
from Aristotle to Green. If such involvement is either irrational
or inconceivable, such labelling will do much to denigrate these
projects in the minds of new generations. It will do much, too, to
debar the presentation of conflicting ideals in education, and
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different views on man and society. Long term endeavours which do
not have an immediate pay—off will be problematic. It is arguable
that for the majority the attempt to master literature, history and
the arts, will be in disrepute.
vi. Concluding remarks
That happiness should finally emerge as the overri.ing aim of
education in market democracy is entirely consistent both with the
view that education is a moral enterprise in market democracy, and
with the point that the very ambiguities in the concept ef happiness
enable it to serve all three variants within the market conception of
democracy. It may be equated with the utility of the economic
democrat pursuing private interests in a minimum state, the deluded
pluralist who believes the system is equitably processing his wants
and the employee in elitism who enmeshes with work. Market theorists
make the crucial move from happiness as a psychological principle to
happiness as a moral principle. (65)
	
it it is fallacious to argue
from the fact that everyone always and necessarily desires his own
happiness, to the conclusion that everyone ought to desire his own
happiness. In terms of the aims of education this leaves us with the
consideration that we ought all to aim at happiness, since happiness
is what we all desire. I have tried to suggest that this bequeathes
a number of problems to education, not least the thorny problem of the
relationship between pleasure and happiness. (66) For Plato some
pleasures were clearly undesirable (67), happiness was to be identified
with the exercise of man's rational nature. (68) mit the develoj]ment
of man's rational nature is, as Mill saw, the fruit of education.
Yet how on the basis of happiness as an aim of education, are we to
tackle the problem that typically a great deal of drudgery is incurred
in the developnent of man's rational nature?
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There is moreover the point that the evanescent character of
happiness, especially the sensation of feeling happy, gives rise to
formidable problems in educational policy. If for example a policy
of selection is conmiended with happiness as our ultimate principle,
then our Judgement must be detennined by considerations of future
happiness, i.e. the anticipated happiness which work enmeshment will
bring; or is our judgement determined by the happiness which actually
accrues when vocational placement has occurred? How can we be sure
that a different distribution of placements would not have secured
greater happiness? There is also the thorny problem of the
distribution of resources for education. Suppose it were possible
to measure happiness, and we were able to calculate that an increase
of resources into the creation of more sixth forms creates as much
happiness as the same increase of resources into remedial education.
How could we make a rational choice between them?
It seems that the market conception of democracy creates more
problems than it solves. The appeal to a rational nature within
individuals implicit within the moral conception of democracy was
ridiculed by market theorists. (69) Thit the incipient naturalism
of the market case not only contains conceptual difficulties, but
empirically threatens the survival of democracy. If the attack on
the moral conception was initially aimed at its metaphysical
underpinning, the disjRite has widened significantly, largely to the
disadvantage of the market theorist. Its effect on education has
been discussed in this chapter. It is now time to discover whether
the moral conception can do better.
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chapter V - Conclusion - Taking Moral Democracy Seriously
i. Introduction
The focus of this chapter is knowledge and its relationship to
the moral conception of democracy. A number of topics are discussed
including some further attention to the relationship between the moral
conception of democracy and education, the implicatioms for the
curriculum, for vocational aims and for policies on eàication within
a liberal democracy. The latter items are not exhaustive of the
possible educational implications of the moral conception of democracy.
They emclude for example implications for the Universities, the media,
and to a great extent economic institutions. I recoiize that there
may be important implications for the latter, but I am bound to be
selective to some extent in the issues I take. In a1dition, I have
so far considered the relationship between market democracy and
education, the curriculum, vocational aims, and happiness, and the
presentation of the moral democratic position on these same issues
seems apposite although they will be presented somewhat differently
within the context of this chapter.
The moral conception of democracy entails the rejection of that
species of naturalism which takes empirical constraints, such as
supposed lack of cognitive ability, and promotes them to the status of
a value judgement. Moral democratic values entail, as I have tried
to show, the education of individuals, and this provides the means to
ameliorate the empirical constraints operating within the political
system. Bat there are challenges which the moral democrat must face.
Whatever and how much knowledge is considered necessaxy for the
individual citizen to possess, the moral democrat clearly baa to show
that he can meet the problem that couceptual facility varies from one
citizen to another and that rationality is a function of conceptual
facility.
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Moral democrats acknowledge the importance of individual moral
choice; revisionists consider this chimerical for various reasons,
and have postulated a role for the individual limited to the mere
expression of preferences. The difference between the two schools of
thought is not a difference about the place of values in political
theory, for whatever the revisionists claim to the contrary, it has
been shown that their position. is unambiguously valu.ative (2) in. its
orientation. The controversy over individual moral choice is in the
place and kind of citizen function and knowledge within the political
system. Democratic elitists reserve policy initiatives to leaders,
pluralists to groups, economic democrats to those for whom there is
the probability of a net gain over a given resource input, be it time
or money. For the mass of the people under market democracy, there
is knowledge only of how to endorse leader policies (elitists), or
how to secure wants (economic democrats), or the maintenance of an
unflinching belief and commitment to the values of pluralism. For
the moral democrat, however, knowledge inheres within the critical
citizen, and is essentially moral knowledge of the worth of society
and. its direction.
ii. (a) What should the moral democrat know?
It is now necessary to try and clarify initially the status of
the various conjectures about knowledge, in the moral conception of
democracy. Are there some things that citizens logically mast know,
and others whose status is merely contingent?
(kie way into this issue is to take stock of the proposed
connection between education and the moral conception of democracy.
It is clear I think that the argument has been that the connection.
is not merely contingent. Considemation has been given to the
political implications of Kant, and the argument was that insofar as
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Kant'ø notion of morality is endemic to the moral conception of
democracy, then since the spread of rationality is, on the Kantian
ethic, a moral obligation, and since the concept of education entails
the intention to develop rationality, then a conceptual link is present
here. It was stressed that training (3) was not a sufficient condition
for the emergence of a rational chooser, its logical function being
that of a paradigm determined concept, rather than an open-ended concept,
facilitating the evaluation of the norms and institutions of society.
I shall suggest subsequently (b), however, that training has a role
to play in the emergence of the rational chooser, insofar as one may
train persons to recognize inconsistencies or covert assumptions in the
statements of politicians. As far as the concept of education is
concerned, I have argued for the logically necessary function of
intention (5), and especially that such a function is inherently
valuative, deeming some learning to be more important than others.
The latter is in turn a reflection of the norms prevalent at that time.
In addition, it was suggested that the sort of knowledge considered
to be desirable, to be prized, has implications for the form of the
political system.(6) In particular, if the knowledge-educated man
ideal, be of a highly abstruse nature, then, contingently (contingent
on the facts about the average limits of human cognition), given the
overwhelming importance of how to live, such an ideal will ensue in an
autocratic political system. 1it, correspondingly, a comparatively
low-level knowledge-educated man ideal, will support a democratic
political system. Reference was also made to the works of Rousseau
and TJ. Green. The former demonstrated the crucial moral importance
of education by showing that the citizen consents only where his will
conforms to his actions, and it is education which secures that
conjunction. For Green, education encapsulates an identity between
society and the individual; it actualizes men's potential as moral
agents. By giving reality to the capacities of will and reason,
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education is an expression of the Coimnon Good.
It is true that it has been argued elsewhere that education cannot
be one of the: " - logical conditions of a democracy, or one of the
conditions whose instantiation is entailed by the existence of a
democracy." (7) It has also been argued, - that there could be
beings, in other respects like men, except for the possession of certain
innate ideas and capacities constituting the knowledge of how to operate
a democratic system." (8)
One immediate difficulty with evaluating this objection is that it
contains no distinction between different conceptions of democracy.
I have not used democracy as an undifferentiated term, and I have argued
for education as logically necessary only in the case of the moral
conception of democracy. A concept is, as Vittgenstein pointed out,
part of a form of life. His analysis of language games has shown just how
complex a seemingly innocuous concept like game can be. The moral
conception of democracy presupposes for a full appreciation, terms
like respect for persons, integrity, justice, autonomy, dignity.
These are in their own right, terms which are essentially social; they
make sense only against a societal field, with a subtle interplay of
socio-linguistic forces. The essential point about humans is that
they do not instantly arrive at the possession of such concepts, but
acquire them over a comparatively long period of time. If there are
such creatures as has been suggested in the references quoted, it is
difficult to see 'what difference this can make to the relationship
between democracy and education since my own work is concerned with
human society and democracy as an organization of human government.
If education is one of the conditions whose instantiation is
entailed by the existence of democracy, it remains to be seen what the
citizen should know and whether the dissemination of such knowledge is
feasible on a wide scale. It is a logically necessary condition of
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democracy, that it be possible to change the government at regular
intervals (9), through the actions of a vast majority of the adult
population. It would be a negation of the democrats' own values not
to equip succeeding generations for the performances of an act that was a
logical condition of democracy. Of course, emerging generations may
prefer not to exercise th.ir rights in this matter, but this does not
alter the fact that potentially it is a decision they face as citizens
in a democracy. To fail to provide for such a decision would imply a
lack of respect for persons. It would be to fail to put a person in
a position where he understood the significance of what he was doing.
To educate for democracy in a minimal sense, is to show this
relationship between the citizens and the government of the community.
Since Rousseau, moral democracy has recognized the importance of
a participatory society. fliilosophical advances along the lines of
self—asswned obligation auger (10) for an education which prepares
individuals to grapple with their own more immediate social, political
and economic surroundings. For G.D.K. Cole, men would obtain a free
society by becoming self governing in their work. Cole argued that
it was inconsistent to admit democracy in politics and deny it in
the rest of .ife. (ii) Recent trends at least implicitly recognize
that work is an important factor in the life of the individual, and
that workplace democracy is a moral issue. (12) If we follow the
argument that a participatory work place is necessary, the issue
arises as to how to equip persons for this. I have already suggested
that (13) the concept of self—assumed obligation i. this ultimate
fruit of moral democracy, with its logical connection with education.
I say logical in that conceptions of dignity, promising and
rationality inhere in a conscious moral agent. To opt for a society
of moral agents, to opt for dignity, is to require a society in which
promising, rationality, are purposeful, expressive acts, emanating from
coherent conceptual structures in which choice is subject to a conscious
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progressive structure. At a minimum this demanda the sort of
consistency of ranking A, B, C, in order of preference, and when faced
with a choice between B and C, opting for B,
&ich consistency is not, however, a sufficient condition for a
role exceeding that of a passive recipient in the social and political
field. Individuals must ultimately, through institutional change
be given the opportunity to do more. Aristotle and Mill both
appreciated the link between experience and political expertise. (i')
People, that is, must be able to engage in an appropriate form of
political life, and must be equipped for making choices of a moral
kind; i.e. they must be equipped with knowledge of how one ought to
live, as well as knowledge for living.
I suggested earlier (15) that the former derives in part, from
reflections on intrinsic areas of knowledge. Doubtless it is
logically possible to construe such disparate subject areas as cookery
and accountancy as candidates for the intrinsic label since they
afford opportunities for the application of skill and judgement to a
fine degree. Izt this would be to, in part, make the application
of the term intrinsic contingent upon a psychological manifestation
and it is the scope for the exercise of reason, judgeinent, and skill
afforded by the discipline, rather than any psychological concomitants
to the former, which have I think rightly, attracted attention.
In addition, the concepts of cookery, accountancy-, needlework, are not
constitutive of reflection upon the norms of society or social and
political problems. It is true of course that literature and history
are not sufficient conditions for such reflection, but they have claim
on being necessary conditions which I would deny in the case of the
above activities. My point in any case was the logical one that it
was possible and legitimate t. advance an instrumental argument in favour
of the traditional "intrinsic' (16) activities having a place on the
curriculum. I now want to advance an instrumental argument from
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from moral democracy, for the inclusion of such activities on the
curriculum.
In advancing this argument I am following what I have identified
as the mainstream view on "intrinsic" (17) areas of knowledge. The
moral conception of democracy entails a view about the good society,
though the latter is always a matter of debate. The aim of education
is to equip men to take part in that debate. My contention is that
one tenable view of art, history, literature and drama is that they
present a view of the good society, inviting reflection on existing
institutions, challenging current cultural norms and preoccupations,
raising individual consciousness above the immediate and the facile.
It is important to appreciate that the latter statement is not solely
a value judgement. Clearly there is room for debate as to what
constitutes the "essence" of a particular discipline, and the way in
which it should be taught. Nonetheless there are conceptual limits
within which the debate can move. We may for example differ about
whether history should be taught in the light of the present or not,
but I think we have to agree that history involves the past. More
important, perhaps, what I have referred to as the mainstream view on
the "intrinsic" areas of knowledge seems to require that such material
is not trivial, simplistic, or facile, but that in terms of the
degree of intellectual ability to master it, it be demanding. If,
however, the moral conception of democracy entails a view on the
nature of the disciplines above, an objector will surely reply that the
market conception of democracy also will have equally valid but
different J4mplications for these same disciplines. This objection
cannot I think hold. Clearly a market democrat may wish to include
art, literature, history, drama on the curriculum for the vast majority
of papils, indeed I think there are positive reasons for him wanting
to do so. Such activities can entertain, please, amuse, occupy and
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distract.	 it I would point out that to make such functions the sole
purpose of including these disciplines on the majority curriculum is
tantamount to trivializing them in the terms of which they have been
understood in 'mAinstream ' opinion. Whatever else one may say about
them on such a curriculum, one could not argue that they were
functioning in the way- that intrinsic areas of knowledge have been
traditionally understood and characterized.
Insofar as "intrinsic " areas of knowledge, properly understood,
invite reflection on existing norms and values, challenge current
cultural preoccupations, and contemporary- images, and require the lifting
of consciousness above the inmiediate and the facile, they cohere with
the values of the moral conception of democracy. As John White
argues when writing of the moral democrat P.11. Green:
"- for Green and his followers, citizenship and knowledge for
its own sake were much more closely connected, since the good citizen
will wish his own and others consciousness to be raised as far as
possible," (18)
The presentation of alternative styles of life and the reflection
on existing past and present styles of life are of the essence of the
moral view of democracy. In this respect the citizen becomes an
agent, in that he can envisage alternatives to existing life styles
and caricatures. From the British Idealists came: "- the insight
that morality is inextricably political: the moral man is the citizen
of a political society, his education fitting him to become one." (19)
The activities of literature, history, art, and music, present
the possibility of cuimi'micating life perspectives freed from
contemporary needs and culture. To teach people merely the skills
required by the economic society of their time, is not to teach them
to be critical of the parameters and values of the society in which
they live. Indeed it is ultimately to lead to the devaluing of
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such activities, as I suggested earlier. &t the significance of
the moral conception of democracy is that its exponents, " - show
abundantly the centrality of morality as an aim, or even the aim of
education." (20) An over-arching moral aim for the emergence of
critical citizens presents the strongest instrumental argument for
the inclusion of worthwhile or intrinsic activities on the majority
curriculum. The 'universal' tragedies of Shakespeare, the Lawrentian
encounters with consciousness, and the putrification of industrialisation,
the conscience of Zola, the rasping morality of Brecht, and the
revelations of Camus, are themselves social perspectives on which moral
agents might sharpen their teeth. There is too the fact that such
disciplines have much to say about relationships amongst men, whether
they- be crudely utilitarian, or genuinely empathetic. For the moral
democrat then, such disciplines will appear on the curriculum for the
majority, not merely to entei.n or to amuse or divert attention from
social and political considerations, but to promote the values of the
moral conception of democracy. For G.D.U. Cole, democracy: "was more
that a political principle; it was a moral relationship among men.
Democracy entailed respect for each individual as a moral subject,
and sort to express each person's will and creativity in as many
activities as possible." (21) J.S. Mill also echoed this view when
he stated: " - what more or better can be said of any condition of
human affairs than that it brings human beings themselves nearer to
the best thing they can be. "(22) With such a heritage the moral
conception of democracy presents a sympathetic climate for the
fostering of the"intrinsic" disciplines. For such activities will
be devalued and besmirched to the extent that their values are not
respected in any particular subculture, and I have tried to show that
for the majority in market democracy, it is utilitarian considerations
which will be presented as appropriate values for lite.
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Mill of course attempted to support the higher pleasures on
the basis of a utility calculus, and I dismissed his argument, (23)
but I suggested that a defence might be possible under the moral
conception of democracy. Instead of being devalued by the utilitarian
ethic, the higher pleasures will be the prime vehicle for the moral aim
in society. As such they will have a greater prestige in education
in a moral democracy, where the emergence of the moral agent is a
greater priority than in market society. For the higher pleasures
have the property not merely of utility for a particular individual,
but of transforming the latter's perception of himself and society;
they contain the necessary conditions for challenge, reflection,
and criticism of a person's own values and those of society.
There is, I grant, much work to be done on the connection between
traditionally intrinsic areas of knowledge, their key concepts, and
their relationship to particular political systems. This I suspect
warrants a thesis all to itself and is one point where new work in
the philosophy of education ought to begin. Part of the task
certainly would entail some elucidation of what is meant by the
"intrinsic", but there is also the further point as to how far the
values of a particular society entail the inclusion of certain subject
areas on the curriculum. I have tried to show that such connections
can be made and to sketch them in the case of the moral conception of
democracy. Reference has been made to disciplines such as history,
literature, and art, and subsequently the place of vocational skills
on the same curriculum will be discussed. I want to give one further
example in this section of entailment between the moral conception
of democracy and curriculum material.
It is arguable that Religious Education is a candidate for
including on the curriculum because it offers a vantage point on
the choices which societies and individuals might take. It presents
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a detached perspective on one form of life with implications on matters
of social and political goals as well as relationships between
individuals. It is thus a factor which the moral democrat would not
want to exclude. Thit there is the further point that religion is a
part of the value system of moral democracy. I have discussed in
Chapter III, the importance of religious ideas in forming the democratic
organization of the independent churches. Since the moral conception
of democracy is concerned with both the values and procedures, religion
seems an important component. To fail to introduce pupils to
religion, would be to fail to introduce them to one of the guiding
principles of the moral conception of democracy. It is true of
course that it is by no means the only guiding principle, and it is
arguable that the values of Kant are at least as important in
explaining such basic tenets as equality and respect for persons.
So that when reference is made to Religious Education it has to be
interpreted as including a specific corpus of instruction in Moral
Education. Let me stress that I ant not here advocating a pure
Wilsonian trea±inent of Moral Education, aimed at turning out budding
moral lawyers. Doubtless a measure of competence in assessing
arguments for consistency and testing them for fallacies is a necessary
portion of expertise for the critical citizen, and I acknowledge this
elsewhere. Rather I am concerned here with two further necessary
connections between the moral conception of democracy and that amalgam
of subject matter consisting of New Testament, Kantian moral principles,
It would I think help to keep these points distinct.
1. I have argued consistently that the most fruitful elucidation
of the concept of democracy is one which takes account of
historical shifts and nuances in its parameters. (21i) This is
not to assume what one sets out to elucidate. It is a matter
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of opting for a particular methodology in the same way in
-which logical positivists opted for a particular methodology
in their use of the verificationist principle. To be a citizen
in moral democracy it is tautological to say that one also ought
to be conversant with the values of moral democracy. Yet these
values are to be found in the history and developnent of moral
democracy.
2. If men are to cultivate moral dispositions, the latter
logically are not created in a vacuum. That is, for a
disposition to be a moral disposition it must function in the
light of a moral code. It may be analytic to say that all
societies require moral dispositions but it is certainly
logically necessary for the moral democrat, requiring as he does
that all the members of the society- endeavour to have a view
about the political and social macrocosm. A moral code is
ready to hand for the moral democrat within the values from
which the moral conception of democracy developed. Thus, though
the moral aim should predominate in the disciplines I discussed
above, of history, literature and art, it should also be
concentrated specifically within	 Religions,4doral education
for the parpose both of ores ting some facility with moral
argument, and for developing moral dispositions.
The above arguments I think make the position of Religious
Education on the curriculum a good deal stronger than its position
in relation to the curriculum of market democracy where it may be
taught either for purposes of social control in elitism, or because
it makes men happy. In both cases its situation is provisional.
For the market democrat, if to teach something else rather than
religion is to produce greater utility, or create greater social
cement, then religion must give way.
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Moral democracy and Political Education
Political education will clearly differ between moral and market
democracy. It will turn again on what the citizen is expected to
know which in turn dependa on the role of the citizen. Both moral
and market democrats implicitly recognize that there is a problem
about what role should be given to the citizen in a democracy.
I have criticized the recommendations of market democrats in this
respect in souse detail. (25) According to Plameuatz, (26), there
is something appropriate about itizens not knowing very much outside
their private interests since their function is different from that
of leaders. The implied suggestion here is that it is not rational
for citizens to know more than leaders, a position entirely acceptable
to Schumpeter. The problem is what it is that leaders are supposed
to do that differs from what a citizen has to do. The answer will
differ according to the particular conception of democracy adopted.
As we have seen, (27), for most market theorists, leaders are
supposed to process preferences, and citizens are to present various
interests to leaders. For moral theorists, leaders are to (Kant)
further the spread of rationality, to (Green) provide 8ulflcient
legislative support to enable the individual to realize himself,
to (Miii) provide a beneficial influence on the masses. This rules
out men as mere objects of utility, it includes epistemic
rationality (28) and political participation. We may encapsulate
this in the idea of the critical citizen.
It is axiomatic to my contention throughout this essay that
judgements about the ends and purposes of life are moral judgements;
that is, they are inescapably connected with what men ought to do,
I have rejected a characterization of the human predicament which
treats such judgements as merely commensurate with satisfaction or
utility; such judgementa will of course involve purely technical
considerations, but that is another matter to be examined shortly,
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For the moment, we should not lose eight of the further moral
argument for equipping citizens with the facility for making broad
judgements about the ends and purposes of society. It was an
important plank in the moral democrat's case that there was an
objective public interest (29) which should command the attention
and respect of subjects, and which should motivate over and above
their private intere8ts. To choose for the public interest implies
an assessment of policies quite outside the immediate effects upon
oneself, and requires knowledge of the alternatives available. Policies
have an effect on people and institutions and may be compared in
their effects by those on whom they fall. 	 it the comparison - or
rather its frame of reference is a complex function. It may be
assessed from the perspective of utility, or moral worth, or both.
It is a necessary condition of the moral 'public interest' concept
that a policy can be assessed from the point of view of its moral
worth. Pirther, that in appropriate cases account may be taken not
merely of one's own utility, but the effect on others of such a policy
and a measure taken between the two. Further, that a policy can be
seen as a function of a broader moral perspective of a particular
political party.
There are a number of empirical objections which may be relevant
here:
1. Some policies are not the result of lofty moral programmes
but merely adopted for reasons of expediency.
2. Some policies are not the result of lofty moral programmes but
merely the outcome of interest—group compromise.
3. It is not possible for most citizens to appraise policies in
other than a utilitarian perspective.
. Even if (3) were erroneous, it is problematic for citizens to
be equipped for other than a utility appraisal.
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I think from an empirical point of view (1) and (2) are correct.
However, even if it were the case that empirically all policy
alternatives were the outcome of pressures from Interest Groups, as
pluralists would favour, this would not of course negate the fact that
some policies were the outcome of the application of political
principles to current problems. iit my main point is that even
though (1) and (2) are correct, the fact that some policies are
evolved in this piecemeal expedient fashion does not logically preclude
a moral assessment either of such policies themselves, or of the
broader consideration of the political parameters which pennit such
compromises. My point is though, that it is the moral democrat
who wants to insist that such an appraisal is indeed a necessary
condition of democracy. The market democrat wanted to preclude this.
For the moral democrat the political system is inextricably part of
the moral life. As such, even if it were the case that all political
enterprises by a government, were enterprises of utility, they could
at least be perceived as such, as one of several values. Dy contrast,
for a market democrat, utility is not merely one value amongst many,
but appears to have the status of an axiom. The market democrat
is thereby robbed of any standard by which be might judge the utility
calculus. For Schumpeter, it appears that political enterprises
cannot be perceived in moral terms at all, by the masses, unless he
is prepared to equate infantile behaviour with moral judgement. FOr
Dahi the norms of polyarchy are to have the status of axioms, and for
Biker utility is axiomatic. It is for this reason that under an
education in market democracy, there is no room for a rational
appraisal of political values.
In the moral conception of democracy, even if it were true that
all policy alternatives represent merely the outcome of pressures
from interest groups, as pluralists would argue, this would not
preclude the assessment of policies by a vote cast in terms of
principle. Thus supposing that two political parties put forward
a major progranme of taxation revision, the one embodying a steeply
graduating tax, the other with an almost uniform rate of change for
all earning levels. Even if it were true that the rival prograies
were solely the outcome of a judicious assessment of the wishes of
the parties' supporters, it would still be possible for a voter to
choose between the policies in terms of moral principles, such as 'the
principle of fairness. The discernment of principles from amongst
policies does in this way represent a higher level of morality than
the mere opting for one policy rather than another on the basis of
private whim or fancy. The reason is that the discovexy of the
principle requires objectifying the values. The latter exercise
requires an evaluation by citizens, and an informed public
reminiscent of the ideal supported by J.S. Mill. The notion of the
worth of evaluation, criticism, and the pursuit of principles, is
implicit in moral democracy. To maintain an intention to educate
for the latter, is not to contemplate the prospect of being
committed to pumping into a child an endless procession of inert
facts, but it is to be committed to achieving an conversance with
alternative styles of life in the shape of alternative clusters of
values.
iii.(a) Is Moral Democracy possible?
It might be objected that if the critical citizen is to be a
reality educators would be obliged to keep men in tutelage until they
were fifty, as Plato counselled, before they had marshalled enough
knowledge on which to base their judgements. There is the challenge
that it is empirically beyond the realms of the possible for one
person to be competent in several fields of knowledge. For I have
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in my coninents on market democracy, clearly rejected a
characterization of activities in the political field at least,
which treats judgements about the latter as merely comnensurate
with satisfaction or utility. diat then can be done to meet the
objector who urges that people cannot possess say knowledge of
two rival economic policies?
There are, I think, a number of points to be made in reply.
1. To possess knowledge and make choices between alternatives on
the basis of that knowledge, is not necessarily to be an accredited
expert within a given field. Thus a pupil may know about the
policies of Bismark and Napoleon III, and make a judgement as to
whether Bismark did or did not manouevre France into war in 1870
without being an accredited expert on Franco-Gerinan relations 1866-
1870. Competence would not amount to an acquaintance with primary
sources but rather an appreciation of the issues involved, an
evaluation of the record of events of that period.
2. We are it is true, accustomed to assume ignorance amongst people
on matters of economic policy, and it is arguable that the close
links between economic policy and political affairs makes an
understanding of the foruer all the more importnnt for the emergence
of the critical citizen. We cannot argue here, however, that
ignorance of economics is simply due to the esoteric subject matter.
For what is evident is that schools have in the main neglected the
teaching of economics, as indeed they have neglected the teaching of
politics. In the consultative paper on the curriculum, 1980, economics
and politics, unlike employment, are not mentioned in the aims of
school education, neither do they figure in the 'core' areas in the
structure of the curriculum. Finally, they are not mentioned in
the various suggested additions to core areas. A View of the
Curriculum in the ThU series, acknowledges that social and political
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education has not been widespread, though it suggests that:
"Schools do qaite coimuonly now offer pupils a choice from
history, geography, economics;" (30) though they achnit that:
"It is however questionable whether, in view of the way these
subjects have developed over recent years, young people will derive
enough of what they need to know and understand. from a choice of
only one of these." (31)
In the past scant attention has been paid to equipping pupils
with the relevant concepts for economics. To appreciate the
distinction between interventionist neo Keynesianism and market
monetarism does not require cognizance of The General Theory of
Thiployment Money and Interest, or Friedmanite controversies about
the direction of causality between the level of income and the
Money Supply. Both theses may be distilled to an elementary foun
analagous to the way in which the course of history may be distilled
from primary sources.
3. It might be argued that 'what is worrying about (2) is the matter
of value judgements. Is not the problem with economic policies
that we have to make value judgements between them? In the first
place this is clearly true of history as well. To opt for the
thesis that Biemark manouevred a sick, dominated, and deluded.
Bnperor into war in 1870 is itself to make a value judgement. Qhat
this objection smounts to is a market protestation that teaching
ought to be value—free. I have already tried to counter this
suggestion by pointing out that the market theorist is value—loaded
in his approach. (32) Of course the choice between Keynesian and
Monetarist policies will not be value free. It is the choice between
unrestrained enterpreneurial activity and govemmen* intervention to
mitigate against the harshest effects of the market. Thit the moral
democrat has no cause to apologize for the intrusion of values, for
the critical citizen is the outcome of moral deliberation.
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li. If it is possible to fo:rin judgements at the elementary level
of a particular discipline and apply these judgementa to political
affairs, a further objection might be put that within particular
disciplines and by implication within political affairs ther• are
some questions which are purely "technical" questions, which most
people are not competent to adjudicate on. Nov there could be
difficulties over what we mean by purely "technical" questions here.
In other words the teiit might refer either to issues in which value
judgements logically do not arise, or that whilst they do arise the
information on which such a judgement is based is by its very
complexity inaccessible to most people. As an example we might
consider the difficulty over the reliance to be placed on a particular
document in history. what are we to make of Bismark 's own accounts
of his policy—making? The judgement of professional historians
is that Bismark deliberately wrote in such a way as to reflect the
greatest diplomatic mastery to himself, and consequently primary
sources from his pen must be treated cautiously. (33) intricate
issues doubtless lead to such a consensus, but the conclusion is
one that may with feasibility percolate down to an elementary level,
issuing in the more cautious portrayal of Bismark as the master of
iropean diplomacy 1860-1885. In other words to appreciate the
conclusions of professional historians does not itself require a
professional historian.
]it what of examples where there is less of a consensus, and
where there is a direct connection with political affairs. Are
there not purely technical questions at issue between rival schools
of economic thought? Granted that we can feel the effects of rival
economic policies, say in terms of more or less government inte.v-vvittion,
and that this is a possible vantage point by which to adjudicate
between them, should we not also be concerned with the extent to
which one is more effective in controlling inflation or alleviating
1
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unemployment, for certainly politicians may choose to emphasize
those aspects. For example, it is a fundamental tenet of monetarism
that public borrowing crowds out private enterprise (3k) and
therefore the former ought to be decreased. The latter is of
course a value judgement. The first part of this example is a
highly technical issue, posing as it does serious problems of
controlling variables. For within any given period of time, where
ft might be argued that public borrowing crowded out private
borrowing, the low proportion of private borrowing may be due to a
third factor such as high stocking levels, poor expectations, even
scarcity of brash entrepreneurs.
What this points to iz the necessity for an informed public to
be aware of the iimitations of correlations, the problem of causality,
and the vexed question of controlling variables. Politicians love
statistics in that they may bask in the ignorance of the recipients
of those statistics. It is therefore that the concepts of
correlation and causality seem vital candidates for a moral democratic
public. To appreciate that X does not necessarily vary as it does
because of Y, but maybe because of an unaccounted for Z, does not
seem any more demanding, and indeed less demanding, than to appreciate
that Icing Lear is a play about integrity. The former provides in
itself a test for the limitation of popular political appeals,
The discernment of value judgements, too, seems a necessary ingredient
in Mill's informed public. The citizen must be able, far example,
to ditcern %he value judgement implicit in the claim that inflation
must be tackled before unemployment.
The existence of technical questions, in the first sense in
which I dealt with them, that is where they are devoid of any value
questions, is of some interest. If we take it that greater equality
of wealth is desirable, it is a technical question as to whether in
fact that can be achieved by a wealth tax. Ikit the latter is not
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the concern of the citizen, directly at least, the former proposition
is. To design a wealth tax so that it does in fact equalize wealth,
rather than fragment it within the same family, is a technical issue.
It is the principle of wealth equalization itself that should be
within the compass of the critical citizen. I reject any suggestion
that such topics have been tried and failed. All the evidence points
to the absence of a social and political education in British schools,
and within colleges of education. (35) It is a glaring omission.
iii.(b) The Moral Democrat and work
Much has been written concerning the necessity for citizen
enlightenment and involvement in macro—political g.als and vain..
but the issue remains of whether a similar involvement would be
possible at work. There seem to me to be at least two distinct
issues here: the one is concerned with whether existing work
institutions largely those of industrial capitalism, could be modified
sufficiently to accommodate a power structure compatible with morally
autonomous employees for whom work was one obvious and immediate
institution for rationalization and reform, and secondly, the issue
of how and whether pupils could be prepared for participation in
work institutions. I want to make it clear that I am primarily
concerned with the second question, rather than with the first.
I recognize that the first issue i. logically prior to the second and
clearly therefore a participatory model of work organisation will be
apparent in what I an saying. What 1 want to resist is a detailed
discussion of the first issue and thus I do not discuss in this essay
whether industrial capitalism is compatible 'with a participatory work
structure. It seems far more coherent, bearing in mind the general
trend of thi. essay, to consider how preparation for work differed
Within a moral democracy from that adhered to within the market
conception of democracy. It would differ primarily in endeavouring
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*0 place the worker in such a position whereby he could evaluate
both the internal aims and processes of his own work institution, for
example, which contracts might be accepted and which refused, and the
external property of work as an institution, for example, whether and
to what extent private enterprise should flourish within society, bow
acceptable modern methods of selling are, to what extent modern
motivational practices within industry are manipulative. There are
both technical and valuative questions here. To be able to discuss
which contracts should be accepted and which refused a worker needs
to be able to recognize a contractual situation, and to have a
yardstick against which to decide whether to accept or reject it.
It should be apparent from what has been said previously that the
decision may entail moral considerations, where for example it
originates from a repugnant political regime. For this the critical
citizen should be well prepared. Implicitly I am rejecting any view
of decision making which construes tlw latter as a function of
entrepreneurial flair. There is no necessary reason why the latter
should coincide either with workers long term interests or the moral
values of society. To recognize that such commercial situations as
the above have a rational basis is itself to remove a barrier to
worker participation in work. For this is to recognize that reasons
can be given for and against a decision, and that such decisions can
be discussed. It is to pave the way for a rational discussion.
Indeed we can state that without the concepts of marginal cost and
contractual liability the employee could not perceive any rational
basis for decision-making. (36) The former concepts appear to be a
logical necessity for understanding here. The latter achievement
is precisely what the moral conception of democracy seeks for men in
their work situation, viz, ensuring that they have the concepts to
perceive the nature of the situation in which they are placed.
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There will of course be other knowledge required, of an
empirical order. That is, the latter will depend on how the
work is organized for a par1nlar employee: whether he is building
cars, and how much of the car he is building. It seems to me that
such matters can be left to shop-floor instruction, rather than be
deliberately imported into the curricmlum.
Let me however apply the points about an understanding of the
work role to a further example. For though someone may agree about
the logical necessity of the understanding of marginal cost and
contract law for a private sector employee they may require to know
how one should tackle the situation of the public sector employee.
What for example must the librarian know in a participatory society,
and how does it differ from the worker in industry? It is a
contingent fact about the librarian's job that it is unlikely to
involve decisions on whether to accept or reject a contract for the
supply of goods on the basis of private cost. Thit the activities
of a library are subject to both legal and financial constraints.
They depend upon funds from public authorities and act under a
statutory duty to supply books to the public. The key to a rational
appraisal lies in an acquaintance with the legal and financial
constraints themselves, for it is they which determine the Varameters
within which the activity takes place.
A rational appraisal of an individual 'a work situation requires
then an acquaintance with those concepts which reveal the constraints
acting upon the particular enterprise. The moral conception of
democracy would therefore require that legal and financial concepts
be given a place on the curriculum of schools which at present they
simply do not have. It is no coincidence that such concepts are
only accessible through higher education, and are reserved to the
policy makers in an enterprise.
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On the broader aspect of work as 5&i institution, by contrast
with work roles, the moral conception of democracy also has something
to say. There are a host of broad issues which ought to concern
the critical citizen. Issues of the ethics of some methods of
motivation, hours of work, the balance between work and leisure,
how large a share of the economy should fall to private enterprise,
the merits or otherwise of advertising. These issues would.
complement an acquaintance with the work role and parameters of the
individual employee's situation. The objective is a rational
appraisal of work as an institution rather than a particular work
role, flow might this be achieved, and why might it be described
as complementary? Motivation would serve as an example, as part
of the repertoire needed for a rational appraisal of work. The
individual would not merely require the concept of motivation, but
also to know the social purposes and manifestations of motivation. (37)
The latter would alert the individual to the possibilities inherent
in modern motivational research of manipulating persons to produce
more by "identifying" more closely with the aims and objectives of
work. (38) It might be objected that indiv-iduals might still
prefer to be placed in the situation of crude "Taylorism" and
simply settle for higher earnings. Iit there is of course a
difference between settling for this, knowing and seeing it for what
it is, and merely responding to a work motivation without knowing
why.
The above demonstrat that moral democrats certainly would not
neglect the world of work. Thit it is of course radically different
in its educational implications from the market democrats who would
merely turn the school into a preliminary factory experiemce. }br
the moral democrat, work is an institution to be subject to rational
scrutiny. .1jos.e who advocate autonomy in one sphere of life and
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not in another are producing a recipe for cognitive dissonance and
eventual di si llusionnent.
I have tried to show that a rational scrutiny of work will
entail both the application of moral principles to work practices
and contracts, and the application of decision-making techniques
to suggested policies and problems, by employees. Both these points
I think are logically necessary conditions for a rational appraisal
of work and follow from the idea of the critical citizen. The
qustion might be posed as to how far such conditions can be realized
within liberal democracy, or how the latter might acconnnodate them.
Before indicating how that question might be answered I shall have
to say something more about the relationship between liberal
democracy and the two conceptions of democracy I have been considering.
iv. The 1iigma of Liberal Democracy
Though it is fashionable now in philosophy- to proceed from a
stipulated "initial position" (39) and establish logical relations
between the former and varioue other properties and conditions it
should have been clear from the beginning that whilst I have been
drawing inferences from various propositions, I also have been
venturing an historical connection, albeit a conceptual one, between
the moral conception of democracy and liberal democracy. (1tO)
Hence whilst I have attempted to establish the moral conception of
democracy and its implications for education, it is perfectly
consistent with my theme to relate the latter points to liberal
democracy, since I have consistently argued that liberal democracy'
is a hybrid of both market and moral democracy.
In the main, writers within the field of philosophy of education
have failed to differentiate between the market and moral conceptions
of democracy. ('ii) Nov I have characterized market democracy in
depreciating tones, pointing out its inconsistencies, its excessive
inatrumentalism and its inadequacy as a secure basis for a democratic
polity. How is it then, it will be asked, that the prescriptions
put forward as education in liberal democracy have seemed at all
credible? The reason for this is that it is the moral conception
of democracy that lends credibility and a semblance of underlying
structure to the liberal democratic hybrid. At the same time, it
is emaciated sufficiently by market considerations to cause
philosophers to cast around for some over—arching aim to justify
their position. A detailed ermination of liberal democracy would
have revealed its incoherence especially the defects Inherent in the
market democratic conception on which it partly relies.
What I am suggesting is that a good deal of progress could be
made within the philosoJiy of education by going behind the hybrid
liberal democracy and taking the implications of the two rival
conceptions of democracy. In fact what has ensued from an acceptance
of this compound is a welter of confusion. In part this failure to
spell out the underlying features within liberal democracy may be due
to the earlier preoccupations with the concept of education and. the
belief in its primacy. ktt I have tried to show that the moral
conception of democracy itself provides the underpinning so vital
for the justification of much of that concept. Liberal democracy
merely covers the competing claims of moral and market conceptions of
democracy. The result is a welter of confusion within the aims of
education. Hard line market instrumental aims emerge as the radical
solution to an intellectual concept of education which appears to
have lost its way. ( 1&2) Bat, says the objector, do not competing
aims of education merely reflect changing priorities within the social
and economic framework? In modern liberal—democracy these
differences in aims arise from changing priorities which themselves
reflect fundamental contradictions within the liberal democratic
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polity. Thilosophy of education has in the main been based on a
consensus about liberal democracy which i8 illusory. No attention
has been paid o the competing strains within the market conception
of democracy, discussed earlier. Nor has much attention been paid
to the emergent participatory theory of democracy, emanating from
Rousseau through Cole to Pateinan, and firmly within the moral
conception of democracy from both an historical and conceptual point
of view. Yet this division within democratic theory is surely
different enough in its implications for education to warrant the
attention of philosophers of education. The different implications
for the education of the majority between Schwnpeter and Pateman
could hardly be more disparate
Where philosophy of education has turned to the political
organism, it appears to have been wedded to the typology of
Aristotle. The essential features of Aristotle's typology of
political systems are those of quantity, staticism, and institutionalisat,
9ach a model is inadequate in the face of dynamic cross—currents of
power arid utility, which cannot be readily identified with any
one institution. How for example could we apply Aristotle's
classification to a highly group centred polity when endeavouring
to ascertain whether in fact it was pluralistic or whether it was
rather highly elitist? In reality odem political systems
logically do not have to confoia merely to one typology. Thtpirically,
it may be the case that the leaders of Dáhl's pluralist groups
would themselves represent an elite. Similarly, pluralism could
easily flourish within an economic democracy because citizens found
that considerable utility was to be gained by functioning as a
pressure group between elections.
essentially what both Aristotle and Montesquien pursued was
an institutional analysis of a polity, whereby for example, the
institution of monarchy can be readi]y distinguished from that of
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oligarchy. (k the wi scale, donocracy can be Identified with
rspr.seatativ. institutions, fri. 'which i*diYiéUIl choice is
inferred. Bezel philosophy of education has based itself, in part,
on an institutional reprssentativ. polity with an ton..ona peblic.
To zarkot theorists go the henours f.r first showing the ivad.quacios
of such a zodel. Tho offset .t th. 'welter of confusi.n is to
obscure Ui. value basis of liberal democracy, thereby both prohibiting
a Judgment about 'which values aigkt be preferable, and (b4biting
an aa..sent of th. conceptual basis of education wi-4 such a
polity. Though aaxkot theorists deny it, their ch..racterisations
are value laden, and to negleit alue considerations within a
deasorstic polity is t. remove its foundation stone. It vain.
c.iuciIence that serious defects 'were found in narkot d.czscy.
The preblea 'with alas such as utility and happiio.s is that they
readily lend themselves t. the superficial and the facile; that
they reinforce ccnte.porax conauzsr images at the expense of
critidon, auay.is, and solf-dete'.4atien. If the principal aim
of education becomes equipping pupils for ,ecatieia1 ends, the norns
of critician and objectivity will be jeepardised. The extreme
discomfort attendant upon any public stat.eEts in .d*cation on
macre-political values allows, intentionally or otherwise, a ath
firmer profile tsr vocational aina. Because, to other 'verde,
liberal-democracy i the unsatisfactory hybrid that it is,
declarations en social and political education are treated with extreme
cantion (for some liberals there would doubtless be grave concern
about the state having anything to say or do with political edneatien),
'whilst the iediat. .M seemingly obvious goal of s.plcyzent same.
the major rel., and if necessity net as an institution or practice
'which requires critical .z.tien, (li3)
All this leads en. to expect grverun"t ptblicstieuas in
education fairly closoly identifying with the "ne.da of industry,
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and this is in fact what happens. '1 View of the (irriculun',
declares: UTh. capacity of ysung people ii profit frc. whatever
.pportunities nay be available to the. beyond 16, viii depend heavily
on the atisiunents, interests, and attitudes they possess as a result
of the education they have experienced up to that point. Awareness
.1 this i. an inportant responsibility f.r all concerned with the
11 to i6 surriculun. (k the other band, an excessively iutrunental
view of the conpulsory period of education runs the risk of actually
reducing the papil.' opportunities at a later stage, by requiring
pre.ature assunptions about their likely futures f.r exauple in
highly specific occupational tern. - and by narrowing the educational
bass en which their potential nay be developed..0 (4i%)
t so tendentioua a declaration as the latter part of that
statenout can easily be everruled by .ceno.is nalais.. The latter
brought, - a searching leek at nany aspects of educational policy. U
(45) I)evelepeeats such as neasures 4. widen educational .pporities
and raiss standards of literacy and eracy, the review of
curricular arrangenents and the exp.rIneaia in vocational preparati.n,
- will giv, our children and young peop10 a better cbancs to realize
their potential and will equip them better to face the d,itdz of
adult lit.. This is .dncatiemally and socially good, it i. also
economically sound.. The active contribution by industry to careers
education; work experience, the goverunent .1 scheels and discussion.
about the currieu.lu. have boon successfully festered.' (4t6)
The bigaity and indeed predilection for instruneutalion in
th. above stateneats reflects an evergunaralised approach to the
aim of education in liberal democracy. Though it is acknowledged
that when discussing point. of substance about 1i it is necessary
'- to nake explicit th. values of th. society in which education
i. taking place and then state the specific content of the., values
that we funk need emphasis'; (47) yet I can find no ovid.eace of a
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comprehensive attempt t. conduct just such an operation with ref.rence
to liberal democracy. The rlt is that we have a characterizatian
of th. latter which is unrecegaisable to the major scho.ls .f tb.mght
discussed her.. In ecenemie democrat c.nl& hardly agree that:
"- bcaus. .f it. highly idiosyncratic character, and because of
the large element ef luck lurking in its objective c.nditists,
education cannot predictably promote, let alan. guarantee bappiess."(8)
Again, Dehi could set consistently endorse the point that democracy
"- requires the institutional vnd.rpiniiig of a system of
representing publie accountability, ad freedom of speech and
assembly. If these are to be mor, than a foimal facad. that can
be *nipulated by interest groups, semefMaig approaching Dewey's
passion for shared experiences, together with concern for th. o-.n
good, is also required to encourag. widespread participation in
lnLblio life." (1i9) Yet again, an elitist such as Schuapeter could
not consistently endorse th. call that for these in error, prejudiced,
and simple-minded, especially in the political reaim; "one of the 4a
of education is to mak. them less so." (50)
Finally, neither elitists nor economic democrats would end.rse
that: "Th. first priority, therefore, i* a democracy is to aim at
,hat L. Kolilberg calls a "principled morality." (51) Nor would
any market theorist agree that: "In the seci.-p.litical sphere much
is demanded .f a citizen of a democratic state. Be must have a
general knowledg, of how the political system w.rks, and be sensitive
to the social and economic conditions that it has to shape aid by
which it i. shaped. Re must be lemiliar enough with current affairs
to criticize policies constructively and to mak. up his own mind
which way to cast his vote. Ideally, toe, he should possess the
social skills necessary to participate in public affairs at least
at the local level." (52) No market theory can justify the point
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that preparation for w.rk - should not be narrow training. It
should also serv, as a way into the wnd.rstanding of principles of
nor, general application and as a focus for nor, general natt.rs of
hnnan concern. (53)
It is clear then, I +Mfr, that greater clarity between
education and danooracy con result by spelling out the different
conceptions of denscracy and the distinctive divisions within these.
At present we siaply d. not have a coherent statonent on the above
and it. inplicaticns for education; it i. long overdue.
Cncudin renarke en theses which have enered in this essay
1. It is clear that sees tran'nission of n.m. is eapirically
necessary for narket denocrata. )Iarket denocracy of whatever variant
is logically coitt.4 to certain values and tb. latter cannot be
dolinited in their effects t. political institutions. For education
is a function of political and ethical nom.; it is analytic to argue
that education consists .1 planned and desirable experiences, and these
experiences constitute the subject natter of learning. No narket
denocrat could with consistency reject the enterprise of education,
since he also espouses certain values which appear to be necessary
for the narket political seciety. Schunpeter for .r*.iple requires
leaders for denocracy and these are persona ef proven ability.
He requires an econesie substructure which presunably entail, the
inculcation of certain skills for the najority of people. 	 t be
requires tee that people shall keep out of politics, apart from
voting, and shall accept this -{4	 role. Now t. keep non out
of politics does net inp]y that they should be restricted nerely to
the engagement of skills, for it nay be that an elitist nay include
on the curriculno facilities for enaic, art, and literature norely
for their entortainoent or 'distraction' value. Resources nay
be readily available for children to acquire skills in th. playing
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of sical inatrunents but not far the devel.t ef . arpertis.
In pelitics. Pre.usably diascratic elitism requires an acquiescent
rath.r than a critical pupillage, .. that highly .utharitarisn
tr.tssion .f norns seems t. be iapli.d. D011 shares the sans
states que values as Scbnnp.ter, but he i. pr.psred t. enferos what
I. understands by democracy by a progr. of indoctrination for the
masses. 1r the economic democrat, .ducatien sb.vl4 b. conducted. in
• nanuer	 enaurate with net rIw utility sine, this is the value
crit.riiii . If education is t be publicly funded this indicates
trmiissien in suck a w as to naT4- as gains and 444 ze costs.
(s can only speculate that such a position entails that the ar4
quantifiable learning takes pica.. Ths return, since it is an
economic ens, will bays t. be a return on neasurabi. benefits such as
mars .lsctricians or plumbers.
2. The moral ala if market and moral democrats are incompatible.
Despite the protestations of market the.rists to the contrary their
theories are value-loaded. Granted that the market theorist has a
value, such as the status qua, he is coitted Ii favouring s types
of learning rather than others. For Bcusseau, Kant, and Green, the
pro sauce of a moral imperative t. educate is guaranteed by th. ethical
pr.perties Integral to their theories. (5k) isoent t. ethical
propesitissia such as a necessity ti advance the spread. ef rationality
entails the recognition ef an intention te educate. FOr market
theorists, education, like politics, is a regulative activity. (55)
1i the moral conception of den. cracy, tb. values if auten.y, rationality,
respect for persons, self realization, themseiws require that activities,
including politics, are not proscribed. In ti. .axkt model, however,
it is arguable that the citizen sf Dell's polyareby is in an inferior
position In relation t. political understanding
 -" a amber of
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S,bn9 .ter' $ polity. For the latter nay always by chance obtain
sone perspective sa politics as a result of events quit. outsid. Ui•
educational syste.. Dabl's citizen, however, will ha,, no chance
for a rational appraisal of politics as a result of a previous
Indoctrination pregi:.
3. I have suggested elsewhere that narket values f.m an insecure
and insufficient baa. for dsaocracy. An onerp'k.0 electerat. in
an olitist syste. i. fodder f.r any group which does net play the
rules if peaceful competition for vet... ha apolitical populace
can be harnessed to tb. designs .f a political ,xtxemist, imply
because they are not in a position to assess hi. vi.,. against any
other social and political .ini. It is never apparent wiry Schunpeter's
elite should keep to the 'rule, of the gone'. Dahi 'a pin.ralisa
reeks of an enforced eligarcliy. True, men nay elect their
governments, but the latter is an emaciated waicheeu, suffocated
by the demands of groups. The choice which voting offers is not
then a change of pelicy, for th. latter ii.. with the p.v.rful and
articulate group.. The absence of an objectiv, public Interest
here leaves out the issue of moral rectitude. If the government
is elected on a popular ticket in pelyarchy and meets the opposition
of sectional interests, the only way it can fulfil it. rob, is
to mobilise popular support, yet to do this would be to und.(ne
the values of p.lyarchy itself. Despite their attempt to elevate
the values ef privatization to the status of an axiem the economic
democrats on their owa utility premise, would have to acquiesce in
a super despot. No argunont is produced ti chew that utility i.
indissolubly wedded to private ends.
i . The mural conception of democracy .ffers a meaningful public
morality for all men. The public morality of the market i.
restricted in Sclmmpeter t. leaders, in Dahi to group leaders, and
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in the economic demo crate it is subenned under privatination.
There is no logical reason for equating a shared public morality
with tetalitaxianien. Kant arguably offers a sopMsticated public
morality based in univer.alizability, yet Kant i. relatively
conservative in relation to g.venaa.nt activity. That this public
morality most be a part of education in the moral conception of
democracy is net merely a contingent matter. It is necessarily
a part of it insofar as education is an intentional activity.
t there is more to it than this. Public morality i. not merely
intei-personal in a logical wq, in the sense that we caet talk
of a public morality without referring t. relationships and
understandings between people. It is also inter-personal in that
in the moral conception of democracy the public is meant t. be
involved in judgements about the distribution .f benefits and
burdens, power and influence, choic, and enj.ymezt. For the public
to share in this morality, in this senses is also for tb.. to share
in government itself.
If we enquire why it is that for the .a'4ret theorist, men mq
net share in this morality, the reasons appear weak. They cannot
for Sehuapeter, because they cannot be relied upon to act
responsibly withi* that morality. it simply because men ar, deemed
to be politically inept, is net a sufficient reason for asking the
value judgment that they ought to so re*ia. For bl they cannot
meaningfully share in that morality, because they cannot be relied
upon to accept it, hence it at be made second nator. to then.
t this is to suppeso that the morality of pelyarchy is self-
.vidit]y right, and beyond question. Per the revisionists a
public morality is to be privatised int, utility r1ization.
let why are we t. endorse utility; apparently because it satisfies
)forel democracies offer a share to man in the public morality.
Por talk about autency, rationality, seif-zeali nation, is about men
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exercising choices, not nerely in relation to their .im privat.
vents, but in relation t. the benefits end burden. in society, in
relation to policies and institutions. Thit for non to perceive
public choices as such, itself requires a social, noral and political
education. This is a logical point in that public choices require
appropriate concepts on the part of choosers.
5. The thesis I have proposed is stronger than the now fashionable
now. of aching various stipulative conditions around sono initial
position and subsequently drawing out various inplications. I have
not siuply t.k'u a conception of danocracy and discussed it.
educational entailaent. Th. reason that it is stronger is that
enpirically the denocratic political syst in the U.K. contains
olesenta of both narket and noral conceptions of deaocracy.
The abov. mnplies not aerely the presence of eanpoting ala.
in education, but also that the eisa reflecting the noral conception
of dasocracy nay at aay tine Lu a liberal denocracy be pushed out.
Though there are noral alas adhering to the aarket conception of
deaseracy those do not require the provision of a social and
political education. Especially insofar as liberal de.ocracy
incorporates the aoral conception of denocracy it cannot, logically,
ignore the cultivation of noral dispositions.
It is uaoloss for liberal danocrats to clam that they value
the foinal principles .2 equality, such as toleration, freedo. of
sp.ech, and yet to fail to provide for then in the aInda of
successive generations. Moral denocratic conceptions cannot rospor
solely under a utility calculus. If a s.ciotal c-ent is required,
and narket theorists +1'4nfr it is, the way forward is through the
cultivation of appropriate noral dispositiena, especially
universalizing one's identity. when ho ref.zi1atod the Social
Contract as an Ides of Benson, Kant (56) broke with ocononis
individnalten, yet be folated a tonchatono for Judging present
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legislation. There is no necessary requirenent for th. grandiose
centralized organs of Rousseau in order to secure a perceptible
public interest. For non to conceive .f thouaelve. as an.bers .f
the public doe. not require than t. be a centralized piblic.
t it doe. require scae kind of 'relational' dinension to one
another, en affective aspect, ihich nay be local rather than national.
It is inpertaut in this 'affective' aspect that u.n 6 not feel
cheated by group. and. rationally s.lf-i*t.rested individuals.
A public interest u.rality would be the stai*rd by which they
adjudicated their desires, the tziuuph of an int.r..t would be an
iMicatien of its a.ral worth,
6. 1iat this suggests is a conceru with noral education in aacr.
tome rather than the highly indivi!n.14st ethos of character
tra4Ing. It is true of course that tb. forner night well include
train4ng, but this usuld be related t. assessing the argunents of
politician.; to recognizing inconsistencies and fallacies. I
hay. already stressed the inportance of .cono.ical]y end
politically literate public, but it is vital such people be
rehearsed in how policy proposals ar. presented for edification,
and the Units .f sack statanonts. 	 iilst I have suggested that
the critical citizon nay be the product of divers, curricula content,
it soon. necessary that his values end concepts should be sharpened
into a political prong by the n.e of specific political training
sessions aenticued above. Th. notion of the critical eitizen
is vacuous if such citizens cannot apply thensolves to political
and social questions. It nay be a necessary condition of restoring
a greater degree of asral politics in liberal de.ecracy, for future
ci ti sans to be aware that rational argonont dec. net alys via the
day in politics. (ut. step to iaproviag tb. p.rfo".ee of politics
ii t. know bow it works already. Sen. degree of political trLiiug
then scene a necessary condition of effective political participation,
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and pay post conveniently be tanit as a distinct discipline.
Thit I aust r.affira that ibis is to be conducted in conjunction with
ether eurriculna areas frea which the values if th. critical citizen
derive. Thus in r.c.iendiag a political training I not f.11.wing
the asitet the.rist in producing a selfuintorested lobbyist 'who is
intent en gaining p*r4 advantage froa the syst.a. The idea .1
a political training is to asks effective on the political stag.
the values I have discussed earlier, it is net a substitute for
these values.
It should be apparent frea this concluding chapter, that the
values derive not frcs one specific discipline, or set of lessons,
t fros th. several facets of the curriculun. In this respect the
establisJeit if the critieal citizen is inseparable frsa the processes
of education in general.
8. ( the basis of the relationships draau between the aoral
conception .f deaocracy and education certain changes ,.ld be
required in schools, and in teacher education. The latter changes
+.blnk can be inferred en the basis .f 'what is said about the joiner.
(a) Politics ist be taught in schools and not aerely en a
descriptive 'social studies' basis of disparate newspaper articles
glued into a scrapbook or truncated hm1r of outdated textbooks
on central g.vsrnaent. I insisted that what was required by th.
end if schooling was a facility 'with political argosent. It auy
be that resource. *st, as I suggested, give ground fren the generous
support ef ausiciauabip to political training and education•
(b) Traditios1iy schools have bad little if anything i.e do 'with
the teaching if f1*nce and legal studies. A fundaaental chang. on
the aurriculnu would be nece.saiy to acc.odat. these subjects, but
the effect could be asdified by legislative prevision for eaployees
to continue their studies en day release courses 'where such studies
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urould be complementary to any craft or technical training. This
provision should also apply to those persons in (a) who wer, net
able t. achieve facility with political argument by school leaving
age.
(c) aat has been said in the thesis mast also I fJb affect the
aatt.r of sel•ctiou in scho.ls Under (b) abeve a large section
of the polatiem would have access to t. disciplines traditionally
the preserve of those in higher education. 	 il.t it night be
argued that such studies would net enable then ii dispense 'with
qualified lawyers and accountant., it is also true that *nagers
themselves, in industrial capitali, completing final institute
ex* lnaticns, are not able also to dispens. with these professional
persons.	 it whilst trained R*agers have been acquainted with these
disciplines, employees would not be as well. In the pursuit of these
disciplines in schools end en day release there would be as a result
a greater ceenonality in the curriculum of secondary scho.ls and to
that extent the case for selection would be harder to make out.
It is true to. that th. post-school functions of pupils as citizens
and in work roles would be badly similar, thus again making the case
for selection harder to make out.
(d) Ther. would in addition to Religious Education be sral
Education and Ethics. Ideally links should be forged between teachers
if these subjects and teachers ef politics since in the moral
conception of democracy judgements about society and it. institutions
are inescapably moral. This miggestion may seen bland, in fact I
suspect it would be mameut.ua owing both to the general absence ef
political education in sehsol.s and to the traditional isolation •f
BJ.
(e) ( the vi., put forward here of the moral conception of democracy
it foilowe that .vexy teacher is In scsi. sense contributing to the
end product of the democratic citizen. This does not however entail
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finà4iig en .utlaw or an aristocrat in every novel. It does entail
that teachers have a perception of their role as one of producing
future citizens. Arguably their training has not a. far helped
then to develop such a perception.
(f) It nay b. that the pr.sont	 strative arrangements for the
control of education at local authority level nay laped. rather than
'11'5"Ce th. above changes. Sen. local authorities and gsve1n(g
bodies nay not be in sympathy with the above suggestions. Though
less than perfect th. above arrangement. may be helpful in resisting
the simplistic efforts of the teacher in (.) above seeking to wholly
politicize every item of learning, and the irresistible stockbroker
belt P.T.A., insisting their children be told thai privat, enterprise
is best.
9. Additionally 1 think it is clear that there are question marks
over some liberal democratic institutions, as a resultof the points
made here. 'What the questions cone doina to is whether the institutions
of liberal democracy are rationally defensible structures. Economic
and political convenience is not tb. equivalent of the latter, and
it may be that a politically li+.erat. mass will d'mend extensive
modifications in respect for erempi. ef the ownership of work
institutions or the anege.ent if policy making in goveent. The
Leveller. criticized those grandiloquent institutions the Lords end
th• Courts and eventually obtained referm. It rea1n to be seen
whether critical citizens will b. as successful in relation to those
modern sacred cows, the norma of 5ecrecy and the capitalist econo.
Neither of the latter tv. appears ti be remotely connected with
conditions necessary for a democratic state. If however, liberal
democracy is merely a bybrid on market and moral democracy, then the
critical citizen appear, to that extent ti have a prior clain both
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logically and historically ever the two features obey. of secrecy
and th. capitalist econo. It follows from this thesis that the
extent to 'which existing institutions are compatible with a democratic
citizenry .at re.ai* an open question.
1iat.ver skills a particular i,o* role may or mq not require,
moral democracy requires employees 'with a moral reference point,
a factor 'which cannot logically be subsumed under platitudes about
happiness •r the need. of industry. Ideally schools should be
distanced from such pressures as the latter, lest they work to
prevent an objectiv, appraisal of industrial capitalism. A moral
conception •f democracy would not necessarily work against the
adoption and acceptance of hierarchy within post-school institutions,
if that practice could be rationally defended.	 iat it would do
would be to t such structures on the defensive instead .f
presenting their various social contrivances as natural to men.
The latter would be a definite step forward.
I have suggested that en analysis of liberal democracy reveals
that it contains two rival constellations of values 'which I have
terned the moral and market conceptions of democracy. These two
conceptions have been .ined and found to contain diverse
conclusions on the matter of involving population. in the management
of government policies. The in.titational prevision for the clang.
of a government en a regular basis 'which appeared to be seemon to
the different schools of thought, covered sharp differences in
relation t. the extent fe 'ich prevision 'was mad. for the electorate
to have any control over policy. Within the market conception of
democracy alono, differences over the role of government between
elitists and economic democrat. axe considerable.
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The concept of liberal democracy is wi obstacle to the
realimation of the vast differences within societies subscribing to
statutory cbimges of govezument. (ie consequence of clinging to
this model is the failure to perceive that th. market wing contains
values 'which do not offer fire support to son. .f tb. practices
championed by this 'wing, be it peaceful competition by elites or
regular elections. Yet such models are acceptable precisely because
they do cbempion these political practices. logically the latter
along with civic guarantees such as the separation of powers and
the right to be heard, survive because of the values i ent in the
moral conception of democracy.
Without an explicit statement and acowl.dgenent of the moral
conception of democracy what I have deemed acceptable political
practices, have only vague notions of the sanctity of the individual
left to Justify and defend thee. (ly by abando4g the liberal
democratic hybrid as such and dissecting it into its parts can its
ultimate dependenc. upon the moral tradition, became apparent.
As long as the liberal democratic hybrid is employed in education
then logically it i. only possible to talk vaguely and in a somewhat
contradictory fashion about th. aims of education. Thus proposals
to improve economic perfozeanco by th. production and supply of
suitably trained labour are mitigated by talk of t life chances of
the individual, and the responsibilities of citis . ship. Of course
one can still proceed in a Eawisian *mer and stipulate n different
conditions about a polity, proceeding from ther. to conclusion.
about the &4. of education and th. content of tb. curriculum.
Thit this is essentially a different game. what I saying about
liberal democracy is that to g. behind it is actually to arrive
at n different conditions from which conclusion.. about education may
be drain. My im view is that the latter procedur. is ch stronger
in its appeal for educators than the alternative stipulativ. exercise.
270
That this should be so arises fron the essential su.bordinaticn
of education to a particular polity, sketched in th. first chapter.
It eana that paradoxically educators can point to properties .f a
particular polity to argue the case for activities and practices
'which aq be given less than full support by goversents, business
aen, and a1.{n{strators. To arrive at the a.ral and aaxket
conceptions if de.ocracy is to be abl, to trace in far aore concrete
teros the alas and laplicaticns for education than is at present
possible with the concept of liberal deaocracy. It is also to
appreciate that the aoral sia aust be predo4"ant.
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